American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Susan Franck

May 16, 2011

The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential
Variations in Arbitration Awards
Susan D. Franck, American University Washington College of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/susan-franck/58/

The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential
Variations in Arbitration Awards
SUSAN

D. FRANCK*

The legitimacy of the World Bank's dispute resolution body the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) - is a matter of heated debate. Some states
have alleged that ICSID is biased, withdrawn from the ICSID
Convention, and advocated creating alternative arbitration
systems. Using pre-2007 archival data of the population of thenknown arbitration awards, this Article quantitatively assesses
whether ICSID arbitration awards were substantially diferent
from arbitrationawards rendered in other forums. The Article
examines variation in the amounts claimed and outcomes
reached to evaluate indicators of bias. The results indicated that
there was no reliable statistical relationship between ICSID
arbitrationsand either amounts claimed or ultimate outcomes.
The results generally did not show a statistical diference when
controllingfor (1) the presence of an Energy dispute, (2) the
presence of a Latin American respondent, or (3) the respondent's
Development Status. Nevertheless, although outcomes were not
statisticallydifferent for Latin American and non-Latin American
respondents, amounts claimed against Latin American states
were higher - but only for non-ICSID arbitration. While the
arguably higher initial arbitration risk may contribute to
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concerns relatedto perception of bias, the results provide initial
evidence that those criticisms may have been misattributed to
ICSID. Results suggested, on the whole, that ICSID arbitration
awards were not statistically different from other arbitral
processes, which is preliminary evidence that ICSID arbitration
was not necessarily biased or that investment arbitration
operated in reasonably equivalent ways across forums. Caution
about this finding is appropriategiven the size of the pre-2007
population and as one analysis suggested that for the subset
comprised only of ICSID Convention awards as compared to all
other awards (including ICSID Additional Facility awards),
awards against Low Income respondents were statistically
higher than awards against High Income respondents.
Qualitative commonalities in that small subset of awards
revealed the presence of certain types of law firms (or the lack
thereoj) or recent civil war in African states. In light of the initial
quantitative findings for a pre-2007 population of arbitration
awards, but recognizing the needfor replication and methods to
facilitate qualitative and normative assessments of ICSID, this
Article concludes by suggesting that there may be value in
implementing tailored reforms and structural safeguards to
address arguable concerns of bias, improve the management of
international economic conflict, and minimize a potential
backlash to the internationalinvestment system.
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INTRODUCTION

International

institutions, such

as the World Bank and its

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),

are critical actors in the international economic order. ICSID tribunals
have addressed the fallout of major international economic disruptions,
such as the 2002 Argentine financial crisis' and the Yukos oil
bankruptcy, which may create over US$100 billion in liability for the
Russian Federation.2 With global supply chains,3 massive investment
1. Luke Eric Peterson, Round-Up: Where Things Stand with Argentina and Its Many
Investment Treaty Arbitrations, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., Dec. 17, 2008, item 5, para. 1,
http://www.iareporter.com/Archive/LAR-1 2-1 7-08.pdf.
2. Chris Johnson, Over aBarrel, 201 LEGAL Bus. 24, 24-25, Feb. 2010; Michael Peel & Jane
Croft. Arbitration: Case Closed, FIN. TIMES, (Apr. 15, 2010, 7:00 PM GMT),
http://tinyurl.com/6jxa3l7; see also Matteo M. Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian
Oil: The Yukos Case Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 115 (2006).
Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 281, 305 (2009)
3. See generally Anupar
(describing the "legal infrastructure" that supports international commerce and the global
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flows, 4 and a network of over 2600 treaties 5 - many of which contain
ex ante agreements channeling disputes towards ICSID arbitration 6
there is a possibility that ICSID-administered international arbitration
tribunals could resolve investment disputes related to the global
financial crisis. 7
With ICSID's growing importance to the international political
economy, a debate has erupted about whether ICSID is an appropriate
and fair forum for resolving investment treaty disputes. Some critics
attack ICSID's institutional legitimacy and suggest that ICSID is biased,
while others decry such accusations as unfounded. These criticisms
have gone so far as to say that "the system is rigged," and "ICSID
represents the inequities of an international system biased against the
developing countries." 8 One head of state has expressed that he has "no
confidence" in ICSID, 9 and a recent document suggested that
investment arbitration is not a "fair, independent, and balanced method
for the resolution of investment disputes and therefore should not be
-

relied on . . . ."'o The vibrant debate encapsulates two core issues: (1)

Whether ICSID is a biased venue for the resolution of international
production of goods); Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of
Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 730-41 (2009)

(discussing the global supply chain, particularly with respect to China); Michael P. Vandenbergh,
The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role ofPrivate Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L.

REv. 913, 916-17, 926-41 (2007) (discussing the creation of private environmental obligations in
contracts within the global supply chain).
4. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Assessing the Impact of the Current
Doc.
UNCTAD
Crisis on
Global FDI Flows,
Financial and Economic

UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/3 (Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact]
(discussing foreign investment flows).
5. UNCTAD, 11A MonitorNo. 3 (2009): Recent Developments in InternationalInvestment

Agreements (2008-June2009), at 2, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (June 3,
2009) [hereinafter IIA Monitor No. 3 (2009)].
6. Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, DelegatingDifferences: BilateralInvestment Treaties and
Bargainingover Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT'L STUD. Q. 1 (2010) (analyzing different

dispute resolution delegations in investment treaties).
7. Luke Eric Peterson, Whither the New FinancialCrisis Claims?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb.

5, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/41gbner ("[I]t is entirely possible that the cataclysmic events of the
[global financial crisis] - including the sometimes haphazard crisis-management by
governments - might give rise to treaty-claims against states."); see also Michael Davison,
Letter to the Editor, Downturn Could Boost Arbitration, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at 10 ("Far
from sounding the death knell of arbitration, the economic downturn may well prove to be its
coming of age."). At the height of the financial downturn, the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law sponsored an "open roundtable" on the global financial crisis' impact on
investment arbitration. Open Roundtable of the Investment Treaty Forum 'Global Financial
Crisis: Implications for Investment Arbitration,' BRIT. INST. INT'L & CoMP. L.,
http://tinyurl.com/4qth3ne (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).

8. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying note 89.
10. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, Aug. 3 1,

2010, T 8, http://tinyurl.com/37b2ktl [hereinafter Public Statement].

2011]

THE ICSID EFFECT?

829

investment disputes, and (2) Given that assessment, what are the
implications for the future of international economic dispute resolution.
This Article will address both issues by offering a quantitative empirical
lens to evaluate the currently available data and consider the normative
implications for the future.
Part I will provide a background on investment treaty arbitration. Part
II will explore ICSID's unique role in the resolution of investment
treaty disputes and the debate as to its legitimacy. Part III will then
provide the methodology designed to begin consideration of whether
ICSID arbitration awards exhibited substantial differences on key
aspects of the adjudicative process. Later in this Part, the research
hypotheses and results will be presented. Overall, based upon the data,
variables, and models, the initial results of the research did not provide
evidence to support the proposition that ICSID arbitration awards were
substantially different from other arbitral forums. As a general matter,
the tests did not demonstrate that ICSID and non-ICSID awards were
statistically different and offered initial evidence that awards could be
functionally equivalent in amounts claimed and ultimate outcomes.
Further analyses revealed similar results when controlling for the
presence of an Energy dispute, Latin American respondent, and
respondent's Development Status (whether defined as membership in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
or the World Bank's development classification)."
First, irrespective of whether the dispute involved an Energy or a
non-Energy sector dispute, there was no statistically significant
difference among amounts claimed and outcomes in either ICSID or
non-ICSID arbitrations. Second, despite concerns of a potential bias
against Latin American respondents, there was no statistically
significant difference in outcomes, regardless of whether the dispute
was resolved at ICSID or some other variable. The existence of a
statistically higher amount claimed against Latin American respondents
in non-ICSID venues in a small subset of awards, however, might
contribute to perceived concerns about bias that may be misattributed to
ICSID. Third, there were generally no statistically significant
relationships between the existence of ICSID arbitration and the
respondent's Development Status upon the dependent variables of
amounts claimed or dispute outcome.
Interestingly, in models that failed to reveal a statistically significant
effect at the macro level, follow-up analyses comparing individual cell
means revealed two effects. One effect did not offer preliminary
11. These terms are defined infra note 170 (Energy dispute), note 185 (Latin American
respondent), and note 130 (Development Status).
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evidence suggestive of bias against the developing world, but the
second effect arguably might. Regarding the former, for non-ICSID
arbitrations only, there was a reliable relationship whereby the amounts
claimed against OECD members were larger than amounts claimed
against non-OECD respondents; there were no such differences in
amounts claimed for ICSID arbitrations. To the extent that there was a
difference in non-ICSID arbitrations, it worked in favor of non-OECD
states, and there were no statistically significant differences in outcome.
As regards the latter, while there was no reliable difference in amounts
claimed as a function of a respondent's World Bank classification in an
ICSID arbitration, comparison of a small subset of cell means reflected
a difference in outcome. When comparing ICSID Convention awards
alone' 2 against all awards rendered under the New York Convention
(including non-ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility awards), Low
Income Respondents experienced a higher mean amount awarded than
their High Income counterparts for ICSID Convention arbitrations and
experienced larger awards rendered against them in ICSID Convention
cases than those cases arising under the New York Convention. A closer
look at the small number of awards contributing to those results
demonstrated that High Income respondents were generally represented
by sophisticated multinational law firms and that Low Income
respondents were all central African states against whom investment
disputes arose after civil wars in the 1990s. Recognizing the preliminary
nature of the results for inferential purposes, the data from the pre-2007
population suggested that concerns of bias were not necessarily
attributable to Latin American states, but there was some initial
evidence of a closer link to African respondents. These results,
however, were not replicated in models that analyzed all ICSID awards
(that is, ICSID Convention and ICSID Additional Facility awards) and
compared them to awards rendered in alternative venues. While the
failure to replicate these results with other models suggests that these
initial findings about the pre-2007 population of awards must be treated
cautiously and replicated with additional data, they nevertheless suggest
that, to the extent that there was a specific issue with Low Income
12. ICSID has jurisdiction to arbitrate claims (1) arising under and pursuant to the ICSID
Convention and (2) arising under the New York Convention pursuant to the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules. See infra notes 38, 40-41, 47, 59-60 and accompanying text. This Article will use
this doctrinal distinction to compare ICSID and non-ICSID cases in two different ways. See infra
notes 123-24 and accompanying text (describing how the variable of "ICSID Status" was
defined). The majority of the analyses in the primary text will consider ICSID Status as a function
of awards administered at ICSID (whether under the ICSID or New York Conventions). The
analyses comparing ICSID Convention awards to all other awards (i.e., New York Convention
awards, whether rendered at ICSID or elsewhere) are typically described in the footnotes. See
infra Part III.

831

THE ICSID EFFECT?

2011]

countries in post-conflict situations in Africa, this could warrant
targeted reforms.
Taking into account the inevitable limitations of the data, measures,
and models, the analyses suggested that, as a general matter, investment
treaty arbitration operated in reasonably equivalent ways across arbitral
forums. The results suggested that it was not possible to ascertain
evidence of bias at ICSID in the pre-2007 population of investment
treaty awards. Certain results suggested that allegations of bias related
to amounts claimed may create a basis for concern, but would be
improperly attributed to ICSID in the pre-2007 population. Respecting
the limitations of empirical scholarship and care needed to extrapolate
the findings beyond the dataset studied - but presuming that systematic
data analysis is preferable to making normative choices on the basis of
potentially unrepresentative experiences, instinct, or random chance inferences from these general results offer initial evidence that weakens
the proposition that wholesale abandonment of ICSID arbitration is
necessary.
Part IV will describe the limitations of the research, given the unit of
analysis,13 the temporal nature of the data,14 and the size of the
dataset - which was the entirety of a then-known population that has
since experienced growth.' 5 In light of those limitations, the resulting
13. The unit of analysis was publicly available arbitration awards. Annulment committees
were not analyzed. See infra notes 92, 133. There has been such a renewed interest in the
annulment process at ICSID that there was a panel on the subject at the American Society of
International Law's 105th Annual Meeting in March 2011. Program of ASIL 105th Annual
Meeting:

Harmony

&

Dissonance

in

International Law,

AM.

SOC'Y

INT'L

L.,

http://www.asil.org/aml 1/program-details.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). Future research might
explore post-award elements like annulment to provide a more holistic assessment of ICSID.
14. Although the data originate before 2007, there is recent independent research replicating
key findings from the dataset used in this Article. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 769, 805-38 (2011) (providing data on

costs in investment arbitration using the dataset from this Article); David Smith, Note, Shifting
Sands: Cost-and-FeeAllocation in InternationalInvestment Arbitration, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 751,

752-54 (2011) (replicating aspects of Franck's findings on cost with independently gathered,
coded, and analyzed data from the years after 2007). Other research, using different methods and
data, has replicated other key elements of research based upon this dataset. See infra note 128 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the author is in the process of expanding the dataset to continue
assessment of the historical baselines identified in this research.
15. The dataset encapsulated the entire then-known population of publicly available
investment treaty awards as of June 1, 2006. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims
About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (2007). Statistical inferences are
not technically necessary to make conclusions about the pre-2007 population. Making inferences
about the current population is appropriate, provided that limitations are expressed. See GARY
KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 6
(1994) ("[N]othing in our set of rules implies that we must .. . collect all relevant data before we
can make valid social scientific inferences. An important topic is worth studying even if very
little information is available. The result of applying any research design in this situation will be
relatively uncertain conclusions, but so long as we honestly report our uncertainty, this kind of
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low statistical power of some models and the need for further research
to assess the ongoing validity of this initial historical snapshot, Part V
will then analyze the results and suggest that for the dataset studied, the
evidence contradicts the theory that ICSID tribunals rendered arbitral
awards that were meaningfully different and arguably biased. Given the
pockets of potential concern and the sensitivity of international
investment, ICSID should consider the value in identifying areas for
targeted, incremental reform based upon data and normative aspirations
for fairness and efficiency. Reforms might reasonably include a
requirement for investors to particularize amounts claimed with an
evidentiary foundation or some other pleading rule to promote realistic
claims. To support the rule of law, ICSID and other organizations might
consider providing technical assistance or other capacity-building
efforts to redress effects arguably linked to the availability of quality
counsel and gaps in infrastructure. This might, for example, take the
form of structured training courses or the development of a legal
assistance center. Finally, ICSID and other organizations could promote
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)16 to ensure that arbitration is
used effectively in appropriate cases. Such proactive measures would be
advantageous in promoting ICSID as a key institution for the resolution
of investment treaty disputes and would provide another venue for
access to justice. The introduction of targeted structural safeguards will
offer opportunities for incremental reform that may prevent the
destabilization of the international investment and arbitration system. If
ICSID is to retain its institutional integrity and aid Bretton Woods' 7
study can be very useful. Limited information is often a necessary feature of social inquiry.").
Even with a relatively small dataset, this Article identifies a statistically significant main effect.
While post hoc power analyses identify the strength of the sample and identify low power, the
lack of large effects may suggest that possible hidden effects may be of less importance. In any
event, systematic social science research, which offers a probabilistic approach to assessing
reality, is normatively preferable to chance alone, unrepresentative experience, or unfounded
intuition. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND

ECONOMIC FORECASTS, at xiv-xv (4th ed. 1998) ("[Elven an intuitive forecaster constructs some
type of model, perhaps without being aware of doing so. . . . [T]here are several advantages to
working with models explicitly. Model building forces the individual to think clearly about, and
account for, all of the important interrelationships involved in a problem. The reliance on
intuition can be dangerous at times because of the possibility that important relationships will be
ignored or improperly used.").
16. This Article defines "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR) as processes other than
exclusive adjudicative, rules-based dispute resolution through arbitration. ADR might involve
interest-based dispute resolution like mediation, a combination of adjudicative or interest-based
modalities, or conflict management systems to prevent the crystallization of formal disputes.
17. The "Bretton Woods system" generally refers to the international monetary regime
established to create the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While the 1944
Bretton Woods conference focused upon the need to recognize the rights of foreign investors and
to move beyond diplomatic protection for foreign investment, it took two decades to establish
ICSID to address these concerns. SAM LUTERELL, BlAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL
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objectives of providing dispute resolution that aids - rather than
disrupts - international investment flows intended to eliminate
poverty,1 8 it must prove worthy of trust and provide effective and
independent dispute resolution services. While further research that
considers other units of analysis (including annulments) or uses
additional data and refined models is necessary, the Article will
conclude that ICSID should target reforms to address highlighted areas
of potential concern so as to better provide dispute resolution that
fosters fairness, efficiency, and institutional integrity.

I.

FOUNDATIONS OF INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

Investment treaty arbitration (ITA) is a unique creature of
international law. When public international law rights are at stake,
private individuals affected by host state action generally petition their
home states to act on their behalf. States, not private actors, typically
pursue international economic law rights,' whether through diplomacy,
espousal of international law rights before the International Court of
Justice,20 or in pursuit of international trade law rights pursuant to the
World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding. 21
ITA was largely an effort to both judicialize22 and depoliticize23 the
process of resolving international investment disputes, namely problems
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 215-16 (2009); EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE
WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 11-13, 336-41 (1973).
18. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD
BANK GUIDELINES 97 n.68 (1993) ("The World Bank sponsored the establishment of ICSID in
the belief that the availability of a dispute settlement machinery of this kind could help to
promote increased flows of international investment."); Scott A. Hipsher, Creating Market Size:
Regional Strategies for Use in the Least Developed Areas of the World, in INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO REDUCING GLOBAL POVERTY 153, 154-57 (James A.F. Stoner & Charles
Wankel eds., 2007) (exploring links between international investment and poverty reduction).
19. See Atsuko Okubo, Environmental Labeling Programs and the GATT/WTO Regime, 11

GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 599, 630-31 (1999) (gathering authorities to suggest that private
action "will fall outside the scope of the GATT/WTO regimes"); Michael P. Vandenbergh,
Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 905, 942-43 (2008) (suggesting that
WTO litigation risk increases when government-mandated schemes are involved). But see
Santiago M. Villalpando, Attribution of Conduct to the State: How the Rules of State
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.

383, 408-09 (2002) ("[In some cases, the conduct of a 'private party' could be directly attributed
to the State, thereby entailing the latter's responsibility under the WTO agreements.").
20. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 8
U.N.T.S. 993 ("Only statels] may be parties in cases before the [International] Court [of
Justice]."); see also JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 132-69 (1999) (describing the nature and scope of ICJ jurisdiction).

21. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
22. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385,
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that private investors experience when state measures arguably damage
the foreign investment.2 Providing private investors with a direct route
to neutral dispute resolution would then presumably lower commercial
risk, facilitate confidence in the international investment system, and
state-to-state
encumbering
sensitivities
avoid the political
adjudication. ITA has the purported benefit of avoiding arguable bias
by national courts, which render decisions against co-equal branches of
their own national governments.26 ITA also has the virtue of preventing
blanket claims of immunity from suit - whether by virtue of sovereign

immunity or political question doctrines - that might otherwise prevent
investors from bringing their claims in national courts.27 In retrospect,
the goal of depoliticization is perhaps ironic. Despite desires to offer a
neutral, legitimate forum where states can consent to resolve disputes
389 (2000); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-StateArbitration:Proportionality'sNew Frontier,4 LAW
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 57-61 (2010); see also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of
Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
23. Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
InternationalRule of Law Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 196 (2001); Susan
D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J.
435, 437-38 (2009); Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the "Have-Nots" in International
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 356-57 (2007).
24. Brower & Steven, supra note 23, at 196; Franck, supra note 23, at 437-38; Rogers, supra
note 23, at 356-57; Sweet, supra note 22, at 57-61.
25. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: BilateralInvestment
Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 107-08 (2005); see also Guy De Vel,
Foreword to EUR. BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., LAW IN TRANSITION: COURTS AND
JUDGES 3 (2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/48waze6 ("[I]ndependence and efficiency of the
judiciary is a conditio sine qua non for the success and sustainability of institutional reforms.
Only countries that can guarantee enforceability of contracts and protection of property rights are
able to attract substantial investment and secure economic growth over the longer term."); Robert
E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in ContractDesign, 115 YALE L.J. 814,
821-22, 856-57 (2006) (suggesting contract design can be improved by anticipating the effect of
litigation); Guanghua Yu & Hao Zhang, Adaptive Efficiency and Financial Development in
China: The Role of Contracts and Contractual Enforcement, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459 (2008)
(arguing that stable dispute resolution and investment frameworks facilitate efficient contracting).
26. ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE
KEY ISSUES, at xxi (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) ("[R]esolution does not rely on standards of
the host state and the domestic courts, which may have a local bias or be subject to the influence
of the host government.").
27. Elihu Lauterpacht, Foreword to CItRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, at ix-x (2d ed. 2009); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater
Depoliticizationof Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, I ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 1 (1986); see also W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 750-51 (1989) (describing aspects of

depoliticizing investment disputes by reference to entities such as ICSID); Christopher M. Ryan,
Discerningthe Compliance Calculus: Why States Comply with InternationalInvestment Law, 38
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63, 67-74 (2009) (outlining the history of depoliticization of investment
disputes); Kate M. Supnik, Note, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile
Competing Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 343, 351-52 (2009)
(describing various reasons for the creation of ICSID and investor-state dispute settlement).
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without allegations of bias, ITA has nevertheless fallen _rey to claims
that it is politicized and biased, including cases at ICSID.
ITA is a doctrinal by-product of an International Investment
Agreement (IIA).29 The net objective of an IIA is to entice inbound
foreign investment and to protect a state's own investors abroad while
minimizing the risk of state liability when foreign investors are granted
unilateral international economic rights. 30 IIAs typically involve a pair
or group of countries that sign a treaty, such as the Dominican
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), 3 1 that
promises to protect international investment within the territory of the
host state. HAs grant reciprocal investment rights, both procedural and
substantive, to private investors from the signatory countries.
Substantively, governments guarantee investors certain treatment,
such as freedom from unlawful expropriation, freedom from
discrimination, and the right to fair and equitable treatment. 32 Some
substantive disputes might involve public law elements, such as those
related to displaced Zimbabwe farmers or beef restrictions due to Mad
Cow Disease.33 Other disputes have a more commercial flavor, such as
28. See, e.g., Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in
Investment Dispute Settlement, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 251, 254, 257 (suggesting ITA was
intended to depoliticize the investment dispute resolution process but expressing skepticism that it
does so properly).
29. An IIA is a treaty made between two or more governments that safeguards investments
made by qualifying investors in the territory of other signatories. Susan D. Franck, Integrating
Investment Treaty Conflict andDispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 171 (2007).
30. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P, Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of
BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 75-79 (2005).
There is, however, a debate about whether IIAs achieve their objective of facilitating investment
and development objectives. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES & INVESTMENT
FLows (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and
InternationalLaw: Insightsfor Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 793
n. 116 (2008) (gathering sources debating the benefits of investment treaties).
31. Multilateral agreements, like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), provide
investment protection on a multilateral basis, and perhaps in conjunction with other international
economic law rights. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep., art. 10, Aug. 5, 2004,
Hein's No. KAV 7157, available at http://tinyurl.com/3dr9zln; North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pt. 4, ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 613 (1993); Antonio R.
Parra,Provisionson the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 287 (1997).
32. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A
REVIEW, at 31-47, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.1
(2005); Franck, supra note 29, at 172.
33. See, e.g., Funnekotter v. Republic of Zimbabwe (Neth. v. Zim.), ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/6, Award (Apr. 22, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/nyho6x (deciding claim against Zimbabwe
for repossession of land from white farmers); Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States,
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction, 1 232 (Jan. 28, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/27twg3a
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the revocation of a banking license or breach of contract. 34
Procedurally, if an investor believes a host state measure has violated its
substantive treaty rights, IIAs permit direct redress against the host state
through the treaty's dispute resolution mechanism. This is the genesis of
ITA, as many HAs permit investors to resolve their disputes through
arbitration. 35 While it varies by treaty, states typically grant investors
the right to elect arbitration before one or more of the following: (1) an
ad hoc tribunal organized under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, (2) the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or (3) a tribunal organized
through the World Bank's ICSID. 36
Presuming jurisdictional prerequisites are met, investors initiate
arbitration by submitting a request for arbitration at their selected
forum. Thereafter, a tribunal is selected38 to adjudicate the dispute in
an impartial manner 39 according to the applicable law. Parties then
(deciding whether Canadian ranchers could sue the United States for restrictions put in place
related to concerns about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow Disease)).
34. Franck, supra note 29, at 185-86 (describing commercial investment treaty claims);
Franck, supra note 15, at 10.
35. A cause of action under an IIA involves (1) a foreign investor asserting that the host state
has violated the treaty and damaged its investment, and (2) if the dispute is not otherwise
resolved, the investor seeking redress by requiring the state to arbitrate. Franck, supra note 14, at
781.
36. See Parra,supra note 31, at 288, 358 (remarking that investors' options may vary based
on rights enumerated in the applicable treaty, which could provide a range of options including
adjudication in national courts, ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, or arbitration
before the ICSID, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or SCC). Other treaties have
limited mechanisms for resolving disputes. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Ghana, art. 10, Oct. 12, 1989,
http://tinyurl.com/4kuvxt2 (providing that certain investment disputes are subject to ad hoc
arbitration, SCC is the default appointing authority, and the tribunal can use either SCC or ICSID
rules "as guidance").
37. Franck, supra note 29, at 193. But see Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the BIT Route: Of
Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE

231, 232-39 (2004) (suggesting that, irrespective of whether the substantive prerequisites are
established, investors may proceed with arbitration).
38. Typically, investors select an arbitrator and the government selects another. Under the
ICSID Convention, parties can agree on the appointment of the president of the tribunal.
International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]. By contrast, under ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, party-appointed
arbitrators agree on the chair. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 7(1), G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N.
Commission on International Trade Law, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17 at Ch. V, Sec. C, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (Apr. 28, 1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701, 705 (1976). Where there is an appointment
problem with the process, an arbitral institution or other appointing authority will step in to make
the requisite appointments. Id art. 7(2)(b); see also RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 124 (1995).
39. Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal: Articles 14 to 36, 9 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 45, 52-53 (1998); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed
Arbitratorin InternationalControversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59, 65 (1995).
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marshal their facts and legal arguments, and ultimately the tribunal
renders an award. Although there are slight differences depending upon
whether enforcement authority is derived from the ICSID Convention 40
or the New York Convention, 41 as a general matter, the award will be
enforceable worldwide. 42
II. THE DEBATE OVER ICSID
ICSID is a linchpin of the current ITA system. Nevertheless, it is also
a subject of intense discussion. This Part explores ICSID's origins, its
special features, and the debate about its role in the international
economic order.
A.

The Origins of ICSID

During a time of intense debate about the meaning of international
investment law and the scope of substantive protection for
expropriation, Aron Broches shifted the discussion by focusing on the
procedural mechanisms to resolve investment disputes. As General
Counsel of the World Bank, Broches advocated for the creation of an
impartial and stable forum, governed by a set of procedures, to settle
investment disputes. 43 In 1965, the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(ICSID Convention) established ICSID as a branch of the World Bank
to resolve investment disputes between foreign investors and host
countries.44 Currently, 146 states have ratified the ICSID Convention. 45
40. ICSID Convention, supra note 38. For ICSID Convention awards, parties seek
"annulment" for limited grounds, usually procedural, under the ICSID Convention. Otherwise,
ICSID Convention awards are immediately enforceable, as if they were a national court judgment
from the respondent state. ICSID Convention, supra note 38, arts. 51-54; Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1547-48 (2005).

41. For New York Convention awards, including those that derive from ICSID's Additional
Facility, parties can attack awards in accordance with national law at the seat of arbitration or
under the national law of the place where enforcement is sought; grounds for denying recognition
and enforcement typically relate to procedural irregularities. Convention of 1958 on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38; see also Franck, supra note 40, at 1549-55. Awards rendered pursuant to the
Panama Convention are similar. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration art. 5, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12 (1981), 1438 U.N.T.S. 248.

42. Franck, supra note 29, at 194.
43. SCHREUER ET AL., supro note 27, at 2-5; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ICSID Convention:
Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 51-52 (2009); see also Odumosu,

supra note 28, at 354-56 (describing the politically charged atmosphere during which ICSID was
founded).
44. Lucy REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 1-4 (2004); see also INT'L CTR. FOR
THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION:
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
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Although originally envisioned as an entity providing dispute
resolution services for investment disputes arising out of international
commercial agreements between investors from Convention signatories
46
and state signatories, ICSID's role has evolved. Three critical events
occurred to move ICSID into the frontline of ITA.
First, in 1978, the ICSID Administrative Council created Additional
Facility Rules. 4 7 The Additional Facility Rules expanded the scope of
dispute resolution services to provide fact-finding and an additional
ground for securing recourse to ICSID arbitration for those cases where
one of the parties to the dispute may be a Convention signatory or an
investor from a signatory state. 48 This last aspect was fundamental, as it
expanded the number of possible ICSID-based arbitrations. Although
"Additional Facility" arbitrations would not be ICSID Convention
awards for enforcement purposes, they could nevertheless benefit from
nearly identical Arbitration Rules at ICSID and the administrative
support and processes offered by ICSID.
Second, in the 1990s, there was a spike in the number of IIAs.4 9
There are now approximately 2676 IIAs,50 and as research suggests,
ICSID jurisdiction is offered in approximately 80% of IIAs. Thus, this
increase in the number of IIAs dramatically expands the potential scope
of ICSID jurisdiction. 5 1

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES

(photo. reprint 2001) (1968) (reviewing the formulation of the ICSID Convention); Julian Davis
Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International

Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 263-64, 281-96 (2010) (analyzing the history of the
ICSID and providing a history of the drafting of the ICSID Convention).
45. ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID Doc.

ICSID/3 (Dec. 10, 2010).
46. See Lowenfeld, supra note 43, at 55-59; see also Kathleen S. McArthur & Pablo A.
Ormachea, International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis of ICSID Decisions

on Jurisdiction,28 REv. LITIG. 559, 572 (2009) (describing a historical shift in the basis of ICSID
consent and suggesting that, in contrast to the first twenty-one years at ICSID, "BIT-based claims
have outnumbered contract-based claims six to one").
47. ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, ICSID Doc. ICSID/ 11(Apr. 2006) [hereinafter
ICSID AdditionalFacility Rules]; see also Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations
and Rules of the International Centrefor Settlement of Investment Disputes, 41 INT'L LAW. 47,
52 (2007).
48. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 47, sched. A, sched. C. ICSID also

expanded conciliation services originally offered in the ICSID Convention. Id. sched. B.
49. UNCTAD,

Bilateral Investment

Treaties

1959-1999,

at

iii,

UNCTAD

Doc.

UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) ("The 1990s saw a rapid increase in the number of bilateral
investment treaties . . . rising from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s.").
50. IIA Monitor No. 3 (2009), supra note 5, at 2.

51. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing how, in a sample of 1473 IIAs, 81%
include consent to ICSID jurisdiction); see also McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 46, at 560
(describing the rise of ICSID and observing the influence of the number of HAs).
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Third, in 1995, Jan Paulsson published his seminal article,
Arbitration Without Privity, which articulated the doctrinal and policy
justification for IIAs to form the basis of ICSID jurisdiction.52 The ex
ante consent to ICSID arbitration in HAs and the Additional Facility
Rules constituted raw ingredients, and Paulsson's article offered the
intellectual architecture for creative lawyers to pave the way towards
ICSID arbitration.
Given the interaction of these variables with the surge in foreign
investment, 53 ICSID's docket of cases quickly grew beyond
international commercial contracts governed by national law. The staple
of ICSID's caseload is now arbitrations that originate under HAs due to
arguably inappropriate government measures that detrimentally affect
foreign investment, even if the government is not a party to an
underlying commercial activity. Statistics from ICSID suggest that
nearly 75% of its caseload follows this paradigm. 54 It is perhaps little
wonder that some observers suggest that "the scope of [ICSID]'s
authority is unrivalled in its domain of activity" and in certain respects
could "be considered constitutional." 55
B.

ICSID's Unique Functions

ICSID provides a series of unique dispute resolution services,
including fact-finding and conciliation.5 6 The fact-finding proceedings
have never been used. 7 While there have only been six conciliation

52. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232

(1995).
53. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, at xvii, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006,
U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D. 11 (2006) (suggesting that the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
in 2005 was US$916 billion, but noting that the peak in 2000 was US$1.4 trillion). But see
UNCTAD, Assessing the Impact, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing the 15% fall in FDI as a result of
the financial crisis in 2008 alone).
54. See ICSID, The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, Issue 2011-1, at 10 (Jan. 21, 2011),

http://tinyurl.com/4jj3v6a [hereinafter ICSID, Statistics 2011] (indicating that 22% of cases at
ICSID were related to investment contracts and 6% were related to investment laws, but the
remainder of the basis for jurisdiction was related to IIAs such as NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and other HAs); ICSID, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, Issue
2010-1, 10 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://tinyurl.comlykqdtpl (noting that 22% of cases at ICSID related
to investment contracts and 5% related to investment laws and other IIAs); ICSID, The ICSID
Caseload- Statistics, Issue 2010-2, 10 (Aug. 25, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/ykqdtpl (same).
55. Sweet, supra note 22, at 58.
56. See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 47. ICSID also provides other support,

including administrative support for non-ICSID dispute settlement in state-to-state or certain
investor-state disputes, such as acting as an appointing authority and deciding upon arbitrator
challenges. ICSID, Statistics 2011, supra note 54, at 9; see also David Collins, RelianceRemedies
at the InternationalCenterfor the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.

195, 196-98 (2009) (providing an overview of ICSID).
57. Franck, supranote 29, at 210-11.
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cases registered at ICSID, it is unclear whether any of these are disputes
arising under IIAs.58
The bulk of ICSID's docket consists of two types of disputes,
namely: (1) arbitrations under the ICSID Convention, and (2)
arbitrations under the ICSID Facility Rules. Recent statistics from
ICSID state that, since its inception, there have been 296 ICSID
Convention arbitrations and twenty-nine Additional Facility
arbitrations. In 2009, ICSID registered twenty-five ICSID Convention
arbitrations and one Additional Facility arbitration.60 In other words, the
scope of ICSID's caseload is not irrelevant.61 ICSID describes the
vitality of the arbitration services that it provides:
As evidenced by its large membership, considerable caseload,
and by the numerous references to its arbitration facilities in
investment treaties and laws, ICSID plays an important role in
the field of international investment and economic development.
Today, ICSID is considered to be the leading international
arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute
settlement. 62
Data from other sources support this perspective. One study of
publicly available arbitration awards reported that nearly 75% of ITA
disputes are resolved at ICSID, either pursuant to the ICSID Convention
or Additional Facility Rules.6 3 Similarly, a 2009 United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publication
reported that close to 65% of cases are resolved at ICSID.64 These
58. See ICSID, Statistics, 2011, supra note 54, at 8 (reflecting six total conciliation cases).
Based upon publicly available information in ICSID's searchable database, Search ICSID Cases,
ICSID, http://tinyurl.com/4n8w2ym (last visited Mar. 22, 2011), it appears that at least one case
may have been related to a conciliation claim, Togo Electricit6 v. Republic of Togo, ICSID Case
No. CONC/05/1 (Apr. 6, 2006), under an investment treaty that ultimately transformed into an
arbitration, Togo Electricit6 v. Republic of Togo, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/7 (Aug. 10, 2010), but
even that is uncertain.
59. ICSID, Statistics 2011, supranote 54, at 8.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Given that ICSID can theoretically have mixed jurisdiction - namely, adjudicating
investor-state disputes under contracts, national legislation, or IIAs - it is critical to recall that
not all of these cases are necessarily investment treaty disputes. Indeed, ICSID's own data
indicate (through general percentages rather than hard data about the number of cases) that only
28% of its caseload does not involve cases arising under IIAs. Id. at 10. Extrapolating from the
available data, this would suggest that approximately 213 cases arise under IIAs. See also
McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 46, at 560 ("Today, ICSID is the leading forum for the
adjudication of disputes between private international investors and [states] . . . and the number of
claims filed annually at ICSID has increased dramatically in the last two decades.").
62. About ICSID, ICSID, http://tinyurl.com/4jsxltf (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
63. Franck, supra note 15, at 40.
64. See UNCTAD, IA Monitor No. 1 (2009): Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, at 2-3, UN Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/6/Revl (2009).
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sources suggest that ICSID is a key element in an international dispute
settlement process that aspires to promote sustainable development and
foreign investment.65
C.

The ICSID Debate

Given its prominence and affiliation with a major Bretton Woods
international economic institution, it is perhaps little wonder that ICSID
has become the focus of scrutiny. 66 The debate focuses upon ICSID's
institutional integrity and has reached the New York Times68 as well as
other mainstream media outlets. 69 The Financial Times observed that
critiques of ICSID "serve as a reminder that the system remains a fragile
one whose authority depends on the consent of those it governs." 70
One might categorize concerns about ICSID as relating to procedural
and substantive aspects. On the procedural side, there have been
concerns related to the transparency of the process, the capacity for
third-party intervention, the availability of meaningful appeal of legal
errors, and the cost of the proceedings. 71 After consultations with
member states, ICSID considered various procedural reforms. It
ultimately rejected certain areas for reform, including proposals to
65. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 56, at 213 (noting the role that ICSID may play in
encouraging foreign investment).
66. Supnik, supra note 27, at 355 ("ICSID's surge in usage has simultaneously rendered it
less popular among host states."); see also McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 46, at 560-61
(suggesting ICSID's increasing prommence requires an assessment of its neutrality).
67. See Gabriel Bottini, Should Arbitrators Live on Mars? Challenge of Arbitrators in
Investment Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 341, 341 (2009) ("Legitimacy of

investment arbitration is becoming one of the main concerns of all the institutions and persons
involved in the process."); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1,
18-19 (2009) (noting the scope of the debate regarding ICSID's possible bias). See generally
Franck, supra note 23, at 436 (outlining the debate about institutional legitimacy); Franck, supra
note 40, at 1595-1600 (describing the critiques of arbitration more generally).
68. Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes,

But Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at BUI ("Their meetings are secret.
Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet
the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and foreign
governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems questioned and
environmental regulations changed."); Editorial, The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2004, at Al ("[T]he arbitration process itself is often one-sided, favoring well-heeled corporations
over poor countries, and must be made fairer than it is today.").
69. Arbitration and Secrecy: Behind ClosedDoors -A Hard Struggle to Shed Some Light on
a Legal Grey Area, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2009, at 68; Alan Beattie, Concern Grows over Global
Trade Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at 9; Alan Beattie, From a Trickle to a Flood How Lawsuits Are Coming to Dictate the Terms of Trade, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at 13;
Kevin Gallagher, Stop Private Firms Exploiting Poor States, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2010,
11:00 AM), http://tinyurl.com/yz7w6va; Sheila McNulty, Chevron Takes Ecuador Fight to the
Hague, FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2009, 3:45 AM), http://tinyurl.com/4rm4sjc.
70. Peel & Croft, supra note 2.
71. See, e.g., Supnik, supra note 27, at 356.
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create an appellate body 72 and to construct a mediation facility.7 1 ICSID
did, however, adopt procedural reforms in April 2006 to facilitate
greater transparency and permit participation by amicus curiae. 74 These
procedural innovations helped to address many concerns related to
perceived procedural justice. Nevertheless, remaining concerns about
process and principles of substantive justice75 raise the question of
whether arbitration -

particularly at ICSID -

is always the appropriate

method for resolving investment treaty disputes. 76 Yet, since arbitration
still appears to be the default mechanism for resolving investment treaty
conflict, the fundamental question becomes: What substantive criticisms
are aimed at the major venues for resolving these disputes?
72. ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations 3-4 (May 12,
2005) (working paper), available at http://tinyurl.com/4sx2v7c; ICSID Secretariat, Possible
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 14-16 (Oct. 22, 2004) (discussion paper),
availableat http://tinyurl.com/4tbvoc5 [hereinafter ICSID 2004 Discussion Paper].
73. ICSID 2004 Discussion Paper, supra note 72, at 4, 13-14. There is renewed interest in
consideration of this aspect of mediation, and international organizations such as ICSID and
UNCTAD are exploring the utility of mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.
See UNCTAD, Investor-StateDisputes: Prevention and Alternatives to ArbitrationII, UNCTAD

Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/1A/2010/8 (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter UNCTAD, ADR II],
availableat http://tinyurl.com/4kvpcj5.
74. See Press Release, ICSID, Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (Apr. 5,
2006), http://tinyurl.com/6gqbl93(Apr. 5, 2006); see also Susan D. Franck, ICSID Institutional
Reform: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution and the Role of Structural Safeguards, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE ON

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-83 (Agata Fijalkowsi ed.,

2007)

(discussing revision of ICSID procedures); Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised:
A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNICTRAL
Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 885, 892-901 (2007) (providing a comprehensive

review of ICSID-related reforms); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the ProceduralLegitimacy
of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52

MCGILL L.J. 681, 706-08 (2007).
75. See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine FinancialCrisis: State Liability Under BITs
and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 199,

222-23 (2008) (suggesting that ICSID's legitimacy depends upon substantive outcomes);
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in ExtraordinaryTimes:
The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral

Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 373-74 (2008) (suggesting that ICSID legitimacy
could be enhanced by substantive changes affecting outcome, particularly the incorporation of an
interpretive "margin of appreciation"); David D. Caron, Investor-State Arbitration: Strategic and
Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 513, 514-15 (2009)

(observing that although several critiques relate to concerns of procedural legitimacy, substantive
justice is also key); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora'sBox: Sovereign Bonds in International
Arbitration, 101 AM. J.INT'L L. 711, 723 (2007) ("Legitimacy of ICSID arbitral awards depends
on respecting this adjudicatory mission . . . ."). But see Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID
Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 202 (2005) (cautioning that, even as
a matter of substance, there can be legitimacy challenges even if the "right" substantive result is
reached through the "wrong" reasoning).
76. See UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, at 19-

20, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTADIDIAE/IA/2009/1l, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, ADR I].
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Given ICSID's pivotal role and the scope of public scrutiny, it is
useful to examine concerns about the legitimacy of ICSID's substantive
services. Commentators have expressed different substantive concerns
about ICSID-related investment treaty disputes. Some concerns relate to
the lack of consistency in outcome,77 which could be remedied by
procedural safeguards. Other concerns relate to the loss of risk-free
exercise of domestic "policy space,"78 the purported failure to support
development objectives,79 or the incorporation of norms related to
corporate social responsibility,80 the environment, or human rights.8 '
While meaningful and important, these issues have less to do with the
adjudication of international law rights; rather, they arise from the
state's original delegation in the treaty of unilateral rights for foreign
investors, the acceptance of responsibility for state conduct, and the
77. Franck, supra note 40, at 1521-22; Weidemaier, supra note 67, at 12-13. But see
Emmanuel Gaillard, A "Black Year": ICSID at CrossroadsAfter Troubling Trend, INT'L ARB. L.

NEWS, Mar. 1,2007, at 3 (stating ICSID case law shows remarkable consistency).
78. Multi-Year Expert Meeting on Investment for Development, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 10-11,
2009, Rep. on the Multi-Year Expert Meeting on Investment for Development on its First Session,
1 16, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C/.II/MEM.3/3 (Mar. 18, 2009); Vicente Yu & Fiona Marshall, Investors'
Obligations and Host State Policy Space, 2D ANNUAL FORUM OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
INVESTMENT NEGOTIATORS, Nov. 4, 2008, at 4, http://tinyurl.com/4k2thhr; see also Martins
Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of Countermeasures, 9 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 264,
288-92 (2008) (questioning whether ICSID precludes states from taking countermeasures and
arguing that alleged preclusion is an inappropriate intrusion on sovereignty). Similarly, there has
also been a concern that IIAs are "unbalanced" by providing unilateral rights to foreign investors
without requiring investor responsibility or offering states an express affirmative defense. Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 451, 468 (2008); Vaughan Lowe, Oxford Univ., Fair and Equitable Treatment in
International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Mar. 30, 2006), in 100 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.) 73, 73-74 (2006). But see
ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:

STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 481-527 (2009) (outlining defenses of states to flA obligations);
Mortenson, supra note 44, at 312-13 (describing Argentina's capacity to raise the defense of

necessity to certain claims because that defense was written into the IIA).
79. See, e.g., Odumosu, supra note 28, at 262 (describing the need to address development
concerns); UNCTAD, IIA Monitor No. 2 (2007): Development Implications for International
Investment Agreements, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007); SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 355 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al.
eds., 2011).
80. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 89-90
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 75, at 369-76
(discussing human rights incorporation); see also Sweet, supra note 22, at 62-64 (discussing the
value of importing concepts such as proportionality and balancing).
81. Mary E. Footer, BITs and Pieces: Social and Environmental Protection in the Regulation
of Foreign Investment, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 33, 61-63 (2009) (advocating incorporation of
corporate social responsibility and environmental norms); Kate Miles, InternationalInvestment
Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the Environment, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 1 (2010); Peter Muchilinski, CorporateSocial Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Muchilinski et al. eds., 2008).
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failure to include defenses or exclusions within the scope of treaty
obligations. 82 Nevertheless, there is one critique that is regular,
poignant, and has critical implications for the integrity of the investorstate dispute settlement system: namely, a concern that arbitration is
biased, particularly with respect to the outcomes of ICSID cases.
ICSID is at the center of a series of criticisms that international
investment arbitration exhibits "institutional bias" and fosters "a sense
that 'the system is rigged' . . . .83 Some commentators even suggest
that "ICSID represents the inequities of an international system biased
against the developing countries." 84 Other academics argue that the
arbitration process has created "unduly pro-investor interpretations at
the expense of states,"85 and "[i]nvestment treaty arbitration as currently
constituted is not a fair, independent, and balanced method for the
resolution of investment disputes and therefore should not be relied on
for this purpose." 86 There are also blunt statements that "there is a
growing perception that ICSID is in the throes of a legitimacy crisis,,,87
and even that "ICSID faces serious challenges to its legitimacy, some of
which fundamentally threaten its very existence as a tool for resolving
investment disputes."8 8 The President of Ecuador stated "he has 'no
82. This concern about "policy space" and lost sovereignty is less about adjudication of
international law rights but more about a delegation of sovereign authority a state cedes when
entering into IIAs in the first instance. This is also a function of the scope of rights, obligations,
and defenses in IIAs and is arguably why many states are more carefully drafting rights,
exclusions, and defenses in model treaties. See, e.g., Asha Kaushal, Note, Revisiting History:
How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50
HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 494-95 (2009).
83. Sandra L. Caruba, Resolving InternationalInvestment Disputes in a Globalised World, 13

N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 128, 150 (2007); see also George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The
Current Legal Framework for Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their
Instrumentalities, and Some Proposalsfor its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 665, 705

(2008) ("In recent years, ICSID and the ICSID Convention have increasingly become targets of
criticism by countries facing liability under ICSID awards, who have accused ICSID of being
biased in favor of investors, and have described the Convention as a threat to their sovereignty.");
William W. Park, ArbitratorIntegrity: The Transitoryand the Permanent,46 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

629, 658 (2009) (discussing a purported "pro-investor" bias on the part of arbitrators).
84. Letter from Food & Water Watch, USA et al., to Ana Palacio, Sec'y Gen. of ICSID (June
21, 2007), http://tinyurl.com/4g749dv; see also Christian Tietje et al., Once and Forever? The
Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID, 6 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 5 (Mar. 2008)

(suggesting Bolivia's withdrawal from ICSID was due to "ICSID's alleged bias"); Steve Josselon,
Pro-North Bias

Seen

at

ICSID,

STEVEN

JOSSELSON

ONLINE

(June

19,

2007),

http://tinyurl.com/4g2557d ("(ICSID] is biased toward corporation[s] based in the Developed
World.").
85. Public Statement, supra note 10, 15.
86. Id 1 8.
87. Sweet, supra note 22, at 68.
88. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory ofPrecedent in Arbitration,51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1895, 1945 (2010); see also lbironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued)
Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 345, 373 (2007) (providing

examples that "reflect the legitimacy crisis that ICSID faces").
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confidence' in the World Bank arbitration branch [ICSID] that is
hearing [a dispute] against Ecuador." 89 There have also been concerns
articulated by counsel appearing at ICSID 90 and arbitrators9'
participating in the annulment process of ICSID Convention cases. 92
Other observers suggest that, despite its status as an autonomous
organization, bias may not just be a function of arbitration outcomes; 93
rather, ICSID's close ties with the World Bank, major international
financial organizations, and multinational corporations call into question
ICSID's integrity. 94 Commentators note that although the World Bank
89. Gabriela Molina, Ecuador Wary of World Bank Arbitration in Occidental Case, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2008, http://tinyurl.com/4q8c57m.
90. Sebastian Perry, ICSID Annulment Committees Under Firefrom Counsel, GLOBAL ARB.
REV., Sept. 20, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/4et6gb4 (quoting R. Doak Bishop as saying, "I think it is

very disconcerting and disturbing that the [Enron] committee created its own basis of annulment
independent of the arguments raised before the committee by the parties themselves") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. Compafhia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Decision in Annulment Proceeding, Additional Opinion of Professor J.H. Dalhuisen,
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://tinyurl.com/4retyub (raising procedural concerns about the activities of
ICSID in supporting the drafting of an annulment decision) ("[T]he Secretariat is not the fourth
member of ICSID Tribunals or ad hoc Committees and is not an interested party in any other
way."); Sebastian Perry, Argentina to Lodge Complaint Against ICSID, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Oct.
8, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/6e4dl4m (suggesting Argentina will lodge complaint against ICSID

related to the behavior of the ICSID Secretariat in the annulment process and observing that
"Dalhuisen complained that the ICSID secretariat had caused 'multiple complications' and delays
by attempting to involve itself in the drafting of the decision"); Tom Toulson, Annulment
Committee

Criticises

Kaufman-Kohler,

GLOBAL

ARB.

REv.,

Aug.

16,

2010,

http://tinyurl.com/4ru4cjk ("In an additional opinion attached to the committee's decision, Dutch
academic Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen launched an unprecedented attack on the ICSID secretariat,
accusing senior members of approaching 'individual committee members informally with a view
to amending the text."').
92. The unit of analysis in this research is awards rather than decisions of ad hoc committees.
Future research might usefully analyze these decisions. See supranote 13; infra note 133.
93. Criticism of ICSID may also be a function of disappointed, perhaps overly high and
unrealistic expectations. As ICSID is a creation of international law, one commentator suggested
ICSID should be held to a higher standard than arbitration occurring pursuant to the ad hoc
UNCITRAL Rules. Odumosu, supra note 28, at 378 ("ICSID is a creation of treaty; thus, it
potentially has a level of international legitimacy not shared by regular ad hoc arbitration. . . . As
a result of the position that it occupies in the international economic order [and since] . . . it is an
international institution specializing in settling investment disputes, ICSID should situate itself in
a space where it can take matters of international concern and public interest into account . . . .").
The suggestion is that ICSID may have a need, and perhaps a duty, as a leading international
economic organization, to be proactive in promoting legitimacy and effective dispute resolution
in an era of globalization.
94. Amanda L. Norris & Katina E. Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private Contracts:
Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitrationand the Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
31, 63--64 (2010); see also Petition of La Coordinadora Para la Defensa del Agua y Vida, La
Federaci6n Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, Semapa Sur, Friends of
the Earth-Netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Omar Fernandez, Father Luis Sanchez, and Congressman
Jorge Alvarado to the Arbitral Tribunal, Aguas Del Tunari v. Republic of Bolivia (Neth. v. Bol.),
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Aug. 29, 2002), 20 ICSID Rev. 450, 457 (2005) (asserting problems
with "bias" and the "integrity" of the process); Why Bolivia Quit ICSID, STOP TELECOM ITALIA,
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and International Monetary Fund (IMF) often agree to multi-billiondollar debt write-offs for countries like the Congo, these same countries
remain at risk for billion-dollar liability in ICSID arbitrations. 95
These concerns involve more than political rhetoric. They are linked
to action with ramifications for international law and the international
economic order. States have proactively withdrawn from the ICSID
system. 96 As Professor Mortenson described, "In April 2007, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela agreed to withdraw from the ICSID
Convention as a means of creating a 'New Regional Economic Order'
for the Americas." 97 Bolivia withdrew from ICSID in 2007;98 in one
proceeding, Bolivia challenged the entirety of the ICSID tribunal9 9 and
stated that it "'will not comply' with any award" rendered in favor of
foreign investors. 00 Ecuador limited the scope of its participation by
removing certain classes of disputes related to oil, gas, and minerals
from ICSID jurisdiction.o'0 Nicaragua has stopped including consent to
ICSID arbitration in its IIAs.1 02 Other states have expressed concern
http://stopeti.wordpress.com/actions/why-bolivia-quit-icsid ("[T]here is a conflict of interest"
because the "World Bank is both judge and party to the ICSID processes.") (last visited Mar. 23,
2011).
95. See Kaushal, supranote 82, at 506-07 (referring to the link between World Bank and IMF
loans and ITA); William Wallis, Congo's Struggles Delay Debt Write-Off. FIN. TIMES, July 4,

2010, http://tinyurl.com/31qcwjh (referring to a US$10.8 billion debt write-off and discussing an
ICSID dispute that could result in "billions of dollars" of liability). But see Susan D. Franck,
InternationalDecisions, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 681 (2005) (indicating that the U.S. government proposed cutting financial
aid to Ecuador given a possibility that Ecuador considered non-payment of an adverse ITA
award).
96. This may not purely be a function of the ICSID system, however. For example, after an
adverse award in the Yukos case, Russia has withdrawn from the Energy Charter Treaty, which
permits foreign investors to bring arbitration claims under that energy-sector-specific investment
agreement. Emmanuel Gaillard, Letter to the Editor, Russia Cannot Walk away from its Legal
Obligations, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, at 6; Alison Ross, Russia Withdraws from Energy
CharterTreaty, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Aug. 7, 2009, http://tinyurl.com/6ed4pj3.
97. Mortenson, supra note 44, at 313; see also Just Say No: Vocal Rejection of Bank Fund
Increasing, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (July 2, 2007), http://tinyurl.com/4ckxhep; Tietje et al.,

supra note 84, at 5.
98. Letter from David Choquehuanca Cespedes, Foreign Affairs Minister, Bol., to Paul
Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, Cancilleria Oficializa la Salida de Bolivia del CIADI

[Ministry of Boliva Officially Exits ICSID] (May 1, 1997), reprintedin 46 I.L.M. 973 (2007);
Press Release, ICSID, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May
16, 2007), http://tinyuri.com/57ky25.
99. Syriaki Karadelis, Bolivia Challenges Entire ICSID Tribunal, GLOBAL ARB. REV., May

10, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/69unacq.
100. Sebastian Perry, Bolivia Ramps Up Anti-ICSID Rhetoric, GLOBAL ARB. REV., July 14,

2010, http://tinyurl.com/6hf5cja.
101. Press Release, ICSID, Ecuador's Notification Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID
Convention (Dec. 5, 2007), http://tinyurl.com/856ga3.
102. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, South American Alternative to ICSID in the Works as
Governments Create an Energy Treaty, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable

Dev., Winnipeg, Man.), Sept. 1, 2008, at 7.
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about ICSID and its ongoing utility.' 03 Even developed states have acted
to foreclose ICSID arbitration. For example, the United States-Australia
Free Trade Agreement excluded all investor-state dispute settlement,'0
and Australia rejected investor-state treaty arbitration more broadly in
April 2011.0s
Criticisms about ICSID have other ramifications. A recent public
statement suggested that, given concerns about investment treaty
arbitration, "[t]here is a strong moral as well as policy case for
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose
investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration awards
against them . . . ."106 Meanwhile, there has been a movement to create
an arbitration body to replace ICSID. A coalition of various states,
known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America
(ALBA),107 have advocated the creation of an organization that mimics
the function of ICSID but that supposedly offers a more legitimate
arbitration process. 0 8 Presumably, this means that they believe the
problem lies not with international arbitration as a dispute settlement
mechanism per se, but rather with ICSID itself.' 09
103. See Marco E. Schnabl & Julie B6dard, The Wrong Kind of 'Interesting,'NAT'L L.J., July
30, 2007, http://tinyurl.com/3r3mzg9 (discussing possible withdrawal from the ICSID
Convention by Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela).
104. William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-UnitedStates Free TradeAgreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1,
2 (2006).
105. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND
PROSPERITY 14 (April 2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/3w3ungv; Luke Eric Peterson, In
Policy Switch, Australia Disavows Need for Investor-State Arbitration Provisions in Trade and
Investment Agreements, INVESITENT ARB. REP., Apr. 14,2011, httpJ/www.iareporter.com/articles20 10414.
106. Public Statement, supra note 10, $ 8.
107. This organization is officially known as Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra
Amdrica. See generally Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America,
16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM., 409, 421-22 (2010) (discussing ALBA); Teresa Arreaza, ALBA:
Bolivarian Alternativefor Latin America and the Carribbean, VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, (Jan.
30, 2004), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/339 (same).
108. Fernando Cabrera Diaz, ALBA Moves Forward with Plan to Create Regional Investment
Arbitration Alternative to ICSID at 7th Summit, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Int'l Inst. for
Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Man.), Nov. 4, 2009, at 3-4; see also Steven Donziger et al.,
Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The Clash ofHuman Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron's
Abusive Litigation in Ecuador's Amazon, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 14 (2010); Vincentelli, supra
note 107, at 454-55 ("Venezuela has fiercely promoted the creation of an alternative - maybe
regional - center of investor-State dispute resolution, as an alternative to ICSID."); Adam D.
Link, Comment, The Perils of Privatization:InternationalDevelopments and Reform in Water
Distribution, 22 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 379, 392 (2010) (discussing
ALBA's proposal to create a regional arbitral forum for resolving treaty disputes).
109. It may also be a question of politics. See Carlos Hecker, Estados que se retiran del Ciadi
[States That Withdrew from ICSID], DERECHOS & INVERSIONES (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://blog.juristasiberoamericanos.com/invest/?p= 115 ("Se podria concluir entonces que el retiro
del Ciadi es una cuesti6n mis politica que prdctica.") ("One might then conclude that withdrawal
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Despite these criticisms, proponents of ICSID are unconvinced that
the system is experiencing problems. Judge Charles Brower and
Stephan Schill suggest that the rejection of ICSID is "a phenomenon
that seems to be limited to a minority of states and can often be
explained more by the countries' internal political situation rather than a
more widespread view of a lack of legitimacy . . 110 Other supporters
champion ICSID as a responsive organization that proactively addresses
stakeholder concerns and concerns related to perceived bias."'
Meanwhile, after recent critiques about ICSID's annulment process, key
figures have gone on record to say that "[t]he [ICSID] secretariat
provides invaluable assistance"ll 2 and that other recent critiques are "illconceived and insolent."'" 3 Yet, as noted arbitrator and arbitration
scholar V.V. Veeder observed, even if "ICSID is the best institution in
its field, the best run, the best staffed, with the best rules and the best
treaty . . . [t]he question today is whether the ICSID we know and

support will still exist in a few years from now?"ll 4
D.

EmpiricalInsights to Evaluate the Debate

Given the foregoing debate, there have been calls for a
"comprehensive empirical literature addressing the settlement of
investor-state disputes through ICSID arbitration.""' Thus far, the
empirical literature specifically on ICSID has taken the form of
descriptive statistics (sometimes gathered by ICSID),11 6 the scope of
legal reasoning,1 17 and analysis of general jurisdictional outcomes. 1 8
from ICSID is a political question rather than a practical one.").
110. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 496 (2009); see also

Mortenson, supra note 44, at 304-05 (discussing ICSID's institutional expertise and legitimacy).
Ill. Caruba, supra note 83, at 141 ("In the past several years, a number of ICSID awards
have clearly demonstrated that ICSID is taking measured steps in response to two major
criticisms frequently leveled by public interest advocates against arbitration, that is, secretiveness
and institutional bias.").
112. Perry, supra note 91 (quoting Yves Fortier) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Toulson, supra note 91 (quoting Albert Jan van den Berg); see also id. (suggesting that
van den Berg believes the critiques "are totally contrary to my experience at ICSID"); id. (quoting
Emmanuel Gaillard as saying the annulment decision was "ill conceived on every account" and
suggesting that "the tone and wording of the decision [were] 'extremely questionable"'); Perry,
note 90 (quoting Doak Bishop to suggest that the Vivendi annulment decision contained
"'gratuitous and harsh' criticism of [a] Swiss arbitrator" involved in the dispute).
114. V.V. Veeder, "Why Bother and Why it Matters," NEWS & NOTES, (Inst. for Transnat'1
Arb., Plano, Tex.), Summer 2006, at 2.
115. McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 46, at 561.
116. See e.g., ICSID, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Stakeholder
Survey (Oct. 2004), http://tinyurl.com/4nfssb7; ICSID, Statistics, 2011, supra note 54; see also

Franck, supra note 15, at 38-41.
117. Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals-An Empirical

Analysis, 19 EUR. J.INT'L L. 301 (2008).
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There has been some general research on outcomes of investment
arbitration,l19 as well as a specific call to consider "whether there are
other differences associated with each type of arbitral forum. For
example, it would be useful to consider whether investors or
governments were more or less likely to win in one venue or another ...
[or whether awards] were higher with a particular type of institution."1 20
Unfortunately, this gap has not yet been addressed. There is still no
analysis of ICSID-specific amounts in dispute or substantive outcomes
that evaluates possible systemic differences based upon aggregate data
and assesses claims about ICSID's bias.
Such a gap in the literature is perhaps unsurprising given the
challenges related to reliable data collection and the establishment of a
comparative baseline against which to measure ICSID conduct. As IIAs
do not necessarily permit national court litigation, there is no public
record of investors choosing national court litigation over ITA for the
resolution of IIA claims. The gap may also be unsurprising since
national court litigation permits states to invoke sovereign immunity or
political question doctrines to quash claims. There may also be other
concerns related to adjudicative independence and neutrality. These
factors suggest that national court litigation may not provide an
appropriate comparative baseline for an assessment of ITA generally
and ICSID in particular. Similarly, although investment claims can be
brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the basis of a
state-to-state mechanism, there may not be a meaningful comparative
baseline given the different legal standards, population size, or existence
of selection bias that may derive from states' election to espouse claims
strategically. 12 1 Although a useful comparison might consider the
treatment of investor-state investment disputes from ad hoc mixedclaims tribunals, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is probably the only
tribunal with a sufficiently large number of claims to compare.
Unfortunately, there is no pre-existing source of reliably coded data and
118. McArthur & Ormachea, supra note 46; W. Michael Tupman, Case Studies in the
Jurisdiction ofthe International Centre for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, 35 INT'L & COMP.

L.Q. 813 (1986).
119. Franck, supra note 23; Franck, supra note 15; see also Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat
Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL

L. REV. 47 (2010).
120. Franck, supra note 15, at 41.
121. The author is unaware of a database that specifically compiles information on

investment-related cases before the ICJ. Rather, the typical sources might be the databases that
provide access to ICJ decisions as a general matter, such as those in Westlaw, Lexis, or on the ICJ
website itself. See, e.g., Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Gaps in International Legal Literature: A
Skeptical Reappraisal, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 363, 366 (2008) (addressing the

availability of ICJ cases in certain formats); Mirela Roznovschi, Building an Electronic Law
Library in a Foreign Country, 24 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 161, 190 (1996).
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variables. Moreover, the tribunal's unique activities and limited scope
over disputes involving only U.S. and Iranian investors may confine the
external validity of the data and inhibit its suitability for comparison.
Future research, however, might usefully consider the creation of a
database to provide meaningful and useful comparisons with ITA.
There are, however, comparable data in a pre-existing dataset that
consists of ITA awards from ICSID and other forums. This will permit
direct comparison of ICSID cases to an analogous set of cases: ITA
disputes arising in non-ICSID venues, including the SCC and ad hoc
arbitrations under UNCITRAL rules. This Article uses that data to
explore variance related to ICSID and its arbitration awards. This is
only one of multiple ways to assess ICSID, and future research might
usefully explore ICSID-related differences in the post-award phase
(such as in ad hoc annulment committees, attempts to vacate awards,
and court enforcement of awards). While research that conducts this
analysis will necessarily be limited to comparing across arbitral forums
to look for meaningful differences across categories, it has the virtue of
comparing apples with apples - namely, investment treaty disputes
arising under a roughly equivalent legal framework. 122
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS

Previous empirical research provided basic descriptive information
and associative hypothesis testing related to ITA in general. This sets
the stage for a more refined analysis. This Part therefore provides a
preliminary overview and then tests a series of hypotheses related to
ICSID. Although those raising the possibility of ICSID bias have not
operationalized "bias," this Article defines bias as a critical aspect of a
dispute - namely, the starting or ending point of adjudication121 3 that
122. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 78 (providing an overview of international
treaty law); STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW (2009) (describing the emergence of a multilateral system of investment protection on the
basis of bilateral treaties); see also Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International
Law for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
142, 168 (2010) ("[Mlost investment treaties share the same basic principles. However,
investment treaties are not identical and may vary quite substantially with regard to the
formulations .... ) (footnote omitted); Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the
EmpiricalStudy of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405 (2008).
123. The starting point (namely amounts claimed) and ending points (outcomes and amounts
awarded) are theoretically useful aspects to evaluate as a moment where perceptions of bias may
be formed or confirmed. Cognitive psychology suggests that the primacy effect can affect our
perceptions as data that we encounter at the outset of an event can shape future perceptions by
weighting the importance of early evidence more heavily. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND
DECIDING 205-07 (4th ed. 2008). Likewise, cognitive biases such as the recency effect create
disproportionate weight on the last pieces of information. Id at 206; Joseph N. Scudder, Social
Sciences Approaches to Persuasion, in CHARLES U. LARSON, PERSUASION: RECEPTION AND
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exhibits a substantial difference in different adjudicative forums. The
theoretical hope was that, given a rough doctrinal equivalence of
procedural rules and applicable law, there should be reasonable
equivalence across adjudicative forums.
The first set of hypotheses therefore address, as a general matter,
whether ICSID awards fundamentally differed from non-ICSID awards
in amounts claimed and ultimate outcome. The second set of hypotheses
then considers three variables and whether there was any reliable
relationship with ICSID and amounts claimed or ultimate outcome.
Specifically, this Article explores the role of Energy disputes, the
presence of Latin American respondents, and a respondent state's
Development Status to assess whether any meaningful differences were
attributable to ICSID.
This research operationalized the independent variable "ICSID
Status" in two ways. First, ICSID Status was a categorical variable that
distinguished between all cases at ICSID, including both ICSID
Convention and ICSID Additional Facility cases (ICSID-ALL), and all
other disputes, namely cases arising under the SCC, UNCITRAL, or
other ad hoc rules. This measure ensures that the independent variable
takes into account those disputes where ICSID arguably retains
oversight over procedural aspects of the case. Second, ICSID Status was
operationalized as a categorical variable differentiating between those
cases arising exclusively under the ICSID Convention (ICSID-C) as
compared to awards requiring enforcement through the New York
Convention, including ICSID Additional Facility (ICSID-AF), SCC,
UNCITRAL, and other ad hoc rules.124 This measure takes into account
ICSID's relationship to the dispute but demarcates the underlying
doctrinal basis for arbitration and enforcement.
A.

Data & Analysis

Based upon existing archival data coding investment treaty awards
publicly available prior to 2007,125 research indicated that of the eightytwo cases in which an award had been rendered, nearly 75% were
rendered at ICSID (59.8% ICSID Convention and 14.6% ICSID
Additional Facility),126 and the remaining 25.6% were resolved under
either SCC or other ad hoc rules.1 27
RESPONSIBILITY 91, 100-02 (12th ed. 2010).

124. See infra note 139 (using this definition of ICSID Status for the independent variables).
125. The data used to conduct the analyses came from the population of 102 investment treaty
awards from eighty-two cases that were publicly available before June 1, 2006. Franck, supra
note 15, at 24. Research is underway to create a second-generation database that expands upon
this initial dataset. Id. at 52.
126. Id. at 40. But see id. at 40 n.172 (acknowledging that one ICSID-AF case was not
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For the fifty-two final awards in that subset of the population, the
data refuted the general conception that ITA was biased in favor of
investors. The general data showed that, for the fifty-two cases resulting
in final awards, (1) states won 57.69% of those cases; (2) investors won
38.46% of those cases; and (3) 3.85% memorialized settlement
agreements.128 That research suggested that there was generallyl 29 no
reliable statistical relationship between the development background of

rendered at ICSID but the parties agreed to use ICSID-AF rules).
127. Id. at 40.

128. Id at 49-50, 73. Previous research using different datasets and different measurements
has largely replicated this finding. See UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 1: Latest Developments in
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, at 3, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTADIWEB/DIAE/IA/2010/3 (2010)

("[B]y the end of 2009, 164 cases had been brought to conclusion. Out of these, 38 per cent were
decided in favour of the State (62) and 29 per cent in favour of the investor (47), while 34 per
cent (55) cases were settled."); Linda A. Ahee & Richard. E. Walck, ICSID Arbitrationin 2009, 7
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. (Apr. 2010) ("Claimants were successful in less than one-half of the
matters that went to an award .... ); Kapeliuk, supra note 119, at 81 (suggesting that for an
analysis focused on "elite" arbitrators, tribunals denied recovery to claims in 60.5% of the cases
and only 7%of investors were awarded 100% of amounts claimed); see also Kassi D. Tallent,
State Responsibility by the Numbers: Towards an Understandingof the Prevalence of the Latin
America Countries in Investment Arbitration, 8 TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT. (Feb. 2011).

129. Given the limited dataset, defined measures, and statistical models, follow-up tests that
suggested that tribunals with a presiding arbitrator from a developing country (when considered
as a function of the World Bank Status of their country of nationality) sometimes favored
respondents from the developed world over some subsets of respondents from the developing
world, see Franck, supra note 23, at 471-74, should be approached with caution.
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the respondent state1 30 and case outcome, whether as a function of
winning or losing'31 or the amounts awarded.132
This Article focuses upon data from ICSID awards 33 rather than
other aspects of ICSID case management.1 34 Given the particular
130. Previous research defined the independent variable, "Development Status," in two ways:
(1) as a two-category variable (OECD status) based upon a respondent's membership in OECD,
and (2) as a "more nuanced" four-category variable (World Bank Status) based upon pre-existing
categories from the World Bank. Id. at 455. Recognizing that there may be other indicators of
development, this Article adopts the definitions and uses the variables "OECD Status" and
"World Bank Status" previously operationalized in Franck, supra note 23.
As the dataset used in this current analysis closed during the summer of 2006, the categories of
OECD and World Bank Status were created and defined at that time. Id. at 455 nn. 110 & 112;
Franck, supra note 15, at 28 n.125, 29 n.127. Variables are therefore limited to four categories for
World Bank Status and two for OECD Status, which means that Mexico was an Upper-Middle
Income state and OECD Member whereas the Czech Republic was a High Income state and an
OECD Member. The choice to adopt categorical definitions used by other researchers was in
accordance with established social science protocols and proper, as even the World Trade
Organization does not provide a definition for "Development Status." See KING ET AL., supra
note 15, at 157 ("Our advice [when coding information] is, first, to try to use judgments made for
entirely different purposes by other researchers [to avoid the risk of subjective measurement
error].") (emphasis in original); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really
Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 67, 104-15 (2005) (using OECD membership as a proxy for development); Mary
Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit . . . and They
Could Bite 8, 9, 11-12 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121, 2003), available

at http://tinyurl.com/4ggql45 (referring to "rich OECD countries," distinguishing between OECD
members and "developing countries," and analyzing FDI flows "from OECD countries to
developing country hosts").
131. Franck, supra note 23, at 460-64. The "ultimate win" dependent variable was defined as
a function of whether the tribunal awarded US$0 for a treaty breach (government win) or more
than US$0 for a treaty breach (investor win). Id. at 456. This Article adopts that definition of
"ultimate win."
132. Id. at 465-71. This dependent variable was a quantitative variable that was analyzed with
raw and winsorized data. Id. at 456-57. This Article adopts those same variables and definitions,
which use the date of the actual award. See id at 454 n. 105 (relying on the dataset referred to in
Franck, supra note 15); see also Franck, supra note 15, at 22 n.98 (stating that a single website
was used to convert the foreign currencies into a U.S. dollar amount with "the date of the award
as the relevant conversion date" to create a common currency). The skewness of amounts
awarded in the pre-2007 dataset was: (1) raw data= 5.311, (2) winsorized data = 1.414,
(3) log = 0.506, and (4) inverse = -0.404; and the standard error for the skewness was 0.330.
Although raw data reflected real dollars awarded, its skewing (over 5.0) mean it should not be
analyzed in isolation. The lower skewing (i.e. closer to 0.00) for the winsorized, logged, and
inverse data generally mean that their use was preferable for analysis.
133. As the dataset focuses on awards, this necessarily excludes analysis of other ICSID
decisions, such as applications for provisional measures or the decisions of ad hoc annulment
committees. See Franck, supra note 15, at 20-21, 24 (describing the unit of analysis in the
dataset). As these procedural steps are critical and the annulment decisions are an area of rising
controversy, see supra notes 90-92, 112-13, future research on these issues could provide fruitful
analysis for assessing ICSID.
134. This meant there was no assessment of qualitative aspects, including a variable to
measure investors', states', counsel's, and arbitrators' satisfaction with aspects of the ICSID
process, or a comparison with alternative dispute resolution venues. It also means that this
research did not assess ICSID's normative and doctrinal foundations related to award
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interest in ICSID outcomes, it is useful to offer descriptive data about
the subset of the fifty-two final awards that were the subject of analysis.
Overall, the percentage of final awards involving ICSID was reasonably
similar to the overall pre-2007 population of awards, albeit with a
slightly smaller proportion of ICSID Convention awards and slightly
larger proportions of ICSID Additional Facility and non-ICSID
awards.' 3 5 See Table 1.
TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF FINAL AWARDS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID
STATUS
Applicable Rules

Frequency

Percentage

ICSID Convention

24

46.2

ICSID Additional Facility

11

21.1

Other (UNCITRAL, SCC, etc.)

17

32.7

Total

52

100.0

B.

GeneralDifferences Between ICSID & Non-ICSID Awards

Given suggestions of ICSID bias, 136 it is appropriate to examine how
ICSID cases differ on amounts claimed and ultimate outcomes. The
objective is to consider indicators of bias by evaluating whether there
was a meaningful difference in amounts at risk and whether there were

any meaningful differences in outcome. Arguably, arbitration doctrine,
rules, and presumably the pool of arbitrators are functionally equivalent
for ICSID and non-ICSID disputes.' 3 7 Doctrinally, there is little basis
for suggesting that ICSID's procedural framework for adjudicating
cases through arbitration - whether for ICSID Convention or
Additional Facility cases - should create a different substantive
result. 3 8 Accordingly, the research hypotheses were that there would be
jurisprudence, which is the province of more traditional legal scholarship.
135. A detailed breakdown of the fifty-two final awards indicated there were twenty-four
ICSID Convention awards (46.15%), eleven ICSID Additional Facility awards (21.15%), eleven
UNCITRAL awards (21.15%), five SCC awards (9.62%), and one other award (1.92%).
136. See supra Part ll.C.

137. Although there is variation in some sub-issues, as a general matter, there is textual
similarity and harmonization among arbitration rules for ICSID Convention, ICSID Additional
Facility, SCC, and UNCITRAL. See Cedric C. Chao & James Shurz, Commentary, International
Arbitration: Selecting The Proper Forum, 22-2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 17 (2007); Parra,

supra note 47, at 54-56.
138. The main difference is doctrinal in that ICSID Convention awards have self-contained
and exclusive ICSID Convention enforcement mechanisms, whereas other awards rely on New
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no reliable statistical relationship between ICSID and either amounts
claimed or substantive outcomes. The objective was to evaluate whether
the aspirational hope was falsifiable.
The independent variable was ICSID Status as defined previously. 139
The dependent variables were (1) amounts claimed,140 (2) ultimate
winner, 14 1 and (3) amounts awarded.14 2 Using models tested in previous
scholarship, 143 this study analyzed the data using an analysis of variance
(ANOVA)'" and a Pearson's Chi-square Test of Independence (Chisquare). 145
1.

Amounts Claimed

Research used one-way ANOVA for independent groups to compare
the means of amounts claimed for ICSID versus non-ICSID cases.14 6 As
hypothesized, the results of the tests did not find a reliable statistical
relationship between amounts claimed and ICSID Status. This held true
irrespective of whether ICSID Status compared amounts for
ICSID-ALLl 47 or ICSID-Cl 48 awards. To contextualize the raw data,
York Convention enforcement. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Other major
doctrinal differences involve the ICSID Secretariat's authority to avoid registering cases with a
"manifest" lack of jurisdiction, the capacity to resolve cases at an early stage, and the power to
accept amicus submissions. These procedural aspects arguably have minimal impact on
substantive outcomes, as they do not affect the underlying legal merits of the dispute.
139. See supra notes 123-24 (defining ICSID Status as: (1) "ICSID-ALL" that compared all
ICSID cases (including ICSID Convention and Additional Facility) against cases in other arbitral
venues, and (2) "ICSID-C," namely ICSID Convention versus other New York Convention
awards (i.e., ICSID Additional Facility, SCC, and other venues)).
140. Previous research analyzed raw values of amounts claimed, and those amounts were
based upon a subset of forty-four final awards that contained data about claimed amounts. Franck,
supra note 15, at 57-59. The original skewness of the raw claimed damages was 6.792, which
was large. After winsorizing, the skewness for claimed amounts was -1.034; after log
transformations, the skewness was 0.088. Reliance on the log transformation is most appropriate
as it reduces the skewness and promotes analysis of data that most closely conform to the
underlying assumption of the statistical tests (i.e., normally distributed data) and enhances
statistical conclusion validity. This research therefore analyzed raw data, winsorized data, and
transformed data. See also Franck, supra note 23 at 456-57 (analyzing raw and winsorized data to
enhance statistical conclusion validity and allowing the analyses to operate more effectively);
Franck, supra note 14 (analyzing raw, winsorized and transformed data for amounts claimed).
141. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
143. See generallyFranck, supra note 23 (prior use of models).
144. An ANOVA analysis compares the means of two of more groups on a dependent
variable to determine if the group means are significantly different from each other. TIMOTHY C.
URDAN, STATISTICS INPLAIN ENGLISH 101-02, 117-18 (2d ed. 2005).

145. The Pearson's Chi-square (e) test evaluates whether there is a pattern of relationship
between two categorical variables or whether the variables appear to be independent and
unrelated. Id. at 161-63.
146. Of the eighty-two different cases in the dataset, forty-four cases quantified investors'
claimed damages either fully or partially. Franck, supranote 15, at 58.
147. For raw data comparing differences in ICSID-ALL cases, there was no significant
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this means that for ICSID Convention and ICSID Additional Facility
disputes, the mean amount claimed was US$424,615,349,1 49 whereas
the mean amount claimed for non-ICSID cases was US$169,463,547.so
While visually striking, the mean difference did not differ from what
one would otherwise expect due to chance alone. The generally small
effect sizes (r < 0.10) also suggest it is unlikely that the lack of
relationship between ICSID Status and amount claimed resulted from an
underpowered sample or an effect is simply so tiny that it may be
difficult to justify resources to research the effect.151 Nevertheless, out
of an abundance of caution, it would be prudent to replicate this aspect
of research before making definitive inferences beyond the dataset to
the current population.

difference (F(1,43) = 0.308; p = 0.58; n = 44) and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.08).
For winsorized data, there was no significant difference (F(1,43) = 1.103; p = 0.30; n = 44), and

the effect size was small (r = 0.16). For transformed data, there was no significant difference
(F(1,43) = 0.134; p = 0.72; n

-

44), and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.06).

148. For raw data comparing differences in ICSID-C cases, there was no significant
difference (F(1,43) = 0.911; p = 0.35; n = 44), and the effect size was small (r = 0.14). For
winsorized data, there was no difference (F(1,43) = 0.0 12; p = 0.91; n = 44), and the effect size
was less than small (r = 0.02). For transformed data, there was no difference (F(1,43) = 0.068;
p = 0.80; n = 44), and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.04).
149. The standard deviation for the raw mean of ICSID cases in the ICSID-ALL analysis was
US$170,089,435 (n = 30). For ICSID-C cases in the ICSID-C analysis, the mean amount claimed
was US$537,501,194.85 (SD = 1,938,099,681; n = 23).
150. The standard deviation for the raw mean of non-ICSID cases in the ICSID-ALL analysis
was US$268,385,246 (n = 14). For New York Convention awards in the ICSID-C analysis, the
mean amount claimed was US$130,877,269 (SD = 224,054,789; n = 21).
151. Effect sizes estimate the risk of missing a reliable statistical relationship, find the sample
size necessary to assess reliably whether a statistical relationship exists, and measure the
magnitude of a potential effect. See Franck, supra note 23, at 457-58, 461 n.132. Cohen's
conventions for understanding effect sizes suggest a "small" effect is r = 0.10, a "medium" effect
is r = 0.30, and a "large" effect r = 0.50. Effect sizes below r = 0.10 are less than "small" and
arguably of trivial impact. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 124 (2d ed. 1988); LOUis COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS INEDUCATION 113-16
(6th ed. 2007); see also FREDERICK J. GRAVETrER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, ESSENTIALS OF
STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 198-201, 345-48 (6th ed. 2007) (describing Type-I
and Type-II errors and explaining ANOVA formulas); see generally PAUL D. ELLIS, THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO EFFECT SIZES: AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL POWER, META-

ANALYSIS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS (2010); Jacob Cohen, A Power
Primer,PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 112, 155 (1992). For the ICSID-ALL and ICSID-C analyses

conducted in notes 147 and 148, post hoc power analyses suggests power was in the order of 0.20
and risk of a Type-ll error was in the order of 80%. For those less than small effect sizes
(r <0.10), the results were likely not a function of power or may simply be so small that it will be
difficult to justify resources to research the issue. For the two analyses with a small effect
(r = 0.14 and 0.16), the risk of error from an underpowered sample for inferences beyond the
dataset analyzed indicates replication is warranted.
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Ultimate Winner

To analyze the ultimate outcome, the research used a 2 x 3 crosstabulation to see if there was a reliable relationship between ICSID
Status and the ultimate outcome of ITA awards. As hypothesized, the
results demonstrated that for ICSID-ALL awards, there was no
significant pattern of relationship between the ultimate winner of a
dispute and whether disputes were brought before ICSID or another
forum (X2(2) = 0.241; p = 0.56; n = 52).152 Follow-up 2 x 2 crosstabulations likewise revealed no significant patterns of relationship
based upon ICSID-ALL and case outcome.15 3 See Table 2. There was
also no significant relationship when comparing outcomes for ICSID-C
versus New York Convention awards, either as a function of the
Omnibus Chi-Squarel 54 or the 2 x 2 follow-up comparisons.155 The lack
of a relationship between ICSID Status and the ultimate winner
remained even after removing awards codifying settlement
agreements.1 56 Given the less than small effect sizes (r < 0.10), the
failure to find a meaningful pattern of relationship may not be a function
of an underpowered sample or an effect is simply so tiny that it may be
difficult to justify resources to research the effect. Nevertheless, out of
an abundance of caution and given that certain follow-up analyses
suggested the presence of a possible small-to-medium effect' 5 7 beyond
152. The effect size for this analysis was less than small (r = 0.07), which suggests that the
result is likely not a function of an underpowered sample or may be so small that it will be
difficult to justify resources to research the issue given the lack of a statistically significant effect
and miniscule effect size.
153. For the 2 x 2 comparing ISCID-all and investor and government wins, there was no
pattern of relationship (X2(l) = 1.797; p = 0.18; n = 50; r = 0.19). For the 2 x 2 comparing
ICSID-ALL and investor wins and settlements, there was no pattern of relationship
((l) = 1.523; p = 0.22; n = 22; r = 0.26). For the 2 x 2 comparing ICSID-ALL and government
2
wins and settlement, there was no pattern of relationship (X (l) = 0.711; p = 0.40; n = 32;
r = 0.15). As the effect sizes are in the small-to-medium range, replication of the analyses is
warranted, particularly as post hoc power analyses suggest that the power of the analyses models
ranges from 0.20-0.30 and the related risk of Type-II error is in the 70-80% range.
154. For the omnibus analysis, there was no pattern of relationship (X2(2) = 0.781; p = 0.61;
n = 52), and the effect size for this was small (r = 0.12).
155. For the 2 x 2 comparing ISCID-C and investor and government wins, there was no
pattern of relationship (;2(1) = 0.483; p = 0.49; n = 50; r = 0.10). For the 2 x 2 comparing
ICSID-C and investor wins and settlements, there was no pattern of relationship (X2(1) = 0.08;
p = 0.78; n = 22; r = 0.06). For the 2 x 2 comparing ICSID-C and government wins and
2
settlement, there was no pattern of relationship (Q(1) = 0.001; p = 0.99; n = 32; r < 0.01). As the
effect sizes for all of these calculations are small (r = 0.10) or less than small, it suggests the
result is likely not a function of an underpowered sample or an effect is simply so tiny that it may
be difficult to justify resources to research the effect.
156. See supra notes 153, 155 (demonstrating a lack of relationship in the 2 x 2 analyses that
examined differences purely between investor and government wins).
157. For those analyses in notes 153, 154, and 155 where r > 0.10, the power ranged from
0.20-0.30, which indicates there is a 70-80% risk of a Type-II error when attempting to make
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the pre-2007 population analyzed here, the low power and related risk
of error suggests that it would be prudent to replicate this aspect of
research before making conclusive inferences about the current
population.
TABLE 2: ICSID STATUS OF AWARD & FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF THE
ULTIMATE WINNER OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION CASE

ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility
Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

Investor
Win
11

Government
Win
22

Settlement
Award
2

Total
35

9

8

0

17

52
2
30
20
Total
* None of the observed frequencies differed from what would be expected
due to chance.

3.

Amounts Awarded

As another way to analyze whether ICSID is linked to arbitration
outcome, the research used a one-way ANOVA for independent groups
to compare the mean amount awarded in ICSID versus non-ICSID
cases. As hypothesized, there was no reliable statistical relationship
between the mean amount awarded and resolving an ITA dispute at
ICSID or at some other forum. This was true irrespective of whether the
tests looked at aggregated ICSID awards (ICSID-ALL)'5 s or ICSID
Convention awards (ICSID-C).15 9 As an example, using winsorized
inferences beyond the pre-2007 population. Replication with expanded data and statistical control
is therefore warranted.
158. For raw data, there was no significant difference (F(1,50) = 1.576; p = 0.22; n = 52),
and the effect size was small (r = 0.18). For winsorized data, there was no significant difference
(F(1,50) = 0.183; p = 0.67; n = 52), and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.06). For the
log-transformed data, there was no significant difference (F(1,50) = 1.529; p = 0.22; n = 52), and

the effect size was small (r = 0.17). For inverse-transformed data, there was no significant
difference (F(1,50) = 1.643; p = 0.21; n = 52), and the effect size was likewise small (r = 0.18).
For the analyses where r = 0.18 or 0.17 and n = 52, the power was between 0.20 and 0.30, which
suggests a Type-II error rate of 70-80% that warrants replication of the analysis before drawing
inferences beyond the pre-2007 population.
159. For raw data, there was no significant difference (F(1,50) = 0.324; p = 0.57; n = 52),

and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.08). For winsorized data, there was no significant
difference (F(1,50) = 0.028; p = 0.87; n = 52), and the effect size was less than small (r -0.02).
For the log-transformed data, there was no significant difference (F(1,50) = 0.158; p = 0.69;
n = 52), and the effect size was less than small (r = 0.06). For inverse-transformed data, there was
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data,160 the mean amount awarded for ICSID Convention and ICSID
Additional Facility disputes was US$1,178,081 (n = 35),161 whereas the

mean amount awarded in non-ICSID cases was US$1,446,001
(n = 17).162 The lack of a reliable relationship between ICSID Status and
amounts awarded means that ICSID could not be the statistical cause of
the outcome for the dataset analyzed. Given the many miniscule effect
sizes (technically defined as less than small as Cohen's conventions
define a "small" effect as r = 0.10-.29)163 of the analyses, the failure to
reject the null hypothesis may not purely be a function of an
underpowered sample and the 70-80% risk of statistical error. It may be
a byproduct of the fact that the relevant effect may simply be so small
that it will be difficult to justify resources to pursue research on the
effect. Nevertheless, the analyses on the pre-2007 population that used
log- and inverse-transformed data suggested that there was a possibility
of a small effect on ICSID-ALL outcomes (r = 0.17 or 0.18). Thus,
replication with additional statistical control would be prudent before
making conclusive inferences about the current population based upon
these initial findings.
4.

Discussion

All of the statistical analyses failed to identify a statistically
significant pattern among ICSID Status, amounts claimed, or outcome.
The consistency in these results and small to less than small effect sizes
offer a uniform narrative. For the dataset studied from prior to 2007, the
no significant difference (F(1,50) = 0.149; p - 0.70; n = 52), and the effect size was also less
than small (r = 0.06). The power is technically below 0.20 and involves an 80% or higher risk of
a Type-II error. Nevertheless, given the lack of statistically significant effects and uniformly less
than small effect sizes, the results may not simply be the byproduct of a lack of power as the
effects may be so small that it will be difficult to justify resources to research the effect.
160. If there are anomalies and outliers in the dataset, the data can be corrected in different
ways, for example by using winsorizing or trimming procedures. Trimming involves removing a
data point, and decisions to "remove a data point (or participant) should not be taken lightly."
JOHN J. SHAUGNESSY, ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 403 (7th ed. 2006). If data

are winsorized, statistical procedures are used and the outlier is replaced with a data point that
reflects the mean. See W.J. Dixon, Simplified Estimationfrom Censored Normal Samples, 31
ANNALS MATH. STAT. 385, 385 (1960). The winsorizing procedure allows all data points to be
kept, while correcting for the skewness (i.e., either positive or negative) that the outlier would
have had on the mean. Winsorizing here involved identifying and converting extreme values in
data into the upper or lower bounds of the distribution of the normal curve. John W. Tukey, The
Future ofDataAnalysis, 33 ANNALS MATH. STAT. 1, 18-19 (1962). The use of winsorized data
was also preferrable to trimmed data as the skewing of the trimmed data (2.43 7) was higher than
that of the winsorized data (1.414). See also supra note 132.
161. Using the raw data for all ICSID cases, the mean award was US$5,304,954
(SD = 22,532,273; n = 35).

162. Using the raw data from all non-ICSID administered cases, the mean award was
US$20,857,559 (SD = 66,406,812; n = 17).
163. See supra note 151.
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tests did not support the hypothesis that ICSID awards were statistically
different from other arbitration forums. The initial evidence of possible
statistical equivalence - both at the initiation and the end of the
primary adjudicative process - begins to undercut the argument that
ICSID is somehow biased or that the arbitration process is unfairly tilted
to favor either investors or states.
Although the pattern was not statistically significant - in contrast to
the suggestions that investors benefitted by ICSID jurisdiction - state
respondents at ICSID won almost twice as many cases. The small or
less than small effect sizes for ICSID Status (typically r < 0.10)164
suggest that, even though the null hypothesis (that is, no differences
related to ICSID Status) must be retained for the pre-2007 population,
the analyses may not be underpowered for making inferences beyond
the dataset or the potential effects are simply so tiny that it may be
difficult to justify resources to research the effect. The dataset was realworld data, and sample sizes could not have been increased to enhance
statistical power because the awards represented the defined population
with a prescribed timeframe. As a result, the initial probabilistic
evidence undercuts assertions that investment arbitration "is not a fair,
independent, and balanced method for the resolution of investment
disputes."1 65
Given the overall pattern of this general data, it seems reasonable to
suggest that ICSID was not a forum where the outcomes of awards were
predetermined or substantially different from other arbitral venues. This
initial evidence also begins to undercut the case for radical overhaul or
outright rejection of ICSID as an acceptable forum. Nevertheless,
replication of these analyses, with additional data and more
sophisticated models controlling for extraneous variance that may
otherwise affect the validity of inferences, is sensible given the low
power for the purpose of making inferences beyond the population
studied. Replication would aid in the assessment of this pre-2007
baseline and increase our confidence in assessing whether the current
population is evolving in a similar or markedly different manner.166
164. The largest effect size related to follow-up analyses related to who won and lost
(r = 0.26). See supra note 153. In that instance, the power of the analysis is approximately 0.40
(N 50; S = 47), which would suggest that the statistical probability that the null hypothesis has
been improperly retained is approximately 60%. A liberal approach to an a priori power analysis
(r = 0.80; S = 120) would suggest a sample size of N = 120 could reliably detect a statistically
significant effect. Using a more conservative a priori power analysis with the smallest effect size
(r = 0.02; S = 781), supra note 159, a sample to catch the smallest effect would be 782.
165. Public Statement, supra note 10, 1 8.
166. Replication might also involve qualitative research with sound ex ante methodology to
understand groups of cases with contextual nuances. Offering quantitative analysis with a holistic
view is fundamental to having a balanced understanding of the system that minimizes the impact
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C. ICSID's Relationship with Energy Disputes, Latin American
Respondents, and Development Status
Given the basic nature of the foregoing models, to the extent the
dataset size permits, it is prudent to control for other variables and to
evaluate their possible contribution to both initial arbitration risk and
actual outcome. This Section therefore analyzes how the dependent
variables and ICSID Status relate to other independent variables,
including (1) Energy disputes, (2) the presence of a Latin American
respondent, and (3) the respondent state's Development Status.
1.

Energy Disputes

Previous descriptive research identified that Energy disputes were the
single largest proportion (23.17%) of ITA dataset. 167 Foreign
investments in the energy sector can be high-value and long-term,1 68
and investment treaty disputes can likewise involve large amounts.169
Given the prevalence, potential value, and political sensitivity of energy
disputes, it is helpful to ascertain whether "Energy" 70 disputes
contributed meaningfully to the variance in ICSID outcomes. As
analysis suggested there was no statistically meaningful difference in
amounts claimed for Energy and non-Energy disputes, 17 1 the research
of cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, which inhibit an accurate understanding. See Jane
Risen & Thomas Gilovitch, Informal Logical Fallacies,in CRITICAL THINKING INPSYCHOLOGY
110, 112-13 (Robert J. Sternberg et al., eds., 2007) (exploring logical fallacies, like confirmation
bias, whereby people favor information that confirms their preconceptions to gather, analyze, and
interpret information selectively to report their findings in a biased manner); see also BARON,
supra note 123, at 171-77, 191-92, 221-27; Joshua Klayman, Varieties ofConfirmation Bias, in
DECISIONMAKING FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 385-95 (Jerome Busemeyer et al., eds.
1995) (discussing confirmation bias).
167. Franck, supra note 15, at 41-43.
168. PETER CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY (2009); see also David Elward, ICSID Releases New Caseload Stats, GLOBAL ARB.
REV., Sept. 5, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/41ahhwf (discussing the predominant scope of energy
disputes at ICSID and describing how "'energy sector [investments] typically involve substantial,
long-term commitments'); InternationalEnergy Investment Law: The Pursuit ofStability, ICSID
BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://tinyurl.com/4klwaq3 (discussing the "high value" of

energy disputes).
169. Law firms have practice groups devoted to these disputes. See, e.g., Energy Disputes:
Overview, HERBERT SMITH LLP, http://tinyurl.com/4764yuw (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(describing practice in "high value" energy disputes).
170. This variable used the Code Book's definition of "Energy" disputes: "Infrastructure
investments related to: (a) electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; (b) natural gas
exploration, transmission or distribution; (c) oil exploration, transmission or distribution; and (d)
dam construction and/or hydro-electric projects." Susan Franck, Code Book - EmpiricalAnalysis
of Cost Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration, http://tinyurl.com/31ls6jw (last visited Apr. 5,

2011) [hereinafter Code Book]. The presence of an Energy dispute was categorized as a binary
variable (0 = Non-Energy; I = Energy).

171. Forty-four awards had either partial or complete data on amounts claimed. Using raw
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hypothesis was that the presence of an Energy dispute, whether at
ICSID or elsewhere, would not affect outcome.
Given that there is no prior literature about the intersection of Energy
disputes and outcome, it is useful to provide preliminary analyses for
Energy and outcome before conducting analyses to consider the
relationship with ICSID. Two groups of tests analyzed the independent
variables ICSID Status and Energy. Initial analyses used a Chi-square
cross-tabulation to see if there was a statistically significant pattern of
relationship between Energy disputes and the ultimate winner. A second
test used an ANOVA 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design to analyze
the effect of ICSID Status, Energy disputes, and their interaction on the
mean amount awarded.
a.

General Energy Outcomes

As hypothesized, the results did not reveal a statistically significant
pattern of relationship between Energy disputes and outcome. Table 3
demonstrates that, irrespective of whether an Energy or non-Energy
dispute was involved, investor wins, state wins, and settlement
agreements were not statistically different (/(2) = 0.529; p = 0.77;
n = 52; r = 0.10). Simple 2 x 2 follow-up analyses confirmed that there
was likewise no statistically meaningful difference for Energy disputes
when comparing (1) investor and government wins (X = 0.090;
p = 0.76;

n = 50;

r = 0.04),

(2)

investor

wins

and

settlements

data, the mean amount claimed for Energy disputes was US$156,669,038 (n = 8;
SD = 155,250,729); the mean amount claimed for non-Energy disputes was US$384,933,273
(n = 36; SD = 1,557,895,347); and a 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA analyzing ICSID-ALL
awards and Energy showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and Energy disputes on claimed
amounts (F(1,40) = 0.005; p = 0.94; r = 0.01), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.124; p

=

0.73; n = 44; r = 0.06), and (3) no main effect (i.e., the mean differences in

claimed amounts were not statistically significant) for Energy (F(1,40) = 0.089; p = 0.77; n = 44;
r = 0.05). Even follow-up comparisons (HSD = 1,253,440,256; k = 4) of cell means reflected no
significant differences. Using winsorized data, the mean amount claimed for Energy disputes was
US$29,626,750 (n = 8; SD = 13,663,780); the mean amount claimed for non-Energy disputes
was US$27,555,641 (n = 36; SD = 157,651,44); and a 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA analyzing
ICSID-ALL and Energy showed (1) no interaction between ICSID Status and Energy on claimed
amounts (F(1,40) = 0.461; p = 0.50; n = 44; r = 0.11), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 1.702; p = 0.20; r = 0.20), and (3) no main effect on amounts claimed as a result of
the existence of an Energy dispute (F(1,40) = 0.224; p = 0.64; n = 44; r = 0.08). Follow-up

comparisons (HSD = 17,699,481; k = 4) likewise reflected no significant differences across
conditions. Transformed data likewise did not show a significant statistical effect of Energy on
amounts claimed (F(1,40) = 0.413; p = 0.52; n = 44; r = 0.10) at either the macro-level or the
micro-level after pairwise comparisons (HSD = 1.088; k = 4). Given that most of these analyses
had an effect size of r < 0.10, the failure to reject the null hypothesis may not derive from an
underpowered dataset. Given that two effect sizes for Energy disputes were small (r = 0.10 for
transformed data and r = 0.11 for winsorized data) and that the power of those analyses are 0.20
with an 80% risk of a Type-lI error, caution is warranted and replication required to assess the
link between Energy disputes and amounts claimed for the current population.

Vx= 0.488; p
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0.49; n = 22; r = 0.15), and (3) government wins and

settlements (= 0.395; p = 0.53; n = 32; r = 0.11). In other words,
statistical tests could not identify a reliable relationship between Energy
and whether an investor won, a state won, or settlements. Nevertheless,
given that two analyses suggested that a small effect may be present for
Energy outcomes, for inferences beyond the pre-2007 population
analyzed here, 72 it would be prudent to replicate these initial findings
before making definitive conclusions about current population.
TABLE 3: ENERGY DISPUTES & FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF THE
ULTIMATE WINNER OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION CASE
Investor

Government

Settlement

Win

Win

Award

Total

Energy Disputes

4

5

0

9

Non-Energy Disputes

16

25

2

43

Total

20

30

2

52

* None of the observed frequencies differed from what would be expected
due to chance.

b.

Energy & Amounts Awarded at ICSID

As regards the effect of Energy disputes on amounts awarded at
ICSID or non-ICSID cases, an ANOVA revealed three things. First,
using winsorized data, there was no statistically significant interaction
among ICSID-ALL awards, Energy disputes, and the amounts tribunals
awarded (F(1,48) = 0.929; p = 0.34; n = 52; r = 0.14).173 Second,
ICSID Status (that is, comparing all awards rendered at ICSID versus
other non-ICSID arbitration venues) had no main effect on amounts
tribunals awarded (F(1,48) = 0.842; p = 0.36; n = 52; r = 0.13).174
172. As many effect sizes were small or less than small (r < 0.10), the results may not suffer
from a power problem as the potential effect of Energy may be negligible. For the small effect
sizes (r = 0.15 and r = 0.10), however, a post hoc power analysis suggests that the power was
between 0.20-0.30, which suggests a 70-80% risk of a Type-II statistical error and a need for
replication given an underpowered sample.
173. There was likewise no significant interaction with ICSID, Energy, and amounts awarded
when analyzing ICSID Status as a function of ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards
using raw data (F(1,48) = 0.908; p = 0.35; n = 52; r = 0.14), winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.114;
p = 0.74; n = 52; r = 0.05), log-transformed data (F(1,48) = 0.680; p = 0.41; n = 52; r = 0.12), or
inverse-transformed data (F(1,48) = 0.929; p = 0.34; n = 52; r = 0.14).

174. There was likewise no main effect on amounts awarded for ICSID-C awards versus New
York Convention awards when using raw data (F(1,48) = 0.043; p = 0.84; n = 52; r = 0.03),
winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.114; p =0.74; n =52; r =0.05), log-transformed data
(F(1,48) =0.697; p=0.41; n= 52; r=0.12), or inverse-transformed data (F(1,48) =0.842;
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Third, there was no main effect for the existence of an Energy dispute
(F(1,48) = 0.025; p = 0.88; n = 52; r = 0.02).175

Even follow-up

comparisons (HSD = 2,260,112; k = 4) of the non-significant results did
not reveal any latent differences in amounts awarded for different
combinations of Energy disputes and ICSID Status.176 Using raw data' 77
with statistical outliers or two different types of transformed data with
minimal skewing,17 there was likewise no mean difference in the
amount awarded, even conducting follow-up comparisons.' 79 As
hypothesized, the results could not identify that the mean amount
awarded differed as a function of ICSID Status, the presence of an
Energy dispute, or an interaction of those variables. See Table 4. Some
of the analyses suggested possible small effects and exhibited a risk of a
Type-II error beyond the standard acceptable rate of 20%. For the
purposes of inferring beyond the pre-2007 population analyzed here,' 8 0
it would therefore be prudent to replicate the research before making
conclusive inferences about the current population based on these initial
findings.

p = 0.36; n = 52; r = 0.13).

175. When analyzing ICSID Status for ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards, there
was likewise no main effect for Energy disputes when analyzing raw data (F(1,48) = 1.167;
p = 0.29; n = 52; r = 0.154), winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.423; p = 0.52; n = 52; r = 0.09), log-

transformed data (F(1,48) =0.198; p =0.66; n = 52; r =0.06), or inverse-transformed data
(F(1,48) = 0.025; p = 0.88; n = 52; r = 0.02).

176. For ICSID-C awards, there were likewise no statistically significant simple effects when
comparing cell means using winsorized data (HSD = 2,260,446; k = 4) or log-transformed data
(HSD = 3.502; k = 4).
177. For raw data, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 1.594; p = 0.21; n = 52; r = 0.18), no

main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.01 2 ;p = 0.92; n = 52; r = 0.02), and no main effect for
Energy (F(1,48) = 0.557; p = 0.46; n = 52; r = 0.11).

178. For the log transformations, there was no interaction (F(1,48) =0.215; p= 0.65; n= 52;
r= 0.07), no main effect for ICSID (F(1,48)= 1.390; p= 0.24 ; n= 52; r= 0.17), and no main
effect for Energy (F(1,48) = 0.079; p = 0.78; n = 52; r = 0.04). For the inverse transformations,
there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 0.296; p = 0.59; n = 52; r = 0.08), no main effect for ICSID
(F(1,48) = 1.727; p = 0.20; n = 52; r = 0.19), and no main effect for Energy (F(1,48) < 0.001;
p = 0.99; n = 52; r < 0.01).

179. For raw (HSD = 43,985,527; k = 4) data, the log-transformed data (HSD = 3.479; k= 4)
and the inverse-transformed data (HSD = 0.526; k = 4) analyzing ICSID-ALL awards, no simple
effects were present when comparing cell means.
180. The effects that were present had r values that ranged from 0.12-.18, which meant the
power ranged from below 0.20-.30, suggesting a 70% or greater risk of a Type-tI error. Many of
the effect sizes, however, were less than small (r < 0.10), which suggests those analyses may not
necessarily simply suffer from a lack of statistical power or may be so small as to not justify
future research.
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TABLE 4: WINSORIZED DATA OF MEAN AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED
BY INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID STATUS &
PRESENCE OF AN ENERGY DISPUTE (n = 52)

ICSID Status
ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

Energy Dispute
Present

Amount
Standard
Mean
Deviation

Total

Energy

1,418,884

2,837,769

4

Non-Energy

1,147,010

2,112,406

31

Energy

1,954,707

2,407,804

5

Non-Energy

1,234,041

1,923,250

12

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

Table 3 indicated that there was no reliable relationship between
Energy disputes and outcome of investment arbitration generally.
Rather, the number of investor and state wins in Energy disputes was
relatively balanced. Similarly, no strong trends appeared in Table 4.
Irrespective of ICSID's involvement, the models could not prove that
the amounts awarded were statistically different regardless of whether
disputes were Energy or non-Energy. Likewise, the models did not
demonstrate that ICSID tribunals or tribunals in other venues exhibited
statistically different awards in Energy and non-Energy cases. Although
Energy disputes had numerically higher amounts awarded, this
difference was not statistically meaningful.
c.

Discussion

None of the statistical analyses could ascertain a statistically
meaningful difference in relationships involving ICSID Status, Energy
disputes, and arbitration awards. The consistency in results and small
effect sizes for this pre-2007 data offered a uniform narrative: The
outcomes for Energy disputes were not statistically different, regardless
of whether the dispute was adjudicated at ICSID or another arbitral
forum. The initial evidence from the dataset suggests that awards at
ICSID and other venues were statistically equivalent and begins to
undercut the argument that ICSID is somehow meaningfully different
than other arbitration forums. The initial evidence also could not
demonstrate that the arbitration process was tilted to favor investors,
even when controlling for the effect of ICSID, Energy, or some
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interaction of those variables. Because there was not even a reliable
statistical relationship among those variables, based upon these models,
it would be inaccurate to suggest that the existence of an ICSID
arbitration causes a result.
As most of the effect sizes for the pre-2007 population were less than
small (r < 0.10) and the relationships were non-significant, those
models may not suffer from a power problem requiring a larger sample
before making inferences beyond the dataset. Nevertheless, as some
analyses indicated the potential presence of a "small" effect
(r < 0.20),1s' the power of those analyses was low and the risk of a

Type-II error was beyond traditionally acceptable levels. It would be
prudent to replicate this research to control for additional variance and
analyze additional data before drawing definitive inferences about the
current population.182
2.

Latin American Respondents

Latin American presidents have publicly expressed skepticism of
ICSID's capacity to render unbiased awards.183 Some commentators
suggest that Latin America faces an inordinate number of investment
treaty disputes at ICSID. 184 Archival data of the eighty-two pre-2007
disputes with a public award indicated that Latin American respondents
(LA) were 40.2% (n = 33) of that population, whereas the remaining
59.8% (n = 49) were not Latin American states.18 5 Given the
181. There were small effect sizes in the various analyses (r = 0.14, r = 0.14, r = 0.13,
r =0.15, r=0.12; r=0.12; r=0.17,r =0.18, r =0.11, and r = 0.19; n =52). See supra notes

173-75, 177, and 178. Post hoc power analysis suggests that the power of the models for the pre2007 data was between 0.20-0.30, which suggests a 70% or greater risk of a Type-H statistical
error. Replication of these results is therefore warranted before drawing more inferences about the
current population.
182. Using a conservative approach to look for the smallest effect size (r = 0.02, supra note
175) in the four-condition model, a sample of 1562 final arbitration awards would be required.
This would be for an analysis with an effect of 0.10 (S = 781) with 80% power (N= n (781 / 2) x
k (4)). Using a more liberal a priori analysis with the largest effect size (r = 0.19), supra note 178,
the sample would require 382 awards (S = 191; r = 0.20; N= n (191 / 2) x k (4)) to create 80%
power and a 20% risk of a Type-II error.
183. See supra note 89 (discussing criticism of ICSID by Ecuador's President); Franck, supra
note 15, at 48 (quoting Bolivian President Evo Morales saying, "Governments from Latin
America and I think all over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always win.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations:Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and
Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 725, 745-46 (2008); Rebecca
Dreyfus, Latin America Faces 61% of Ongoing Mining Cases at the International Centerfor
Settlement of Investment Disputes, NETWORK FOR JUSTICE IN GLOBAL INVESTMENT (Feb. 26,

2010), http://tinyurl.com/48aueyh.
185. Using an existing definition from another context in conformity with social science
practices, the Code Book defined a Latin American state (Latin America) as a country "listed in
http://lanic.utexas.edu/subject/countries, excluding Puerto Rico as it is a United States territory,"
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sensitivities articulated by heads of state and the withdrawals from the
international investment regime by Latin American governments, 186 it is
critical to consider how the "LA" variable contributed, if at all, to
ICSID cases in the pre-2007 population. This Subsection explores
whether there was a difference in amounts claimed in cases against
Latin America, who the ultimate winner in LA cases was, and whether
amounts awarded were somehow related to ICSID Status.
a.

Amounts Claimed

Data from forty-four awards were used to analyze amounts claimed
to compare LA and non-LA respondents. Raw data that included
statistical outliers revealed that the mean amount claimed against LA
respondents was US$142,173,117 (n = 14; SD = 140,670,846); the
mean amount claimed against non-LA
respondents was
US$437,350,883 (n = 30; SD = 1,705,641,271).187 The question is
whether these claims differed as a function of LA respondents, ICSID
Status, or an interaction of those variables. On the theory that Latin
American investments are not necessarily more or less valuable than
comparable investments in other states, the research hypotheses were
that there would be no difference in amounts claimed against LA and
non-LA respondents.
A 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA factorial using winsorized data to
control for skewing caused by statistical outliers demonstrated three
things. First, for ICSID-ALL awards, there was no statistically
significant interaction among ICSID Status, LA respondents, and the
mean amount claimed (F(1,40) = 1.133; p = 0.29; n = 44; r = 0.16).188

Second, ICSID had no main effect on the mean amount investors
claimed (F(1,40) = 0.026; p = 0.87; n = 44; r = 0.03).189 Third, there

was a main effect for LA respondents, such that there was a statistically
including Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, French
Guiana, Grenada, Guadalupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent &
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Turks & Caicos, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Virgin
Islands (LA = 1). See Code Book, supra note 170. All other states were coded as not Latin
American states (LA = 0).

186. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
187. The mean amount claimed in LA disputes for the winsorized data, which minimized
skewing caused by statistical outliers, was US$34,384,481 (n = 14; SD = 10,627,298), and the
mean amount claimed in non-LA disputes for the winsorized data was US$24,921,144 (n = 30;
SD = 16,306,131).
188. The was likewise no significant interaction when analyzing ICSID-C awards
(F(1,40) = 1.065; p = 0.31; n = 44; r = 0.16).

189. There was likewise no main effect for ICSID-C awards (F(1,40) = 0.007; p = 0.93;
n = 44; r = 0.01).
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significant difference between the mean amount claimed by investors
(F(1,40) = 4.476; p = 0.04; n = 44; r = 0.32). Pairwise comparisons

using an HSD 90 revealed that, in keeping with the research hypothesis,
there was no difference in amounts claimed in ICSID cases for LA and
non-LA disputes. Contrary to the research hypothesis, there was a
difference between non-ICSID cases such that the mean amount
claimed against LA respondents was higher than the mean amount
claimed against non-LA respondents.' 9 ' Raw' 92 and inversetransformed' 93 data generally mirrored these results, with the exception
that all main effects were descriptive and there was otherwise no
statistically meaningful difference in amounts claimed by virtue of an
ICSID venue, an LA respondent, or a combination of those variables.

190. For this model (k = 4) based on winsorized data, the HSD was 16,942,718.
191. Similarly, there was no significant main effect for Latin America when analyzing
ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards (F(1,40) = 3.332; p = 0.08; n = 44; r = 0.28).
Although approaching significance, follow-up pairwise comparisons (HSD = 17,061,003; k = 4)
did not reveal any differences in amounts claimed against LA respondents for either ICSID-C or
New York Convention awards.
192. For all ICSID-ALL awards, using raw data to analyze LA and amounts claimed, the
analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID Status and LA on claimed amounts
(F(1,40) = 0.126; p = 0.73; n =44; r =0.06), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.152; p = 0.70; r = 0.06), and (3) no main effect for LA (F(1,40) = 0.205; p = 0.65;
n = 44; r = 0.07). Even follow-up comparisons did not reveal any significant simple effects
across conditions (HSD = 1,650,857,407; k = 4). For ICSID-C awards, the analysis showed, (1)
no interaction between ICSID Status and LA on claimed amounts (F(1,40) = 0.077; p = 0.78;
n = 44; r = 0.04), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,40) = 0.416; p = 0.52; n = 44;
r = 0.10), and (3) no main effect for LA (F(1,40) = 0.217; p = 0.64; n = 44; r = 0.07). Similarly,

follow-up comparisons did not reveal any statistically significant differences
(HSD = 1,647,014,406; k = 4).
193. For ICSID-ALL awards, transformed data analyzing the effect of LA on amounts
claimed, the analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID Status and LA on claimed
amounts (F(1,40) = 0.399; p = 0.53; n = 44; r = 0.10), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.016; p = 0.90; n = 44; r = 0.02), and (3) no main effect for LA (F(1,40) = 1.277;

p = 0.27; n = 44; r = 0.18). Follow-up comparisons revealed no significant simple effects
(HSD = 1.091; k = 4). For ICSID-C awards analyzing the effect of LA, the analysis showed (1)
no interaction between ICSID Status and LA on claimed amounts (F(1,40) = 0.002; p = 0.96;
n = 44; r = 0.01), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,40) = 0.192; p = 0.66; n = 44;
r = 0.07), and (3) no main effect for LA (F(1,40) = 1.109; p = 0.30; n = 44; r = 0.16). Follow-up

comparisons revealed no statistically significant differences among cell means (HSD = 1.093;
k = 4).
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TABLE 5: WINSORIZED DATA OF MEAN AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED
BY INVESTORS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID STATUS & PRESENCE OF A LATIN
AMERICAN RESPONDENT (n = 44)
Amount

ICSID Status

Latin American
Respondent
Present

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Total

LA Respondent

33,302,050

11,866,203

11

Non-LA

27,428,635

15,629,626

19

LA Respondent

38,353,394

0

3

Non-LA

25,590,025

17,285,455

11

ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

As hypothesized, for the pre-2007 population, the results could not
support the conclusions that the mean amount claimed differed as a
function of an ICSID venue by itself or when combining ICSID Status
and the presence of a LA respondent. This model revealed that the
amounts involved in ICSID arbitration were not substantially different
for LA respondents.
Yet, the pre-2007 population indicated Latin American respondents
were affected in an unexpected way. The winsorized data revealed a
statistically significant effect for LA status, and follow-up comparisons
revealed the difference in amounts claimed against LA respondents was
not attributable to ICSID. The difference in amounts claimed was
statistically attributable only to non-ICSID disputes, such that amounts
claimed against LA respondents in three cases were higher than non-LA
respondents in eleven cases. The tests did not reveal a statistically
meaningful difference for the mean amount claimed against LA
respondents at ICSID. See Table 5.
These initial findings for the pre-2007 population chip away at the
idea that ICSID arbitration resulted in materially different risk for LA
respondents; it also disrupts the idea that Latin American respondents
facing ICSID arbitration experienced higher amounts claimed. Although
there were only three LA respondents in the subset, the findings do
suggest, however, that Latin American states' concerns of perceived
bias in arbitration are worthy of exploration in the context of non-ICSID
arbitration. The difference in amounts claimed (arguably one of the
primary and memorable experiences in arbitration in that it gives states
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a sense of their potential risk and fiscal exposure) may form a basis of
legitimate concern. The data, however, suggest that discontent (at least
as regards the pre-2007 population) should not be attributed to ICSID,
as the effect was only present in non-ICSID cases. This adds credence
to the argument that radical reform or rejection of ICSID may be
unnecessary, but it also suggests that further exploration of differential
arbitration risk in non-ICSID arbitrations is appropriate.
However, as the significant effect of higher claimed damages against
LA respondents in non-ICSID cases was not present in analyses of the
raw and transformed data for the pre-2007 population, replication of this
research is necessary. Given the small number of cases against Latin
American respondents in non-ICSID forums, it would be prudent to
avoid strong inferences and confirm whether this effect is replicable and
an ongoing population parameter. Although many of the effect sizes
were less than small (r < 0.10), the possible small effects (r = 0.18) in
some of the non-significant analyses suggests replication is also
warranted to address potentially underpowered samplesl 94 and replicate
the significant findings before drawing firm conclusions about the
current population.195
b.

Ultimate Outcome

The process and doctrines of ITA are reasonably similar across
institutions, and systematic bias against LA respondents - or any
respondent - should be unacceptable as a normative matter.196 The
research hypothesis and normative hope was that there should be no
difference in outcomes as a function of ICSID Status, the presence of an
LA respondent, or a combination of these variables. Two models were
used to analyze the hypothesis. First, an initial analysis used a Chisquare cross-tabulation to see if there was a statistically significant
pattern of relationship between disputes with LA respondents and the
ultimate winner. Second, a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design

194. The six small effect sizes were r = 0.16, r = 0.16, r = 0.10, r = 0.10, r = 0.18, and

r = 0.16. See supra notes 188, 191-93. Post hoc power analysis suggests that the power of the
models for the pre-2007 data was between 0.20-0.30, which suggests a 70-80% risk of a Type-I
error. For the nearly medium effect (r = 0.28) comparing ICISID-C and New York Convention
awards, the power of the analysis was 0.50, which suggests a 50% risk of a Type-II error. Given
the low power, replication is warranted before drawing definitive inferences from the initial data.
195. Using a conservative approach to look for the smallest effect size (r = 0.10, supra notes
192-93) in the four-condition model, a sample of 1562 final arbitration awards would be
required. This would be for an analysis with an effect of 0.10 (S = 781) with 80% power (N= n
(781 / 2) x k (4)). Using a less conservative approach (r = 0.20; S= 191), the requisite sample
size would be 382.
196. Franck, supra note 23, at 437-38.
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analyzed the effects of two independent variables, namely ICSID Status
and the presence of a LA respondent on the mean amount awarded.
As regards the Chi-square analyses, as hypothesized, the results could not
prove a statistically significant pattern of relationship between disputes with
LA respondents and outcome. Table 6 shows the numbers of investor wins,
government wins, and settlement agreements were not statistically different
(f(2)= 1.065; p = 0.59; n = 52; r = 0.14). Simple two-way follow-up

analyses confirmed that there is likewise no statistically significant pattern
between (1) investor and government wins (V(1) = 0.137; p = 0.71; n = 50;
r = 0.05), (2) investor wins and settlements (xl) = 1.026; p = 0.31; n = 22;

r = 0.22), and (3) government wins and settlements (V(1)=.834; p = 0.36;
n = 32; r = 0.16).197 In other words, statistical tests could not identify a
meaningfully different pattern of relationship between Latin American
respondents and whether an investor won, a state won, or the case resulted in
a settlement agreement. Nevertheless, given that two analyses (both related
to the effect of settlement agreements) suggested the possibility of a small
effect of LA status, the statistical power for making inferences beyond the
analyzed dataset was low.198 Before making conclusive inferences about the
current population, replication of these initial results is warranted.
TABLE 6: LATIN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS AND FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN
OF THE ULTIMATE WINNER OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
CASE

Investor
Win

Government
Win

Settlement
Award

Total

Latin American

7

9

0

16

Non-Latin American

13

21

2

36

Total

20

30

2

52

* None of the observed frequencies diferedfrom what would be expected
due to chance.

197. When the "ultimate win" variable is condensed to a binary respondent wins or loses,
there was likewise no statistically significant relationship with Latin American respondents
(V(1) = 0.138; p = 0.71; n = 50; r = 0.05). This model is the equivalent of the first two-way
follow-up.
198. As the comparison between LA and non-LA respondents was less than small (r < 0.10)
for the investor versus government wins, this suggests that the results did not suffer from a power
problem or the potential effect was likely negligible. For the small effect sizes (r = 0.22 and
r = 0.16), which were linked to comparisons with settlements, a post hoc power analysis suggests
that the power was between 0.20-0.30, which suggests a 70-80% risk of a Type-II statistical
error. Replication with expanded data is warranted to address the likely underpowered inferences.
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Amounts Awarded

As regards the ANOVA, the results indicated three things. First,
using winsorized data to analyze ICSID-ALL, there was no statistically
significant interaction among ICSID Status, disputes with LA
respondents, and the amounts awarded (F(1,48) = 0.842; p = 0.36;
n = 52; r = 0. 13).199 Second, ICSID Status (that is, all awards at ICSID

versus non-ICSID awards) had no main effect on amounts tribunals
awarded (F(1,48) = 0.007; p = 0.93; n = 52; r = 0.01).200 Third, there
was no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.752; p = 0.39;

n = 52; r = 0.12).201 Follow-up analyses of cell means also revealed no
latent significant differences across conditions (HSD = 2,206,190;
k = 4).202 Even conducting the same analysis but using raw,203 logtransformed,204 or inverse-transformed205 data, there were likewise no
199. There was likewise no significant interaction when analyzing ICSID Status for ICSID-C
versus New York Convention awards using raw data (F(1,48) 0.1.159; p = 0.29; n = 52;
r = 0.15), winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.056; p = 0.81; n = 52; r 0.03), log-transformed data
(F(1,48) =0.450; p =0.51; n =52; r =0.10) or inverse-transformed data (F(1,48) = 0.459;
p = 0.50; n = 52; r = 0.10).
200. There was likewise no main effect for ICSID Status when comparing ICSID-C versus
New York Convention awards as a function of raw data (F(1,48) = 0.001; p = 0.29; r = 0.01),
winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.007; p = 0.93; n = 52; r = 0.01), log-transformed data
(F(1,48) <0.001; p =0.98; n =52; r <0.01), or inverse-transformed data (F(1,48) = 0.001;
p = 0.97; n = 52; r = 0.01).
201. When ICSID Status was a function of being an ICSID Convention award, there was
likewise no main effect for LA respondents as a function of raw data (F(1,48) = 0.360; p = 0.55;
n =52; r =0.09), winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.1.839; p =0.18; n =52; r =0.19), logtransformed data (F(1,48) = 0.429; p =0.52; n =52; r =0.09), or inverse-transformed data
(F(1,48) = 0.15 4 ;p = 0.70; n = 52; r = 0.06).
202. For ICSID-C awards analyzing LA respondents, there was likewise no difference when
doing follow-up comparisons between individual cell means using either winsorized data
(HSD = 2,231,913; k = 4) or log-transformed data (HSD = 3.51; k= 4).

203. For raw data analyzing ICSID-ALL using raw data, there was no interaction
(F(1,48) = 0.335; p = 0.57; n = 52; r = 0.08), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.770;

p = 0.39; n = 52; r = 0.13), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.092; p = 0.76;
n = 52; r = 0.04). Follow-up analyses (HSD = 44,629,486; k = 4) revealed no latent differences.

For ICSID-C and New York Convention awards, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 1.159;
p = .29; r = 0.15), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.001; p = 0.29; r = 0.01), and no
main effect for LA. Follow-ups revealed no other significant differences (HSD = 44,898,478;
k = 4).
204. For ICSID-ALL awards using log data, there was no statistically significant interaction
(F(1,48) = 2.867; p = 0.10; n = 52; r = 0.24), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.144;
p = 0.71; n = 52; r = 0.06), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.005; p = 0.94;

n = 52; r = 0.01). Even with the interaction approaching significance, pair-wise comparisons
(HSD = 3.371; k = 4) failed to reveal any latent difference among cell means. The potential effect
of the interaction was that, at ICSID, it may be possible that there was a trend towards higher
mean award against Latin American respondents (3.3836; SD = 3.5810; n= 12) than non-LA
respondents (1.6318; SD = 2.8282; n = 23); in contrast, at other venues, there was a trend towards
a potentially lower mean award again Latin American respondents (1.9636; SD = 3.9273; n = 4)
versus non-LA respondents (3.8702; SD = 3.2983; n = 13). As the results and follow-up tests
were all non-significant, it would be improper to suggest this was a population parameter.
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mean differences in the amount awarded as a function of either ICSID
Status or LA respondents. The results did not demonstrate that the mean
amount awarded differed as a function of ICSID Status, LA
respondents, or an interaction of those variables. See Table 7.
TABLE 7: WINSORIZED DATA OF AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY
INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID STATUS &
PRESENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS (n = 52)

ICSID Status
ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

Latin American
Respondent

LA Respondent

Amount
Standard
Mean
Deviation

Total

2,007,200

2,698,869

12

Non-LA

745,498

1,726,958

23

LA Respondent

1,418,884

2,837,769

4

Non-LA

2,837,769

1,860,741

13

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

d.

Discussion

Table 6 indicates that, for the pre-2007 population, there was no
reliable relationship between disputes with LA respondents and
outcome of investment arbitration; the breakdown of wins as a function
of LA respondents was also reasonably balanced. Proportionally, it may
appear that there was a higher degree of government wins for non-LA
respondents, yet the results were not statistically different. Similarly,
Table 7 reflects a lack of statistically significant difference in amounts
awarded for the pre-2007 population. Although winsorized data
suggested that, for ICSID cases, LA respondents experienced awards
that were 100% larger than non-LA respondents, these results were not
statistically significant, and even the log- and inverse-transformed data
did not reveal a significant effect. Although it may be appropriate to
rule out variables such as an adjustment for inflation,206 the intriguing
205. For ICSID-ALL awards using inverse transformations, there was no interaction
(F(1,48) = 3.433; p = 0.07; n = 52; r = 0.26), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.103;

p = 0.75; n = 52; r = 0.05), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.150; p = 0.70;
n = 52; r = 0.06). Even with the interaction approaching significance, pair-wise comparisons
(HSD = 0.509; k = 4) failed to reveal any latent difference among cell means,
206. Out of an abudance of caution, given that the effect for the ICSID-ALL model (but not
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facial difference could be attributable to other variables (such as
amounts claimed) or even chance alone. There have, however, been
several awards rendered against countries, including Argentina, since
the dataset was closed. This suggests that the results of this research
bear watching in the future analysis.
Even with a difference in amounts claimed at non-ICSID venues, the
analyses did not demonstrate that LA respondents experienced
statistically different fiscal outcomes from non-LA respondents. Rather,
the initial results suggest that LA respondents experienced statistically
equivalent awards irrespective of whether ICSID or another body
rendered the award. Many effect sizes were less than small (r < 0.10).
Nevertheless, the presence of some statistically small effects in nonsignificant analyses means that, for making inferences beyond the
population studied, replication is warranted given the lack of power in
the dataset, 207 and certain models using transformed data were
approaching significance for an interaction effect only.
the ICSID-C model) was approaching significance for the log transformations, this research
controlled for the time value of money by adjusting the amounts awarded in accordance with the
Consumer Price Index or Nominal Gross Domestic Product. For all of the analyses using the
ICSID-ALL model using log-transformed data, even controlling for the time value of money,
there was no statistically significant relationship between the variables studied and mean amounts
awarded. For the CPI-adjusted raw amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) =0.335;
p = 0.57; n = 52; r = 0.08), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.790; p = 0.38; n = 52;

r = 0.13), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.068; p -0.80; n 52; r -0.07).
For the CPI-adjusted winsorized amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) 0.73 1;
p = 0.40; n = 52; r = 0.12), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.011; p -0.92; n = 52;
r = 0.02), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.737; p -0.40; n = 52; r = 0.12).
For the CPI-adjusted log-transformed amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 2.849;
p = 0.10; n = 52; r = 0.24), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.136; p -0.71; n = 52;
r = 0.05), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.006; p = 0.94; n

=

52; r

=

0.01).

For the CPI-adjusted transformed amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) 3.433;
p = 0.07; n = 52; r = 0.26), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.103; p -0.75; n = 52;
r = 0.05), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.150; p -0.70; n -52; r 0.06).
For the GDP-adjusted raw amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 0.337; p - 0.56;
n = 52; r = 0.08), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.800; p = 0.38; n - 52; r = 0.13),
and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.053; p = 0.82; n = 52; r -0.03). For the

GDP-adjusted winsorized amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 0.692; p

-

0.41;

n = 52; r = 0.12), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.014; p = 0.91; n = 52; r -0.02),

and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.708; p = 0.40; n = 52; r = 0.12). For the
GDP-adjusted log-transformed amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48) = 2.840;
p = 0.10; n = 52; r = 0.24), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48)
r = 0.05), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.007; p

0.133; p = 0.72; n = 52;
0.93; n = 52; r 0.01).

=

For the GDP-adjusted transformed amount awarded, there was no interaction (F(1,48)

3.433;

p = 0.07; n = 52; r = 0.26), no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.103; p -0.75; n = 52;
r = 0.05), and no main effect for LA respondents (F(1,48) = 0.150; p = 0.70; n = 52; r = 0.06).

Despite the low power, the repeated finding of a lack of a statistically significant relationship
suggests that the results were robust.
207. As various models had small effect sizes (r = 0.13; r = 0.15; r = 0.10; r = 0.12;
r = 0.19; r = 0.13; r = 0.15; n = 52), see supra notes 199, 201, and 203, this suggests that the

power of the analysis is in the order of 0.20-0.30 and there is a 70-80% probability of having
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The net effect is that the current results provide initial evidence that a
differential initial arbitration risk for LA respondents was not attributable to
ICSID. In any event, outcomes for LA respondents did not differ
meaningfully either within or without ICSID for the pre-2007 population
studied. For the pre-2007 population, without proof of a meaningful
difference, the initial evidence suggests that the results for LA respondents
were statistically equivalent irrespective of the venue for arbitration. This
may not be the case for the current population (which includes both pre-2007
and post-2007 awards), but future research could usefully explore this aspect
and also control for the effect of amounts claimed on the fiscal outcome.
The differences in amounts claimed against LA respondents in non-ICSID
cases does suggest that it would also be appropriate to consider how best to
manage concerns that Latin American states may experience larger claims
and presumably face a larger initial arbitration risk. The overall evidence
from the pre-2007 population could not establish differential outcomes at
ICSID on the basis of classification as an LA or non-LA respondent, let
alone provide evidence that the Latin American respondents experienced
harsher outcomes than other states. Although worthy of future monitoring
and additional research to consider the implications for the emerging
population given the low power of the models, 208 these initial findings did
not support the claim of bias against Latin American states at ICSID.
Although Latin American respondents may wish to consider reform to IIAs
or ITA for other policy reasons, the assessments from the pre-2007
population did not support the conclusion of systemic differences in
outcomes that might otherwise justify the abandonment of ICSID.
3.

Respondent Development Status

Previous research highlighted concerns related to the role that states'
developmental background may have on outcome. That research explored
the Development Status 209 of respondents, of presiding arbitrators, and the
interaction of those variables. Yet that research did not control for the role of
ICSID or other arbitral venues. Given stated concerns about ICSID, this
Article continues the exploration of links between Development Status and
made a Type-I error.
208. Using a conservative approach to look for the smallest effect size (r = 0.01, supra note
200) in the four-condition model with 80% power, a sample of 1562 final arbitration awards
would be required. This would be for an analysis with an effect of 0.10 (S = 781) with 80%
power (N= n (781 / 2) x k (4)). Using a more liberal approach to isolate the largest effect
observed, r = 0.26 at supra note 205, using an effect of 0.25, the requisite sample with 80%
power would be 240 (S = 120; N= n (120 / 2) x k (4)).
209. Development Status was defined in previous research as derivative of OECD
membership or analysis of World Bank classification. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
As previously explained, those categorical variables were created either by virtue of a state's
ratification of the OECD Convention or a pre-existing World Bank classifications. Id.
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outcome. This Subsection treats ICSID Status as an independent variable in
order to explore differences in amounts claimed and outcome as a function of
respondents' Development Status.
a.

Amounts Claimed

Using raw data that included statistical outliers from the forty-four cases
offering data on amounts claimed, the mean amount claimed against OECD
respondents was US$162,184,890; (n = 15; SD = 256,603,333), whereas the
mean amount claimed for disputes against non-OECD respondents was
US$437,178,510 (n = 29; SD = 1,729,849,697).210 This binary variable lacks
some subtlety.211 A more refined assessment of Development Statususing four World Bank categories - and raw data indicated the mean
amount claimed against High Income respondents was US$250,855,045
(n = 8; SD = 333,851,690); the mean amount claimed against Upper Middle
Income respondents was US$125,235,035 (n = 15; SD = 141,121,927); the

mean amount claimed against Lower Middle Income respondents was
US$639,509,132 (n

=

16; SD = 2,336,891,369); and the mean amount

claimed against Low Income respondents was US$198,687,629 (n = 5;
SD = 218,579,080).212 Although there were facial differences in claims, the
next issue was whether that difference was significant and otherwise
attributable to statistical chance.
The research examined whether amounts claimed differed as a function of
a Development Status, ICSID Status, or an interaction of those independent
variables. The research hypotheses were that there would be no difference in
amounts claimed for disputes with respondents from different developmental
backgrounds, even controlling for the presence of ICSID disputes. To
analyze this question, the research used winsorized data to analyze 2 x 2
between groups ANOVA factorials analyzing OECD membership and the
presence of an ICSID dispute and a 2 x 4 between groups ANOVA factorials
analyzing World Bank status and the presence of an ICSID dispute.
When analyzing development as a function of respondent's OECD
membership, the results demonstrated three things. First, there was no
statistically significant interaction as a function of OECD membership,
ICSID-ALL status (comparing ICSID Convention and Additional Facility
210. The mean amount claimed against OECD respondents for the winsorized data was
US$32,097,218 (n = 15; SD = 27,932,206), while the mean amount claimed against non-OECD
respondents for the winsorized data was US$25,777,889 (n = 29; SD = 15,892,812).
211. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
212. For winsorized data, the mean amount claimed against High Income respondents was
US$28,844,788 (n = 8; SD = 17,606,735); mean amount against Upper Middle Income
respondents was US$31,277,610 (n = 15; SD = 12,369,857); mean amount against Lower Middle
Income respondents was US$24,943,804 (n 16; SD = 16,768,855); and mean amount against
Low Income respondents was US$25,998,745 (n = 5; SD = 17,085,503).
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awards versus other awards), and amounts claimed (F(1,40) = 2.165;
p = 0.15; n = 44; r

=

0.23).213 Second, ICSID-ALL status (comparing ICSID

Convention and Additional Facility awards versus other awards) had no
main effect on the amounts investors claimed (F(1,40) = 1.330; p = 0.25;
n = 44; r = 0.18).214 Third, there was no main effect for OECD Status
(F(1,40) = 3.829; p = 0.06; n = 44; r = 0.30). 2 15 Raw2 16 and inversetransfomed2 17 data analyzing differences in ICSID-ALL awards had similar
results for the mean amount claimed. 2 18 The only small variation - despite
213. See also infra note 232 and accompanying text (reporting results of HSD follow-up
analyses on the interaction of ICSID-ALL and OECD awards, despite its non-significance).
Although there was a significant interaction with outcome when analyzing OECD Status and
ICSID Status as a function of ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards (F(1,40) = 9.307;
p < 0.01; n = 44; r = 0.43), this result is likely not meaningful. For this model, there is only one
award, Maffezini v. Spain, that is both an ICSID Convention award and an award involving an
OECD respondent. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Arg. v. Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002). As explained in previous research, it is not
clear that Maffezini is a representative case, given that it had the lowest amount claimed in the
entire dataset and it is one of two awards that involved an undisputed amount from a loan. See
Franck, supra note 23, at 472.
214. There was likewise no main effect for ICSID when analyzing ICSID-C versus New York
Convention awards using winsorized data (F(1,40) = 1.858; p = 0.18; n = 44; r = 0.211).

215. There was also no significant main effect for OECD Status when analyzing ICSID-C
awards (F(1,40) = 0.437;p = 0.51; n = 44; r = 0.10).

216. For ICSID-ALL awards using raw data analyzing OECD Status on amounts claimed, the
analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on claimed amounts
(F(1,40) = 0.616; p =0.44; n =44; r = 0.12), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.075; p = 0.79; n = 44; r = 0.04), (3) no main effect for OECD (F(1,40) = 0.077;

p = 0.78; n = 44; r = 0.04), and (4) no latent statistically significant simple effects
(HSD = 1,646,705,471; k =4). For ICSID-C awards analyzing the effect of OECD Status,
analyses showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on claimed amounts
(F(1,40) = 1.82; p = 0.67; n = 44; r = 0.21), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.045; p = 0.83;

(F(1,40) = 0.072; p

=

n = 44;

r = 0.03),

(3) no

main

effect

for OECD

Status

0.79; n = 44; r = 0.04), and (4) no latent significant simple effects

(HSD = 1,648,679,500; k = 4).

217. For all ICSID-ALL awards using transformeddata analyzing OECD Status on amounts
claimed, the analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on claimed
amounts (F(1,40) = 3.975; p = 0.053; n = 44; r = 0.30), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,40) = 0.002; p = 0.97; n = 44; r = 0.01), and (3) no main effect for OECD (F(1,40) = 0.403;

p = 0.53; n = 44; r = 0.01). As the p-value (0.053) was on the cusp of significance, a follow-up
set of pairwise comparisons (HSD = 1.057; k = 4) did not reveal any significant differences,
although one possible simple effect - namely, that for non-ICSID awards, average claims
against OECD respondents was higher - bears watching. One might expect investments in
higher-income economies to be worth more; damage to those investments would have a higher
value. See Franck, supra note 23, at 441 n.22 (suggesting that equivalent investments in higher
income countries may be worth more).
218. Using transformed data, for ICSID-C (comparing ICSID-C and New York Convention
awards) analyzing the effect of OECD Status, there were significant differences related to (1) the
interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on claimed amounts (F(1,40) = 11.72; p < 0.01;
n = 44; r = 0.48), (2) a main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,40) = 4.388; p = 0.04; n = 44;
r = 0.31), and (3) a main effect for OECD Status (F(1,40) = 4.079; p = 0.05; n = 44; r = 0.30).

Follow-up simple effects (HSD = 0.975; k = 4) suggested two things. First, for ICSID-C awards
only, there were higher amounts claimed against non-OECD countries than OCED countries, and
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the non-significant effect of OECD Status - was that when comparing cell
means in non-ICSID cases, the amounts investors claimed against OECD
respondents were higher than against non-OECD respondents. 2 9 This effect,
while interesting, may be a function of the arguably higher-value investments
in OECD member states. Nevertheless, even where there was a latent
difference in amounts claimed for the pre-2007 population, the critical point
was that the variance was not linked to ICSID. At ICSID, the results did not
indicate the amounts claimed were statistically different. That initial
evidence, particularly as non-ICSID claims operated against the developed
world, begins to chip away at the idea that claims at ICSID exhibited
systemic bias against the developing world in the form of higher proportional
risk of liability. 20
When analyzing Development Status with the more nuanced World Bank
variable, the results demonstrated a similar lack of relationship among
ICSID, Development Status, and mean amount claimed. First, using
winsorized data, there was no statistically significant interaction between
World Bank and ICSID-ALL awards against others for amounts claimed
(F(3,36) = 2.612; p

=

0.07; n = 44; r = 0.42). Second, ICSID Status (for

ICSID-ALL versus other awards) had no main effect on the amounts
investors claimed (F(1,36) = 1.918; p

=

0.18; n = 44; r = 0.23). Third, as

shown on Table 8, there was no main effect for World Bank Status
(F(3,36) = 0.314; p

=

0.82; n = 44; r = 0.16).221 Follow-up comparisons on

this effect was not present when comparing New York Convention awards. Second, for OECD
respondents, amounts claimed were higher in New York Convention awards than ICSID-C
awards, but this effect was not present when comparing non-OECD respondents. These simple
effects were only present when Maffezini was the basis of comparison to the remainder of the
sample. As the model has one cell that contains a single case (Maffezini) that is arguably
unrepresentative, see supra note 213, these results must be treated with caution, as a single data
point was arguably responsible for all the statistically significant differences.
219. Follow-up analyses (HSD = 16,872,303; k = 4) suggested that this was the only
statistically meaningful difference; all other follow-ups could not demonstrate a statistically
meaningful difference in ICSID-ALL awards for claims against OECD and non-OECD
respondents.
220. Several of the analyses exhibited less than -small effect sizes (r < 0.10), suggesting the
results did not suffer from a lack of power. Several small-to-medium effects (r = 0.23; r = 0.18;
r =0.21; r = 0.30; r =0.10; r =0.12, r =0.21; r = 0.30; n =44), see supra notes 213-17,

however, suggest that caution is warranted and replication is required before making inferences
about current population parameters as the analyses ranged from 0.20-0.50 in power, suggesting
a 50-80% risk of a Type-Il error.
221. When comparing ICSID-C awards, there was neither a main effect for ICSLD
Convention awards (F(1,36) =0.014; p =0.91; n = 44; r =0.02) nor World Bank Status
(F(3,36) = 1.792; p = 0.17; n = 44; r = 0.36). There was, however, a significant interaction
(F(3,36) = 2.866; p = 0.05; n = 44; r = 0.43), but this result is likely not meaningful. There is

only one award in the category of "High Income" ICSID-C award, namely Maffezini, which is
likely an unrepresentative case as regards amounts claimed, and it may have undue influence on
the results. See supra notes 213, 218. Moreover, there is only one case, Petrobart v. Kyrgyz
Republic, in the category of "Low Income" respondents that were not New York Convention
awards, and Petrobart may not be representative, as it is only one of three Energy Charter Treaty
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marginal means (HSD = 16,834,436; k = 4) and cell means
(HSD = 28,519,487; k = 8) did not indicate any significant simple effects. In
other words, for the pre-2007 population, statistical tests using winsorized
data could not identify a statistical link between World Bank Status and the
mean amount claimed. The interaction has sufficient statistical power to
reject the null hypothesis and make inferences beyond the dataset studied.222
However, as other analyses suggested the possibility of small or medium
effects beyond the pre-2007 population,223 it would be prudent to replicate
the research with a larger dataset before making strong inferences about
ongoing population parameters.
TABLE

8: WINSORIZED DATA OF MEAN AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED

BY INVESTORS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID STATUS AND WORLD BANK
STATUS FOR RESPONDENTS (n = 44)

ICSID Status
ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

World Bank
Status

Amount
Standard
Deviation
Mean

Total

High Income

19,254,354

27,010,121

2

Upper Middle

36,737,595

4,815,250

11

Lower Middle

24,533,483

16,818,863

13

Low Income

31,477,268

13,752,252

4

High Income

32,041,598

15,460,678

6

Upper Middle

16,262,652

15,062,083

14

Lower Middle

26,721,867

20,146,395

3

Low Income

4,084,652

0

1

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

claims in the dataset and is the sixth-smallest amount claimed in the sample. Petrobart Ltd. v.
Award
(Mar.
29,
2005),
(SCC),
Arb.
No.
126/2003,
Kyrgyz
Republic
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/petrobart-kyrgyz.pdf. This has implications for the replicability
of the model's results.
222. As the effect size is r = 0.42 and n = 44, the interaction has 80% power and an
acceptable 20% risk of a Type-I error, according to social science conventions.
223. The majority of effect sizes were less than small (r < 0.10), which suggests the results
may not suffer from a power problem or that the effect is simply so tiny that it may be difficult
justifying resources to isolate the effect. For the small-to-medium effects (r = 0.12; r = 0.15;
r = 0.36, r = 0.11; n = 44), however, a post hoc power analysis suggests that the power was

between 0.20-0.60, which suggests a 40-80% risk of a Type-H statistical error and a need for
replication.
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Raw224 and inverse-transformed data225 analyzing differences
between ICSID-ALL and other awards had similar results to the
winsorized data. Inverse-transformed data - which adheres even more
closely to the statistical assumptions of underlying tests - did,
however, suggest that there was a significant interaction with ICSID
StatuS226 and World Bank status for amounts claimed (F(3,36) = 2.904;
p = 0.048; r = 0.44).227 The small cell counts for "Low Income" non-

ICSID cases (n = 1) and "High Income ICSID Cases" (n = 2) were
arguably at the root of this significant result; and given the arguably

224. For ICSID-ALL awards using raw data to analyze World Bank Status and mean amount
claimed, the analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and World Bank Status on
claimed amounts (F(3,36) = 0.136; p = 0.94; n = 44; r = 0.11), (2) no main effect for ICSID
Status (F(1,36) = 0.090; p = 0.77; n = 44; r = 0.05), and (3) no main effect for World Bank
Status (F(3,36) = 0.096; p = 0.96; n = 44; r = 0.09). Follow-up analyses using HSDs did not

k = 4) or cell
reveal differences for either marginal (HSD = 1,745,690,656;
(HSD = 2,957,391,991; k = 8) means. For ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards, the
effect of World Bank Status and ICSID Status suggested (1) no interaction between ICSID and
World Bank Status on claimed amounts (F(3,36) = 0.095; p = 0.96; n = 44; r = 0.09), (2) no
main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,36) = 0.107; p = 0.75; n = 44; r = 0.05), and (3) no main effect
for World Bank Status (F(3,36) = 0.073; p = 0.97; n = 44; r = 0.08). HSD follow-ups likewise

did not reveal any statistically significant differences on marginal (HSD = 1,744,837,088; k = 4)
or cell (HSD = 2,955,945,954; k = 8) means.

225. For all ICSID-ALL awards using inverse-transformed data analyzing World Bank Status
on amounts claimed, the analysis showed (1) no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,36) = 0.195;
p = 0.66; n 44; r = 0.07), and (2) no main effect for World Bank Status (F(3,36) = 0.277;
p = 0.84; n =44; r = 0.15).

226. This reflected an analysis for ICSID Status looking at ICSID-ALL awards. When
analyzing ICSID-C awards, there was no main effect for ICSID (F(1,36) = 0.092; p = 0.76;
n = 44; r = 0.05) and no main effect for World Bank Status (F(3,36) = 2.644; p = 0.06; n = 44;
r = 0.43). Although there was an interaction (F(3,36) = 5.122; p = 0.01; n = 44; r = 0.55) and a
large effect size, for reasons similar to those explained infra note 227 related to the small cell
counts and Maffezini and Petrobart,it is doubtful that this result is meaningful.
227. Using traditional follow-up to analyze both marginal means (HSD = 1.049; k = 4) and
cell means (HSD = 1.778; k = 8), there were no differences in amounts claimed in the interaction.
A more sensitive measure known as the Least Significant Difference (LSD) is more likely to find
statistically significant differences but with a higher rate of error. For marginal means
(LSD = 0.789; k = 4) to analyze differences among World Bank Status, there were no statistically
significant differences. For cell means to look for simple effects (LSD = 1.116; k = 8), there were
statistically significant differences. For amounts claimed in ICSID awards, (1) amounts claimed
against Upper Middle income was greater than High Income respondents, (2) amounts claimed
against Low Income respondents was greater than High Income, and (3) all other comparisons
failed to demonstrate a statistically significant difference in amounts claimed. For amounts
claimed in non-ICSID awards, (1) amounts claimed against High Income respondents were
greater than Low, and (2) all other comparisons failed to reveal a statistically significant
difference. When comparing results for claims against High Income respondents, ICSID cases
had lower amounts claimed whereas other forums have higher amounts; meanwhile, when
comparing claims against Low Income respondents, ICSID cases have higher amounts claimed,
whereas other forums have lower amounts claimed; for both Upper Middle and Lower Middle
income respondents, there is no statistically significant difference between ICSID and non-ICSID
cases in amounts claimed.
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2 29 - that
unrepresentative awards - namely Maffezini 22 8 and Petrobart
230
results from the model
are likely the root of the interaction,
examining Development Status as a function of World Bank
categorization should be viewed cautiously. Instead, the model
considering ICSID and development as a function of OECD Status with larger cell counts balanced across all categories and involving
more representative cases - may provide a better basis for inferences
beyond the population studied. Although results from that model
demonstrated no statistical difference in amounts claimed, the
interaction is on the cusp of significance (p = 0.053) and the model is
slightly underpowered. This makes the model worthy of replication
before making strong inferences about the current population.23 1
Replication is also warranted by the follow-up pair-wise comparisons
that suggest only for non-ICSID awards (many of which were North
American Free Trade Agreement claims) that mean amount claimed
against OECD respondents was higher than the mean amount claimed
against non-OECD respondents.232

228. See supra notes 213, 218, and 221.
229. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
230. Using transformed data, for ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards analyzing the
effect of OECD Status, there were significant differences related to (1) the interaction between
ICSID and OECD Status on claimed amounts (F(1,40) = 11.72; p <0.01; n = 44; r = 0.48), (2) a
main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,40) = 4.388; p = 0.04; n = 44; r = 0.31), and (3) a main effect
for OECD Status (F(1,40) = 4.079; p = 0.05; n = 44; r = 0.30). Follow-up simple effects
(HSD = 0.975) suggested two things. First, for ICSID Convention cases, there were higher
amounts claimed against non-OECD countries than OCED countries, and this effect was not
present when comparing New York Convention awards. Second, for OECD respondents, amounts
claimed were higher in New York Convention cases than ICSID Convention cases, but this effect
was not present when comparing non-OECD respondents. These simple effects were only present
when Maffezini was the basis of comparison to the remainder of the sample. As the model has one
cell with a single, arguably unrepresentative data point that may be the basis of the differences,
the results must be treated with caution. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Arg. v. Spain), ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002).
231. This is key as the power for this analysis was slightly over 50% (r = 0.30; n = 44),
which is moving toward the 80% acceptable error rate. An a priori power analysis suggests that
the requisite sample to capture the four-condition OECD interaction (r = 0.30; S = 82) would be
164 (N- n (82 / 2) x k (4)). Replication could also contextualize why the significant interaction
using transformed data to analyze World Bank Status and amounts claimed revealed no
significant follow-up effects using traditional measures (HSD), but liberal measures (LSD) - but
pointed to various permutations: (1) in ICSID cases, higher amounts claimed against Upper
Middle Income respondents than High Income respondents, (2) in ICSID cases, higher amounts
claimed against Low Income respondents than High Income cases, and (3) in non-ICSID cases,
higher amounts claimed against High Income than Low Income respondents. See supra note 227.
232. The HSD for this model was 16,872,303. For ICSID awards, amounts claimed against
OECD and non-OECD respondents were not statistically different. This also means: (1) for
OECD respondents, ICSID and non-ICSID amounts claimed were not statistically different, and
(2) for non-OECD respondents, ICSID and non-ICSID amounts claimed were not statistically
different.
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Ultimate Winners

Previous research on the Development Status of respondents and
presiding arbitrators did not reveal any statistically significant pattern of
relationships for winning or losing investment arbitrations. 233 This
research expands on that research by considering the outcomes and as a
function of Development Status and ICSID Status.
A 2 x 2 x 2 Chi-Square analysis of ICSID-ALL and OECD Status
failed to reveal any statistically significant pattern of relationship. See
Table 9. With regard to the simple two-way effect of ICSID, for ICSID
Convention and Additional Facility (ICSID-ALL) cases, there was no
pattern of relationship between OECD Status and outcome
(1) = 0.068; p = 0.79; n = 33; r = 0.05). Likewise, for the simple
two-way analysis of non-ICSID cases, there was no significant pattern
of relationship between OECD Status and outcome
(1) = 1.446;
p = 0.23; n = 17; r = 0.29).234 Because the simple two-way tests were
not significant, it is unlikely that there is a three-way interaction or that
the two two-ways are meaningfully different from each other. Although
the ICSID-ALL model evaluating OECD Status suggested the possible
effect on outcome was less than small (r = 0.05), the possibility of a
medium-sized effect (r = 0.30) on outcome for Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.) suggests the analyses are underpowered and require
replication before drawing strong inferences for the current
population.235

233. Franck, supra note 23, at 460-64.
234. When using OECD to evaluate Development Status, the results were similar when
analyzing ICSID as a function of ICSID-C awards (X(l) = 0.224; p = 0.64; n = 23; r = 0.10). For
ICSID Convention awards, there was no pattern of relationship on OECD Status and outcome.
For New York Convention awards, there was no pattern of relationship on OCED Status and
outcome (1) = 1.5 5 6 ; p = 0.21; n = 27; r = 0.24).
235. The effect sizes suggest that power is in the order of 0.20, which means there is an 80%
or larger risk of a Type-II error.
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TABLE 9: ICSID STATUS OF DISPUTE, OECD STATUS OF RESPONDENT
STATE, AND FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF THE ULTIMATE WINNER OF AN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION CASE (n = 50)
Ultimate Winner
ICSID Status

Respondent
State

Claimant

Respondent

Total

OECD

4

7

11

Non-OECD

7

15

22

OECD

3

5

8

Non-OECD

6

3

9

ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

50
20
30
Total
* None of the observedfrequenciesdiferedfrom what would be expected due to
chance.

A 2 x 4 x 2 Chi-Square analysis of ICSID-ALL and World Bank status failed

to reveal any statistically significant pattern of relationship. See Table 10. Even
when defining Development Status according to World Bank criteria, the omnibus
Chi-Square analyses in the two 2 x 4 analyses did not reveal a significant pattern of
relationship between ICSID-ALL236 Development Status and the ultimate winner
2 (>l) = 2.337; p = 0.51; n = 33; r=0.26). For just the follow-up simple two-way
(X
analyses comparing the outcomes of ICSID-ALL awards, none of the six tests
revealed a statistically significant pattem of relationship.2 37 Similarly, for the
follow-up simple two-way analyses comparing outcomes for Other Awards, none
of the six tests revealed a statistically significant pattern of relationship. 238
236. When analyzing World Bank Status and ICSID as a function of ICSIC-C awards, there
was no reliable pattern of relationship among, ICSID-C awards, World Bank Status, and
outcomes (V(>1)= 2.585;p = 0.46; n = 23; r = 0.32).
237. Using World Bank Status as a proxy for Development Status, there was no pattern of
results when comparing (1) High versus Upper Middle income respondents (12(1) = 1.534;
p = 0.22; n =19; r = 0.28), (2) High versus Lower Middle income respondents ((1) = 0.16;
p = 0.69; n = 18; r = 0.09), (3) High versus Low income respondents (l2(1)= 0.888; p =0.37;
n = 8; r = 0.33), (4) Upper Middle versus Lower Middle respondents (12(1) =0.01; p = 0.92;
n = 15; r = 0.03), (5) Upper Middle versus Low respondents (e(1) = 0.525; p = 0.47; n = 14;

r = 0.19), and (6) Lower Middle versus Low respondents (2(1) = 0.525; p =0.49; n = 14;
r = 0.19).
238. There was no pattern of results when comparing (1) High versus Upper Middle income
respondents (V(1)<0.01; p > 0.99; n = 12; r < 0.01), (2) High versus Lower Middle income
respondents (12(1) <0.00; p > 0.99; n = 10; r < 0.01), (3) High versus Low income respondents
(/(l) = 0.875; p = 0.35; n = 7; r - 0.35), (4) Upper Middle versus Lower Middle respondents
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Although several effects were less than small (r<0.10), other effect sizes
suggested the analyses were underpowered, namely with a beyond traditionally
accepted risk of a Type-II error. Out of an abundance of caution, replication is
necessary before drawing strong inferences beyond the population analyzed.2 39
TABLE 10: ICSID STATUS OF DISPUTE, WORLD BANK STATUS OF
RESPONDENT STATE, AND FREQUENCY BREAKDOWN OF THE ULTIMATE
WINNER OF AN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION CASE (n = 50)

ICSID Status
ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

Respondent State

Ultimate Winner
Claimant Respondent

Total

High Income

1

5

6

Upper Middle

6

7

13

Lower Middle

3

9

12

Low Income

1

1

2

High Income

3

3

6

Upper Middle

3

3

6

Lower Middle

2

2

4

Low Middle

1

0

1

Other Awards (SCC,
UNCITRAL, etc.)

50
30
20
Total
* None of the observedfrequencies differedfrom what would be expected due to
chance.

As hypothesized, for the pre-2007 population, the data did not reveal

any meaningful pattern of relationship among respondents'
Development Status, ICSID Status, and whether the claimant or
respondent won the treaty dispute. The lack of a reliable pattern of
relationship between OECD membership and winning or losing (f(1)<0.00; p>0.99; n=10; r<.01), (5) Upper Middle versus Low respondents
(2(1) = 0.875; p = 0.35; n = 7; r = 0.35), and (6) Lower Middle versus Low respondents
()(1) = 0.833; p = 0.36; n = 5; r = 0.41).

239. The effect sizes suggest the omnibus tests for ICSID-ALL and ICSID-C comparisons of
World Bank Status are underpowered (approximately 0.20-0.40 power), given as there is a 6080% likelihood of a Type-II error. Given the larger number of sub-categories and decreased cell
counts, the follow-up comparisons are similarly underpowered (less than 0.20 power and greater
than 80% risk of error).
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irrespective of whether the dispute was resolved at ICSID or
elsewhere - suggests that the outcomes at ICSID were statistically
equivalent to other arbitration venues for both OECD and non-OECD
respondents. The World Bank analyses, which were more nuanced in
measuring development, mirrored the results and also failed to reveal a
significant pattern of relationship. This initial evidence from the pre2007 population chips away at the theory that ICSID arbitration awards
were somehow different (presumably exhibiting a form of bias) from
other venues. Rather, the evidence could not demonstrate that ICSID
awards were meaningfully different, and even controlling for variables
intended to address concerns related to development, the outcomes did
not favor either investors or states.
The evidence from the pre-2007 population did not support the
hypothesis that ICSID arbitration was associated with meaningfully
different outcomes when controlling for Development Status. Although
inferences about the current population should be made with caution,
this is a piece of evidence that suggests ICSID arbitration need not be
radically overhauled or rejected. The caution is particularly warranted as
the effect size for the subset of non-ICSID awards model in the OECDbased bordered on medium-sized (r = 0.29) and, for inferential
purposes, the model was underpowered. 24 0 For this reason, before
extrapolating beyond the dataset analyzed in this research, replication is
warranted to promote an assessment of whether the initial finding
represents an ongoing population parameter or if there has been a
systemic change.24'
c.

Amounts Awarded

Since a binary win-loss dependent variable condenses potential
variations in outcome, this research also used a continuous variable to
assess outcome by focusing on amounts awarded. The research used
240. With a non-significant pattern of relationship and a less than small effect size (r = 0.05)
for the OECD model, the lack of an effect in the ICSID awards may not result from an
underpowered sample. For the non-ICSID awards, the effect sizes (r = 0.29; n = 17) indicates the
power is between 0.20-0.30 and there is a 70-80% risk of a Type-II error; this is worthy of
replication. See also supra note 234 and accompanying text (offering power analyses for the
World Bank models).
241. Using a conservative approach to look for the smallest effect size for all the different
OECD-based models (r = 0.10, supra note 234) in the four-condition model, a sample of 1562
final arbitration awards would be required. This would be for an analysis with an effect of 0.10
(S = 781) with 80% power (N= n (781 / 2) x k (4)). Using a less conservative approach (effect
size of r = 0.30; S = 82) for the OECD model, the requisite sample would be 164. If using a
conservative approach and the smallest effect size from the World Bank models (r = 0.10;
S = 781) in an eight-condition model, the requisite sample would be 3124 final arbitration awards
(N = n (781 / 2) x k (8)). Using a less conservative approach for the World Bank models (effect
size r = 0.25; S = 120), a sample of 480 final awards is required.
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various between-subjects factorials to analyze the effects of two
independent variables, namely ICSID Status and the respondent's
Development Status, on the mean amount awarded. Given ICSID's
doctrinal equivalence with other venues and the existing data suggesting
that a respondent's development background is not reliably associated
with outcome, the research hypothesis -

and normative hope -

was

that there would be no reliable statistical relationship between the
independent and dependent variables.
i.

Raw Amounts Awarded

Using raw data that included statistical outliers from the fifty-two
final awards, the mean amount awarded against OECD respondents was
US$15,650,907 (n = 19; SD = 61,675,838), whereas the mean amount

claimed for disputes against non-OECD respondents was US$7,360,140
(n = 33; SD = 25,792,613).242 As binary categories potentially hide
variation, a more sensitive analysis using World Bank categories and
raw data indicated the mean amount claimed against High Income
respondents was US$250,855,045 (n = 8; SD = 333,851,690); the mean

amount claimed against Upper Middle Income respondents was
US$125,235,035

(n = 15;

SD = 141,121,927);

the

mean amount

claimed against Lower Middle Income respondents was
US$639,509,132 (n = 16; SD = 2,336,891,369); and the mean amount
claimed against Low Income respondents was US$198,687,629 (n = 5;
SD = 218,579,080).243 As the facial differences in raw data (with
statistical outliers) might suggest, awards against developed countries
were larger than awards against developing states; this research
considered whether the means were any different than what might be
due to chance alone.
ii.

Amounts Awarded: OECD Status & ICSID

The next question was whether awards differed meaningfully as a
function of Development Status, ICSID Status, or an interaction of those
variables. This research therefore analyzed winsorized data to evaluate
those relationships through 2 x 2 between groups ANOVA factorials

242. Means for winsorized data, which minimized the skewing caused by statistical outliers,
mean amount awarded against OECD respondents was US$1,169,437 (n = 19; SD = 2,171,590);
the mean awards for non-OECD respondents was US$1,321,078 (n = 33; SD = 2,089,101).
243. For winsorized data, the mean award rendered against High Income respondents was
US$22,851,784 (n = 12; SD =77,780,645); the mean award against Upper Middle Income
respondents was US$8,981,026 (n = 19; SD = 30,345,259); the mean award against Lower
Middle Income respondents was US$4,839,440 (n = 17; SD = 17,300,488); and the mean award
against Low Income respondents was US$3,280,124 (n = 4; SD = 4,007,490).

2011]

THE

ICSID EFFECT?

887

analyzing OECD membership and a 2 x 4 between groups ANOVA
factorials analyzing World Bank categories.
When analyzing development as a function of respondent's OECD
Status, the results demonstrated three things. First, there was no
statistically significant interaction of OECD membership and ICSID
Status (comparing all ICSID cases against others) on amounts awarded
(F(1,48) = 0.052; p = 0.82; n - 52; r = 0.03).244 Second, there was no
main effect for ICSID-ALL on amounts awarded (F(1,48) = 0.174;
p = 0.70; n = 52; r = 0.06).245 Third, there was no main effect for
OECD Status (F(1,48) = 0.132; p = 0.72; n 52; r = 0.05).246 Also,

follow-up comparisons (HSD = 2,267,233; k = 4) did not demonstrate
that there were any latent statistically significant simple effects when
comparing the individual cell means. Raw,247 log-transformed,248 and
inverse-transformed 24 9 data exhibited similar results whereby there were
244. When ICSID Status is a function of being an ICSID-C or New York Convention award,
there was likewise no significant interaction using winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.45 1; p = 0.51;
n = 52; r = 0.10).

245. There was no main effect for ICSID-C or New York Convention awards using
winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.476; p = 0.49; n = 52; r = 0.10).
246. There was no significant main effect for OECD Status when analyzing ICSID-C versus
New York Convention awards using winsorized data (F(1,48) = 0.504; p = 0.48; n = 52;
r = 0.10).
247. For ICSID-ALL awards using raw data analyzing OECD Status on amounts awarded,
there was no reliable relationship between amounts awarded for (1) an interaction between ICSID
and OECD Status (F(1,48) = 1.376; p = 0.25; n = 52; r = 0.17), (2) a main effect for ICSID
Status (F(1,48) = 1.805; p = 0.19; n = 52; r = 0.19), (3) a main effect for OECD Status
(F(1,48) = 0.655; p = 0.42; n = 52; r = 0.12), or (4) follow-up comparisons among cell means
(HSD = 44,219,238; k = 4). For ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards, analyses showed
that for amounts awarded there was (1) no interaction between ICSID-ALL and OECD Status
(F(1,48) = 0.236; p = 0.63; r = 0.07), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,48) = 0.233;

p = 0.63; n = 52; r = 0.07), (3) no main effect for OECD Status (F(1,48) = 0.006; p = 0.94;
n = 52; r = 0.01), and (4) no significant simple effects when comparing cell means
(HSD = 45,417,872; k = 4).

248. For ICSID-ALL awards using log-transformed data analyzing OECD Status on amounts
awarded, the analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on claimed
awarded (F(1,48) = 0.699; p = 0.41.; n = 52; r = 0.11), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,48) = 1.279; p = 0.26; r = 0.16), (3) no main effect for OECD (F(1,48) = 0.579; p = 0.45;
n = 52; r =0.11), and (4) no significant simple effects (HSD = 3.454; k = 4). For ICSID-C versus
New York Convention awards, analyses similarly showed that, for amounts awarded, there was
(1) no interaction between ICSID-C and OECD Status (F(1,48) =0.189; p =0.67; n =52;
r = 0.06), (2) no main effect for ICSID-C (F(1,48) = 0.081; p = 0.78; n = 52; r = 0.04), (3) no
main effect for OECD Status (F(1,48) = 0.091; p -0.76; n 52; r = 0.04), and (4) no significant
simple effects when comparing cell means (HSD 3.514; k 4).
249. For ICSID-ALL awards using inverse-transformed data analyzing OECD Status on
amounts awarded, the analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and OECD Status on
claimed awarded (F(1,48) 1.147; p = 0.29.; n = 52; r = 0. 15), (2) no main effect for ICSID
Status (F(1,48) = 1.316; p 0.26; r = 0.16), (3) no main effect for OECD (F(1,48) = 0.757;
p = 0.39; n = 52; r = 0.13), and (4) no significant simple effects (HSD = 0.52; k = 4). For ICSIDC versus New York Convention awards, analyses similarly showed that, for amounts awarded,
there was (1) no interaction between ICSID-C and OECD Status (F(1,48) = 0.612; p = 0.44;
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no interactions, no main effects, and no simple effects when comparing
individual cell means with HSD follow-ups.
The results did not support a hypothesis that amounts awarded at
ICSID differed meaningfully as a function of the OECD Status of the
respondent. The tests failed to demonstrate that amounts at ICSID
awarded against OECD respondents was higher; likewise, the tests
failed to demonstrate that the mean amount awarded at ICSID against
non-OECD respondents was higher than the mean amount awarded
against OECD respondents. This suggests that amounts awarded - as a
function of OECD and ICSID-ALL awards - may be functionally
equivalent. Without a reliable statistical relationship between ICSID and
outcome, it is inappropriate to suggest ICSID caused outcomes for
either OECD or non-OECD members. Much like the lack of a
relationship with OECD Status and ICSID Status in the binary win-loss
dependent variable, the lack of a reliable pattern of relationship between
OECD membership and amounts awarded indicates that awards at
ICSID in the pre-2007 population were not meaningfully different. The
results also offer initial probabilistic evidence that mean awards are
currently not meaningfully different. While the inferences are based
upon initial data from the first generation of a population, the results
offer evidence that undercuts the argument that ICSID arbitration
awards were biased and that the proper normative outcome is to reject
ICSID arbitration. Nevertheless, before drawing definitive conclusions,
caution is warranted and replication is necessary. While effect sizes for
many of the OECD-analyses were less than small (r < 0.10), the
possibility of small effects and the possibility of underpowered models
with a related risk of error 250 suggests that replication with a larger
dataset is needed before drawing strong inferences about the current
population.2 5 1
r = 0.11), (2) no main effect for ICSID-C (F(1,48) = 0.007; p = 0.93; n = 52; r = 0.01), (3) no
main effect for OECD Status (F(1,48) = 0.018;p = 0.89.; n = 52; r = 0.02), and (4) no significant
simple effects when comparing cell means (HSD = 0.529; k = 4).
250. For the various small effect sizes from the different models analyzing raw, winsorized
and transformed data (r = 0.10; r = 0.10; r = 0.10; r = 0.17; r = 0.1 9 ; r = 0.12; r = 0.16;
r = 0.15; r = 0.16; r = 0.13; n = 52), see supra notes 244-49, the power of the models ranged
between 0.20-0.30 and there is a 70% or greater risk of a Type-I error. For the analyses where
there is a less than small effect size (r < 0.10) and a non-significant effect, it is unlikely that these
analyses suffer from an underpowered sample, or the effect may be so small that it will be
difficult to justify research resources. Out of an abundance of caution, however, replication is
prudent.
251. Using a conservative approach to look for the smallest effect (r - 0.10, supra notes 24446) in the four-condition model, an a priori power analysis indicates that a sample of 1,562 final
arbitration awards would be required. This would be for an analysis with an effect of 0.10
(S = 781) with 80% power (N= n (781 / 2) x k (4)). Using a less conservative approach (effect
size of r = 0.20; S = 191), the requisite sample would be 382.
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iii. Amounts Awarded: World Bank Status & ICSID
As the binary OECD Status variable is a blunt measure to analyze
Development Status, the next model used the more sensitive fourcategory variable of World Bank Status. The analysis then evaluated the
effect on the continuous dependent variable (amounts awarded) from
the two independent variables, namely World Bank Status and the
presence of an ICSID (or non-ICSID) dispute.
As regards the similarities, at the macro level, as hypothesized, there
was no reliable relationship between either the independent variables or
their interaction upon the amounts awarded. First, there was no
statistically significant interaction between World Bank and ICSID
Status (comparing all ICSID Convention and Additional Facility awards
against others) and amounts claimed (F(3,44) = 0.903; p = 0.45;
n = 52; r = 0.24). Second, there was no main effect of ICSID-ALL

awards on amounts awarded (F(1,44) = 0.001; p = 0.97; n = 52;
r < 0.01). Third, there was no main effect for World Bank Status
252
(F(3,44) = 0.453; p = 0.72; n = 52; r = 0.10). See Table 11. Raw,
254
25
3
data analyzing
log-transformed,
and inverse-transformed
252. For ICSID-ALL using raw data analyzing World Bank Status on amounts awarded, the
analysis showed (1) no interaction between ICSID and World Bank Status on amounts
(F(3,44) = 1.068; p = 0.37; n = 52; r = 0.26), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,44) = 0.579; p = 0.34; n = 52; r = 0.11), (3) no main effect for World Bank Status
(F(3,44) = 0.399; p = 0.45; n = 52; r = 0.10), and (4) no statistically simple effects when
comparing across cell means (HSD = 75,735,126; k = 8). For ICSID-C and New York
Convention awards analyzing the effect of World Bank Status, analyses showed (1) no interaction
between ICSID and World Bank Status on amounts awarded (F(3,44) = 0.696; p = 0.56; n = 52;
r = 0.21), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status (F(1,44) = 0.119; p = 0.73; n = 52; r = 0.05), (3)
no main effect for World Bank Status (F(3,44) = 0.094; p = 0.96; n = 52; r = 0.05), and (4)

follow-up pairwise comparisons across cells did not reveal a statistically significant latent effect
(HSD = 77,408,533; k = 8). None of the HSD follow-ups for those two models revealed
statistically significant differences in marginal means or simple effects.
253. For ICSID-ALL awards using log-transformed data analyzing World Bank Status on
amounts awarded, the analysis showed (1) no interaction with ICSID and World Bank Status
(F(3,44) = 0.347; p - .79; n = 52; r = 0.15), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,44) = 1.406; p -0.24; n = 52; r -0.18), (3) no main effect for World Bank Status
(F(3,44) = 0.893; p 0.45; n = 52; r = 0.24), (4) no simple effects across marginal means
(HSD = 3.46; k = 4), and (5) no significant simple effects across cell means (HSD = 5.836; k = 8).

For ICSID-C and New York Convention awards analyzing the effect of World Bank Status,
analyses showed: (1) no interaction between ICSID and World Bank Status on amounts awarded
(F(3,44) =0.512; p =0.68; n = 52; r = 0.18), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,44) = 0.174; p = 0.70; n = 52; r = 0.06), (3) no main effect for World Bank Status
(F(3,44) = 0.982; p = 0.41; n = 52; r = 0.25), (4) no simple effects acros marginal means
(HSD = 3.504; k= 4), and (5) no significant simple effects across cell means (HSD = 5.911;
k = 8).
254. For ICSID-ALL awards using inverse-transformed data analyzing World Bank Status on
amounts awarded, the analysis showed (1) no interaction with ICSID and World Bank Status
(F(3,44) = 0.250; p = 0.86; n =52; r =0.13), (2) no main effect for ICSID Status
(F(1,44) =1.692; p =0.20; n =52; r =0.19), (3) no main effect for World Bank Status
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differences among ICSID-ALL awards similarly failed to demonstrate a
relationship between development and outcome at the macro level.
TABLE 11: WINSORIZED DATA OF AMoUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO
INVESTORS AS A FUNCTION OF ICSID STATUS & WORLD BANK STATUS
FOR RESPONDENTS (n = 52)

ICSID Status
ICSID Convention &
Additional Facility

World Bank
Status

Amount
Standard
Mean
Deviation

High Income

25,886

63,407

6

Upper Middle

1,852,800

2,643,258

13

Lower Middle

640,459

1,630,155

13

Low Income

2,888,391

2,839,123

3

High Income
Upper Middle

1,654,604

2,479,167

6

1,303,900

1,442,693

6

Lower Middle

1,425,035

2,833,692

4

Low Income

1,130,859

0

1

Total

Other Awards (SCC,

UNCITRAL, etc.)

For the ICSID-ALL model, follow-up comparisons of individual cell
means (HSD = 3,752,306; k = 8) across categories did not reveal any
statistically significant latent effects. When focusing purely on ICSID
Convention and Additional Facility cases, for example, this suggests
that the following combinations of amounts awarded were not
statistically different: (1) High versus Upper Middle Income
respondents, (2) High versus Lower Middle Income respondents, (3)
High versus Low Income respondents, (4) Upper Middle versus Lower
Middle Income respondents, (5) Upper Middle versus Low Income
respondents, and (6) Lower Middle versus Low Income respondents.
Although the difference in amounts awarded between High and Low
(F(3,44) = 0.921; p = 0.44; n = 52; r = 0.14), and (4) no significant simple effects across cell

means (HSD = 0.526; k = 4). For ICSID-C and New York Convention awards analyzing the
effect of World Bank Status, analyses showed (1) no interaction between ICS[D and World Bank
Status on amounts awarded (F(3,44) = 0.443; p = 0.72; n = 52; r = 0.17), (2) no main effect for

ICSID Status (F(1,44) = 0.154; p = 0.70; n = 52; r = 0.06), and (3) no main effect for World
Bank Status (F(3,44) = 0. 86 1; p = 0.47; n = 52; r = 0.10). Although the HSD follow-ups did not
reveal any statistically significant differences in marginal means or cell means, using the less
conservative LSD did for did reveal some significant effects. See infra notes 260-61, 263.
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Income respondents in ICSID awards seems facially striking, the
follow-ups demonstrated that the difference was not statistically
meaningful. Instead, the initial evidence suggests that, for the pre-2007
population, the mean amount awarded may be statistically equivalent.
The absence of a meaningful difference on the basis of different World
Bank development classifications suggests that, for the pre-2007
population, ICSID was no better or worse than other arbitration venues.
Moreover, without a reliable statistical relationship between ICSID and
outcome, it is inappropriate to suggest World Bank classification caused
ICSID outcomes. Those results, like their counterparts when analyzing
development as a function of OECD status, offer preliminary evidence
that undercuts the hypothesis that ICSID was biased. If ICSID were
somehow biased against the developing world, one would have at least
expected to see meaningfully different (and presumably larger) awards
against developing states, but this was not the case. Given that some
analyses suggested that there may be a small-to-medium size effect of
the models beyond the pre-2007 population analyzed here,215 it would
be prudent to replicate the research before making definitive
conclusions about the current population parameters.
If ICSID Status was not viewed as a comparison purely between all
ICSID awards (namely ICSID Convention and Additional Facility
cases) and other arbitration awards (that is, other institutions or ad hoc
proceedings), the results were generally the same, but they exhibited a
slight but noteworthy divergence. Like the "ICSID-ALL" counterpart,
when comparing ICSID Convention awards against all other New York
Convention awards (and including ICSID Additional Facility cases), (1)
there was no statistically significant interaction claimed
(F(3,44) = 1.321; p

=

0.28; n = 52; r = 0.29), (2) there was no main

effect for ICSID Convention awards awarded (F(1,44) = 0.624;
p = 0.43; n = 52; r - 0.12), and (3) there was no main effect for World
Bank Status (F(3,44) = 1.114; p = 0.35; n = 52; r = 0.16).2 5 6 These
255. For the various small to medium effects from different models analyzing raw,
winsorized, log-transformed, and inverse-transformed data (r = 0.24; r = 0.10; r =0.26; r =0.11;
r =0.10; r =0.21; r= 0.24; r=0.18; r =0.15; r =0.13; r =0.19; r =0.14; r= 0.17; r =0.10;

n = 52), see supra notes 252-54, the power of the models ranged 0.20-0.40, which means there is
a 60-80% risk of a Type-Il error. For the analyses where there is a less than small effect size
(r < 0.10) and a non-significant effect, it is unlikely that these analyses suffer from an
underpowered sample, or the effect may be so small that it will be difficult to justify research
resources. Out of an abundance of caution, before drawing conclusive inferences about the
current population, using the smallest effect size (r = 0.10; S - 781) in an eight-condition model
requires a sample of 3,124 final arbitration awards (N= n (781 / 2) x k (8)). Using a more realistic
approach and an effect size of r = 0.20 (S= 191), a sample of 764 would be required before
making statistically definitive conclusions.
256. The macro level results from the winsorized data were replicated using both raw, logtransformed, and inverse-transformed data of amounts awarded. See supra notes 252-54.
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macro-level results indicated that, for the pre-2007 population, there
was no reliable relationship between the ICSID and Development
Status.
Although the latent effects were not replicated when using
transformed data, the winsorized data revealed two latent differences
when comparing the individual cell means for the ICSID-C model.25 7
First, for Low Income countries, the mean ICSID Convention award
was higher than a New York Convention award. All other follow-ups
comparing ICSID Convention to New York Convention awards for
High, Upper Middle, and Lower Middle Income respondents were not
statistically different. 258 Second, for ICSID Convention awards only, the
mean amount awarded against Low Income respondents was
statistically larger than their High Income counterparts.25 All other
follow-up effects for ICSID Convention awards failed to reveal a
statistically significant difference, including comparisons between (1)
High Income versus Upper Middle Income respondents, (2) High
Income versus Lower Middle Income respondents, (3) Upper Middle
versus Lower Middle Income respondents, (4) Upper Middle versus
Low Income respondents, and (5) Lower Middle versus Low Income
respondents. All New York Convention awards did not have statistically
different amounts awarded. If the more sensitive Fisher's Least
Significant Difference (LSD) 260 test was used, the phenomenon
whereby Low Income respondents experienced larger awards than their
High Income counterparts at ICSID was also present when comparing
cell means across ICSID-ALL versus other awards in winsorized
data, 261 log-transformed data, 262 and inverse-transformed 263 data. The
257. See supra notes 253-54 (demonstrating a lack of statistically significant simple effects
using HSD follow-up analyses in the ICSID-C models). For the winsorized data, the follow-up
comparisons were for cell means of ICSID-C versus New York Convention awards
(HSD = 3,714,086; k = 8).
258. For the interaction of ICSID-C and World Bank Status, follow-ups revealed no
significant differences in the marginal means of various World Bank categories
(HSD = 2,202,104; k = 4). The results were also mirrored in the interaction of ICSID-ALL and
World Bank Status with no significant differences in marginal means (HSD = 2,224,765; k = 4).
In other words, there was no statistically significant difference between amounts awarded against
High, Upper Middle, Low Middle, and Low Income respondents.
259. While all other follow-ups for ICSID-C awards were descriptive, this effect mimics a
potential effect found analyzing all ICSID cases but only using the more liberal and sensitive
LSD follow-up. See infra note 261.
260. LSD analyses must be treated with extreme caution given the lack of a statistically
significant effect and the sometimes overly sensitive nature of LSDs that may result in
inadvertently finding non-replicable significant effects.
261. Using LSD follow-ups in winsorized data, while there were no differences in the
marginal means for various World Bank categories (LSD = 1,677,746; k = 4), there was one
striking and significant simple effect (LSD = 2,372,691; k = 8). For ICSID-ALL cases, there was
a significant difference whereby amounts awarded by Low Income countries experienced higher
awards than High Income countries; all other comparisons for awards at ICSID (i.e., High versus
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lack of a significant macro effect, the arguable oversensitivity of LSDs,
and slight divergence in follow-ups suggests inferences from this
analysis should be treated cautiously. Prior to making definitive
inferences, further research that contains a larger sample and additional
statistical control is required.
In the meantime, macro-level analyses of the pre-2007 population all
found that outcome was not reliably linked to World Bank classification
or the presence of an ICSID dispute. The lack of a statistically
meaningful difference in the initial evidence of statistical equivalence in
amounts awarded suggests that ICSID was not any better (or any worse)
than other forms of arbitration for resolving treaty disputes. Inferences
from this evidence undermine suggestions that ICSID caused outcomes
or was somehow biased against developing states. It also provides a
preliminary, but limited, baseline for considering whether that result
continues to be the current population parameter.

Upper-Middle, High versus Lower-Middle, Upper-Middle versus Lower-Middle, Upper-Middle
versus Low, and Lower-Middle versus Low) were not statistically different. No awards in other
arbitral forums were statistically different. For ICSID-ALL, the awards involving High Income
respondents were: ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America (NAFTA), ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/1, Award (Jan. 9, 2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 470 (2004); Genin v. Republic of Estonia
(U.S. v. Est.), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002);
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States of America (NAFTA), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States of America
(NAFTA), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192; Soufraki
v. United Arab Emirates (It. v. U.A.E.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award (July 7, 2004),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Soufraki_000.pdf; Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Arg. v.
Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002). The
ICSID-ALL awards against Low Income respondents were: Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v.
Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 21, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (2002);
Goetz v. Republic of Burundi (Belg. v. Burundi), ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award (Feb. 10,
1999), 6 ICSID Rep. 5 (2004); Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Gov't of the Union of
Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1 (Mar. 31,2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003).
262. Using LSD follow-ups analyzing ICSID-ALL for log-transformed data, there were
differences in marginal means across World Bank categories, such that (1) High Income awards
were lower than those against Low Income respondents, and (2) Low Middle Income awards
were lower than those against Low Income respondents (LSD = 2.690; k = 4). All other followups were statistically equivalent. For cell means using transformed data (LSD = 3.690; k = 8),
there was only one significant effect: namely, that awards against Low Income respondents
outside of ICSID were higher than those against High Income respondents at ICSID. All other
comparisons were statistically equivalent. None of these effects were present using the
statistically more conservative HSD folllow-ups.
263. Using LSD follow-ups analyzing ICSID-ALL for inverse-transformed data, there were
differences in marginal means across World Bank categories, such that (1) High Income awards
were lower than those against Low Income respondents, and (2) Low Middle Income awards
were lower than those against Low Income respondents (LSD = 0.469; k = 4). For cell means
using transformed data (LSD = 0.664; k = 8), there was only one significant effect: namely, that
awards against Low Income respondents outside ICSID were higher than those against High
Income respondents inside ICSID. All other comparisons were statistically equivalent.
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Nevertheless, although the effect was expressed in pure ICSID
Convention cases and not all ICSID cases generally, the presence of two
simple effects with a unique, and arguably adverse, impact on Low
Income respondents is worthy of further consideration, both in terms of
additional research and due care in policy choices. While the pre-2007
data do not necessarily suggest that ICSID is in need of radical
overhaul, these results may be evidence that targeted incremental
strategies might usefully redress areas of concern. Further research to
establish whether these simple effects using winsorized data from the
pre-2007 population are replicable in the future - and whether the
results from the population analyses can be extrapolated as a parameter
for the current population - is therefore warranted. Replication is also
prudent, given the scope of the nearly medium effect sizes and the
possibility that, for the basis of making inferences beyond the pre-2007
population, there would be an underpowered sample with nonsignificant effects.264
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSES

While the results of the analyses are a useful starting place to assess
ICSID, it is critical to place the results within their proper context. As
suggested in previous research using the current database, recognizing
the limitations is fundamental to understanding the scope of reasonable
inferences that can and should be drawn from the data 2 65 as they
inevitably have implications for the integrity of potential normative
reforms. 266 First, the population data come from public awards. This
necessarily means that there is a case selection bias that may affect the
external validity of the results. Although it is not certain that the effect
would weigh in favor of either investors or states, it is possible that
private awards differ in some critical aspect from public awards.
Likewise, the data do not include any awards rendered after June 1,
2006. This necessarily means that more than four years of data are not
264. For the ICSID-ALL and World Bank interaction using winsorized data, the effect size
was close to medium (r = 0.24), but for the ICSID-C and World Bank interaction, there was a
medium effect size (r = 0.29). Such effects, where close to 30% of that variance is attributable to
the isolated variables, is worthy of reflection. Using effect sizes from the winsorized data, for the
ICSID-ALL interaction, the power of the analysis was between 0.40-0.50, suggesting a 50-60%
risk of a Type-I error, and for the ICSID-C interaction, the power of the analysis is between
0.50-0.60, suggesting a 40-50% risk of a Type-li error. Even the log-transformed data exhibited
closer to medium effect sizes for the interaction for ICSID-ALL (r = 0.24) and ICSID-C
(r = 0.25). Post hoc power analysis suggests the power of the interaction was 0.40, which
indicates a 60% risk of a Type-Il error.
265. Franck, supra note 23, at 440, 459 n.129, 472, 474-76, 478 n.187; Franck, supra note
15, at 17, 24 n.109, 39 n.170, 62, 68, 73, 83.
266. Franck, supra note 30 at 811-12.
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included, and cases, particularly some of the larger awards against
countries such as Argentina and Ecuador, were omitted from the
analysis. To the extent that the analysis does not reflect the current
population and provides a historical baseline for ongoing consideration,
it is necessary to expand the dataset, replicate the analysis, and engage
in more precise analyses that control for spurious or co-linear variables
that may inadvertently contribute to the results. The author is expanding
the "Generation 2" database to address such issues, which means the
analyses in this Article will offer a baseline for future analysis and
consideration.
Second, the strength of these inferences beyond the analyses
conducted for the population is necessarily limited because the sample
may not reflect the current population parameters. For the main effect of
Latin American respondents, whereby in non-ICSID cases higher
amounts were claimed against LA respondents than non-LA
respondents, the cell count for LA respondents in non-ICSID cases was
relatively small (n = 3). For LA respondents, there was also an
interaction that was approaching significance (p = 0.10) in the logged
data, which in light of the relatively low power of the dataset and closeto-medium effect size, requires replication and additional statistical
control before a definitive assessment that there is no reliable
relationship in the population. Regarding Development Status and mean
amount claimed, although the main effect for OECD Status was on the
cusp of significance (p = 0.06), the significant simple effect that only
for other cases (that is, non-ICSID disputes) amount claimed against
OECD respondents was higher than non-OECD respondents must be
viewed cautiously. When a main effect is not significant, follow-ups
that reveal significant simple effects may not necessarily represent
replicable variance within the larger population.267 Along a similar vein,
for the simple effect that suggests for ICSID cases only, there was a
significant difference such that Low Income countries had higher
amounts awarded against them than High Income countries, 268 there was
no significant interaction or main effect, and it would be inappropriate
to attribute too much to those simple effects. Nevertheless, focusing on
significant simple effects (provided they correct for statistical error)
even with a non-significant main effect might offer a useful early
267. For example, an identical 2 x 2 factorial using transformed data, which more closely
adheres to the statistical assumptions of the underlying test, revealed an interaction approaching
significance (p = 0.053), see supra note 217, but follow-up comparisons (HSD = 1.057) did not
reveal any statistically significant differences. In any event, when analyzing amounts claimed as a
function of ICSID and World Bank Status, the winsorized data did not reveal any significant
differences, and inferences from transformed data are limited. See supra notes 221-26 and
accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 234-42.
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warning signal that could create a basis for thoughtful discussion about
appropriate normative reform, particularly where additional analyses
offer an opportunity for replication.
Third, given the relatively new nature of empirical approaches to ITA
and the current limitations of the dataset, the statistical models used
were blunt and the variables were limited. It would be prudent for future
research to address the possibility of co-linearity, control for spurious
variables, and consider multi-variate regressions to reflect the real-life
complexities while simultaneously decreasing statistical error.269
Although this research may be a moment in a greater historical
narrative, future analyses may find different or complementary nuances
as we develop more sophisticated measures and models in the quest to
minimize statistical error. Future scholarship may focus on historical
shifts and methodological innovations in an effort to improve the
common knowledge.
Finally, there may be issues related to the statistical conclusion
validity of the data. While there were a multitude of effect sizes (r) that
were less than small (that is, r < 0.10), there were analyses that
exhibited small-to-medium effect sizes (r = 0.10-0.30). This suggests
that, for those analyses failing to find a statistically significant effect,
the power of the research was relatively low and the resulting risk of
statistical error is beyond traditionally accepted levels. 270 Analyses with
larger sample sizes will be necessary to redress this issue. As replication
is the sine qua non of social science research, future analysis is both
normal and prudent.
To the extent that ITA is a relatively recent phenomenon in
international law, we should not be surprised that the research has
limited statistical power. Any attempt to increase the power of the
analyses by increasing the dataset would have been futile, as the dataset
was comprised of real-world data that represented all of the public
awards within the prescribed timeframe. In the past, there were simply
no investment awards available to analyze and no databases existed that
contained information capable of analysis. This should not stop us from
conducting analyses, particularly when prominent political scientists
remind us that, "[u]ncertainty and limited data should not cause us to
abandon scientific research. On the contrary, the biggest payoff for
using the rules of scientific inference occurs precisely when data are
limited, observation tools are flawed, measurements are unclear, and
relationships are uncertain." 271 The phenomenon of a small dataset for
269. Franck, supra note 23, at 475.
270. See supra notes 152, 155, 158, 172, 181, 207, 237, 250 (considering the power of various
analyses and providing post hoc power analyses).
271. KING ET AL., supra note 15, at 10.
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new international economic dispute resolution systems is perhaps
typical. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 272 and
the revised Dispute Settlement Understanding 273 have similarly
experienced a limited number of cases (ten to forty per year), but this
has not stopped vital research on this area.274 Particularly where there
are now more awards and even more investment treaty disputes in the
pipeline, some sense of what the data show now is vital for creating the
baseline for future consideration. Nevertheless, it is always critical to
remember that (1) systematic analysis must describe its methodology to
promote the reliability of data collection, statistical research, and related
statistical inferences; (2) research must be subject to replication in the
future; and (3) expanded analysis with more sophisticated models and
statistical control is prudent. While no quantitative research is perfect,
provided it is methodologically sound ex ante, it is normatively
preferable to no research at all or the substitution of chance, personal
opinion, instinct, or unrepresentative examples that may be byproducts
of cognitive biases.
More research is therefore required to generate analyses with better
levels of power, stability, statistical control, and enhanced external
validity before reaching definitive conclusions about the role of ICSID
in setting population parameters in investment treaty arbitration.
UNCTAD's recent research suggests that there are over 350 known
investment treaty arbitrations. 275 At the rate of approximately thirty new
cases a year,2 76 it will likely take decades before there is a sufficient
pool of awards - potentially more than 1500 final awards, as a priori
power analyses suggest 277 - to conduct the requisite analyses that
would be needed to reliably ascertain the smallest effects and whether it
is appropriate to retain the null hypothesis. Recognizing the
imperfection of life, but hoping to do the best we can within those
limitations, future research will be challenging and will likely require a
pooling of scholarly resources. Nevertheless, it is an undertaking well
worth doing, and doing well. There is too much at stake in terms of
272. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.NT.S. 194.
273. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 21, Annex 2.
274. The empirical evidence for international trade law disputes suggests that, during the
GATT era, there were approximately nine cases a year, but there are now approximately thirty to
thirty-five per year. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview ofthe First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 15-16 (1999); Eric A. Posner &
John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence and International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (2005).
275. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, at 83,

U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.2 (2010).
276. Id.
277. See supra notes 182, 195, 208, 231, 251, 255, 264 and accompanying text. Using similar
models and an a priori power analysis, previous research found that a sample of 1562 awards
would be required. Franck, supra note 23, at 461 n.132.
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economic, political, and legal implications to sit idly by without
methodically attempting to improve the quality of the research and the
basis for either potential normative reforms or the retention of the
existing status quo.
V.

ANALYSIS

& RECOMMENDATION

Given ICSID's leading role in the provision of arbitration services for
the resolution of investment disputes, ICSID has been at the forefront of
thoughtful consideration of the management of investment treaty
disputes. It is therefore prudent to evaluate ICSID in light of the existing
data and quantitative analyses. This Part explores the general results,
findings related to amounts claimed, and analyses related to outcome.
This Article argues that, based upon the analyses from the pre-2007
population data and related inferences, ICSID arbitrations did not
generally appear to be meaningfully different (presumably biased) as a
function of amounts claimed or outcomes. In light of the results that do
point to specific and limited areas of potential concern, the Part
recommends ongoing research and the implementation of targeted
normative measures. The objective should be to promote incremental
reforms and structural safeguards at ICSID that are designed to prevent
inadvertent systemic bias and to minimize the backlash to a treaty
network that forms a core backdrop of the international economic
system.
A.

GeneralFindings & Recommendations

There were no general differences between ICSID and non-ICSID
cases in amounts claimed and outcomes. When refining the analyses to
address three variables of interest, ICSID was still not reliably linked to
either amounts claimed or outcomes. First, there was no reliable
relationship between ICSID and Energy disputes for either amounts
claimed or outcomes. Second, although there was a relationship
between amounts claimed against Latin American respondents in nonICSID awards, there was no reliable relationship among ICSID, Latin
American respondents, and outcomes. Third, there was no reliable
relationship for either amounts claimed or outcome, as a function of
Development Status and all ICSID awards (that is, ICSID Convention
and Additional Facility awards).
As a general matter, this meant that, for the pre-2007 population data,
the claims and outcomes of arbitration awards at ICSID were not
statistically different, and the evidence did not suggest that ICISD was
any worse (or any better) than other arbitration forums. That evidence
supported neither the contention that ICSID was biased nor the
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hypothesis that ICSID arbitration awards were meaningfully
different.278 The data revealed no obvious general disparity at ICSID
when controlling for Energy disputes, Latin American respondents, or
respondents' Development Status. Given that the pre-2007 data cannot
even establish a meaningful statistical relationship between the variables
of interest and ICSID, it would be improper to suggest that ICSID
caused differences. Inferences from these initial analyses of pre-2007
population data suggest that calls to reject ICSID, such as that from
ALBA, are arguably misplaced or perhaps misattributed. Likewise, calls
for radical overhaul or outright rejection of ICSID may appear
overstated as a general matter on the basis of current data. While there
may be specific cases where states question the specific "benefit of their
bargain" in agreeing to grant unilateral rights to investors in exchange
for the potential value of foreign investment, 279 that is a different
question from whether ICSID and the investment arbitration system as a
whole exhibit bias or are otherwise fundamentally unsound.
Nevertheless, in light of certain findings, follow-ups, effect sizes, and
power analyses, there are aspects that require further reflection. For
amounts claimed, this relates to (1) the significant main effect for LA
such that, in non-ICSID awards, higher amounts were claimed against
LA respondents; and (2) the latent simple effect for OECD Status such
that, for non-ICSID awards, amounts claimed against OECD
respondents were higher than non-OECD members. For amounts
awarded, this relates to (1) the absence of any impact on reliable link
between ICSID and LA respondents upon outcome; (2) the latent simple
effect for Low Income respondents such that ICSID Convention awards
were higher than New York Convention awards; and (3) the latent
simple effect for ICSID Convention awards whereby awards against
Low Income respondents were higher than awards against High Income
278. The author is unaware of any investment treaty claim having been brought before a
national court, even though many states include provisions in their ILAs to permit investors to sue
the state within the state's own national courts. See Parra,supra note 31, at 288, 358 (indicating
investors can sometimes litigate before national courts). Given investors' failure to pursue their
treaty claims before national courts, the inference about a lack of ICSID bias should be limited to
comparisons with other forms of arbitration. Unfortunately, the inference cannot be extended to
all forms of adjudication, as there is no comparable court litigation, given investors' failure to
take states up on their offers to litigate claims before national courts.
279. It is likewise prudent to recall that the analyses in this Article are quantitative and
holistic in nature. The analyses evaluate systemic associations rather than predicting individual
outcomes or identifying the unique value of an 11A in an individual state-to-state negotiation. A
qualitative assessment of specific IIAs, particularly with a sound ex ante research protocol, may
identify specific areas of concern or suggest a different cost-benefit analysis that is a variation
from the population as a whole. That does not undermine, however, the value of providing
systemic information to ensure that a selection bias occurs such that cognitive biases (such as the
confirmation bias) operate to undermine the value of the research and related analyses. See supra
notes 134, 166 and accompanying text.
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states. Given the concerns raised by those analyses, these highlighted
issues are arguably worthy of targeted solutions. Concerns related to
disparate amounts claimed, for example, might be addressed by
instituting pleading rules that may require a good-faith obligation for
pleading, particularization of claimed damages, or cost-shifting for
unsubstantiated claims. Likewise, to the extent that concerns about
disparate outcomes reflect concerns about the availability of counsel or
states that have recently experienced civil war (whether from Africa or
elsewhere), reforms may consider how to usefully address gaps in legal
capacity and rule of law infrastructure. Otherwise, the initial
evidence from this research - which is subject to the evolution of
future research before making broader inferences - does not support
the theory of radical rejection or reform. While the data do not mean the
system is perfect, they do offer preliminary statistical evidence that is a
cause for cautious optimism as regards the effect of ICSID.
B.

Amounts Claimed

This Section explores the differences in amounts claimed that were
linked to LA or OECD Status. It then assesses ICSID's arguable
possible bias on this dependent variable, given that amounts claimed by
investors are currently outside ICSID's control.
For amounts claimed against LA respondents, the presence of the
statistically significant main effect is intriguing, particularly given the
sensitivities expressed by some Latin American heads of state. Making
an inference on the basis of the pre-2007 population, the results suggest
that, in non-ICSID arbitrations, LA respondents may initially experience
a larger fiscal exposure and therefore perceive a larger arbitration risk.
Given the role of cognitive biases and how initial perceptions may
affect ultimate conclusions drawn about institutions despite evidence to
the contrary, 280 perhaps this small seed - namely, disparate amounts
claimed against LA respondents - is at the root of stated concerns
about the perceived bias of ICSID. It would therefore be prudent to
explore further the intersection of amounts claimed and Latin American
states to consider the scope of the risk and explore how best to minimize
the potential differential arbitration risk. Nevertheless, three critical
elements must be considered to properly contextualize the results.
First, the differential amounts claimed against LA respondents in
non-ICSID cases did not affect the actual amounts awarded, irrespective
280. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 741 (2008) (describing theories of risk perception and the role of emotional apprehension,
including whether such apprehension acts as an improper predicator of future risk, and creates
challenges for informed and rational policymaking).
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of whether the case occurred inside or outside of ICSID. Even though
LA respondents experienced higher amounts claimed in non-ICSID
cases than their non-LA counterparts, the analyses could not
demonstrate that LA respondents experienced differential results. In
other words, despite the initial risk, the results offered preliminary
evidence that outcomes in the pre-2007 population were statistically
equivalent across arbitral forums.
Second, to the extent that differences in amounts claimed reflect an
area of concern within investment arbitration, those concerns may be
improperly attributed to ICSID. While LA respondents may experience
legitimate concerns about their high risk in ITA, casting doubt on
ICSID's integrity appears to be misplaced at present. Rather, although
the number of claims in the subset is small, inferences from the data
suggest that the perception of enhanced arbitration risk would be more
rightly attributed to non-ICSID venues.
Third, differences even in a non-ICSID context may simply reflect
case selection bias such that investors may elect non-ICSID venues in
higher value disputes or in cases that require the immediate formation of
a tribunal. For example, to the extent that the ICSID registration
process, the formation of ICSID tribunals, and the overall timetable of
ICSID arbitrations may take longer than alternative forums281
particularly as the registration process is not an element of SCC or ad
hoc arbitration - it is possible that investors may have self-selected a
venue that they assume operates more quickly than ICSID. In such a
case, for example, where the claim is substantial or interim relief is
needed expeditiously, it may be unsurprising that larger-value disputes
find their way into non-ICSID venues.2 2 This may be partially
responsible for, or perhaps co-linear with, the variance reflected in the
larger amounts claimed against LA respondents in other arbitration
venues. Future research might test this theory by controlling for the
length of the dispute or the presence of a request for interim relief.
For amounts claimed as a function of a respondent's OECD status, as
hypothesized, data revealed that the mean amount claimed did not
generally differ as a function of respondent's Development Status when
comparing all ICSID awards (that is, combining ICSID Convention and
ICSID Additional Facility cases) against disputes in all other venues
(that is, the SCC, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), etc.). In
other words, the presence of an ICSID or non-ICSID venue was not
281. LucY REED ET AL, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 127 (2d ed. 2011) ("Registration
historically was slow, with the average registration time being 83 days from the request filing
date. ICSID has, however, radically improved registration times - for the second half of 2009,
the average time for registration was only 29 days.").
282. The author is grateful to Ingrid Wuerth for exploring these issues.
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reliably associated with differential amounts claimed in ITA.
Nevertheless, certain follow-up comparisons on the non-significant
analyses suggested a latent difference on amounts claimed, but only in
non-ICSID arbitral venues.2 83 This has various implications. First, the
direction of the difference is key. The amounts claimed against OECD
respondents were higher than their non-OECD counterparts. To the
extent that OECD membership is actually linked to a greater risk of
higher claims, this presumably operates in favor of the developing
world rather than against it. Moreover, if the value of investments in
OECD respondents is higher, this may be a reasonable result. Future
research might usefully explore this element by controlling for the
average value of investments or limiting the co-linearity of OECD
Status and investment value.
Even though there were differences in claimed amounts as a function
of both LA and OECD Status, analyses revealed that neither effect was
attributable to ICSID awards. Moreover, ICSID is not currently
permitted to regulate the amounts investors claim. Rather than reflecting
the institutional integrity of ICSID, the results reflect the discretion of
investors and their lawyers - the sole actors permitted to make claims.
Amounts claimed ultimately reflect investors' pleading choices (which
presumably, but not necessarily, reflect the value of the underlying
investment), the HAs that offer investors unbridled discretion to claim
damages, and the absence of a good-faith pleading obligation or
affiliated sanctions in international arbitration. In other words, the
differences in claimed amounts may be an inevitable byproduct of the
legal doctrine stakeholders created. Rather than relying on rules and
other legal structures to create incentives for proper pleading decisions,
parties must instead rely upon informal market mechanisms, such as
concerns about reputation for those lawyers and parties who are "repeat
players" in the ITA game, to encourage reasonable and appropriate
damage claims. ICSID's lack of legal authority to control pleading of
damage amounts and the possible statistical equivalence of amounts
claimed at ICSID across categories suggest that ICSID has not caused,
as a quantitative matter, the scope of arbitration risk. Nevertheless,
given the highlighted results, there may be value in ICSID considering
targeted reforms to offer incentives for stakeholders to make reasonable
and substantiated damage claims.

283. This was for the 2 x 2 model comparing ICSID-ALL awards and OECD Status using
winsorized data (HSD = 16,872,303) and inverse-transformed data (HSD = 1.057). Similarly, for
the 2 x 4 analyzing World Bank Status, a facial review of winsorized data suggested a possible
gap in amounts claimed in non-ICSID cases whereby Low Income respondents experienced lower
claims than High Income respondents. Yet, this difference was not statistically significant.
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Award Outcomes

This Section explores the results of amounts awarded as a function of
ICSID, LA, and Development Status. Given ALBA's stated concerns
about ICSID arbitration, this Section first explores the implications of
the lack of a reliable relationship between ICSID and outcomes for LA
respondents. It then turns to a consideration of the role of Development
Status in outcome, focusing on the latent simple effects related to ICSID
Convention awards, World Bank Status, and amounts awarded.
The results of the data contradict claims that ICSID somehow treats
LA respondents unfairly. None of the statistical analyses exhibited a
statistically significant pattern of relationship among ICSID Status, LA
respondents, and arbitration outcomes in the population studied. The
consistency in the results offers useful information that demonstrates
ICSID awards were not substantially different (neither better nor worse)
with respect to Latin American states as compared to other states. Many
of the effect sizes are less than small (r < 0.10) and the relationships
were non-significant. This suggests that it is unlikely that those
relationships suffer from a power problem requiring a larger sample or
it may simply be that the possible effect is simply so tiny that it may not
warrant the investment of research resources to attempt to identify a
variable of minimal impact. Nevertheless, some analyses indicated that
the presence of a possible small to bordering on medium effect
(r < 0.24) in the raw, winsorized and log-inverse data.284 This warrants
caution before drawing broad inferences from the initial data of the pre2007 population as a current population parameter; it would therefore be
prudent to replicate this research with a larger sample, control for
additional variance, and address potential co-linearity.28
Nevertheless, the analyses demonstrated that, irrespective of whether
the dispute occurs at ICSID or some other arbitral venue, the amounts
awarded against LA respondents were not meaningfully different from
those awarded against non-LA respondents, which supports the
inference that amounts awarded to either category were possibly
statistically equivalent. Inferences drawn from the pre-2007 dataset are
284. Winsorized data is available in Table 7. For the raw data comparing all ICSID cases
versus others: (1) ICSID awards against LA respondents averaged US$13,568,009
(SD = 37,992,637; n = 12); (2) ICSID awards against non-LA respondents averaged US$993,795
(SD = 2,497,730; n = 23); (3) Other awards against LA respondents averaged US$17,883,387
(SD = 35,766,775; n = 4); and (4) Other awards against non-LA respondents averaged
US$21,772,699 (SD = 74,539,575; n = 13). Data related to the log-transformed data is available,
supra, at notes 204, 206.
285. Provided there are not missing data and that it is possible to ascertain both the amount
claimed and the amount awarded in a single dispute, it would be prudent to control for amounts
claimed. This is key for awards against LA respondents given the differential amounts claimed in
non-ICSID cases.
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pieces of evidence suggesting that ALBA and others are arguably
incorrect to suggest that the problem with ITA is that ICSID is
somehow biased against Latin American states. If those stakeholders are
concerned about the integrity of the existing arbitral regime, creating
alternative regional regional arbitration regime does not necessarily
offer an antidote to the underlying concerns. Instead, it arguably recreates the issues, but it does so in an even more fragmented manner.
If ALBA and others were concerned about the procedural integrity of
ICSID and ITA, it would be appropriate to consider alternative means of
promoting norms of procedural justice and substantive fairness rather
than painting ICSID with too broad a brush. Procedural integrity
concerns are a critical element of both procedural and substantive
justice, but it is normatively preferable to address identifiable problems
with targeted solutions rather than masking the real issue and missing
the mark. This is not to say that certain states may have experienced
results that are atypical. For example, Ecuador and Argentina may have
arguably experienced caseloads that are unique as regards the general
population or even the sub-population of Latin American states, and
future research might usefully explore those differences. While much
could be learned from thinking systematically about the qualitative
experiences of certain states, the holistic analysis of quantitative data
based upon pre-2007 data does not point to a specific problem in the
overall system for Latin American states, at least as regards the matter
of award outcome.
As regards Development Status, the results also offer evidence that
contradict claims of ICSID bias against the developing world.
Development Status had little to no impact on "outcome" at ICSID,
irrespective of how the variables were operationalized. Chi-square
comparisons suggested there was no difference in outcome as a function
of ICSID and development. Rather, analyses replicating aspects of
previous research found minimal links between development and
outcome. There was no reliable pattern of relationship among ICSID,
OECD Status, and winning or losing ITA. Likewise, as regards
ANOVAs analyzing amounts awarded, there was generally a lack of
any reliable statistical relationships among ICSID awards and
Development Status. The absence of a reliable statistical relationship
makes it more challenging to assert that either Development Status or
ICSID improperly affected the outcome of ITA. These results
demonstrate that ICSID was neither better nor worse than other
arbitration venues, and such results offer initial evidence based upon the
pre-2007 population that contradicts the assertion that outcomes of
ICSID arbitration awards were biased.
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Generally, follow-up analyses did not reveal any statistically
significant differences among awards as a function of ICSID or
Development Status. None of the follow-up analyses of ICSID and
OECD Status revealed any statistically significant effects.286 Even the
cell-by-cell comparisons based upon World Bank Status and
comparisons of all ICSID Awards (ICSID Convention and Additional
Facility disputes versus disputes in other venues) - arguably the most
appropriate model for sensitively analyzing the cases on ICSID's
docket - failed to reveal any statistically reliable differences. 287 All
twelve different permutations of individual cell comparisons including the six comparisons involving ICSID disputes only - could
not reveal a meaningful difference and, as such, were initial evidence of
statistically equivalent awards.
Follow-up analyses for the model that analyzed ICSID Status as a
function of ICSID Convention awards versus New York Convention
awards (that is, including ICSID Additional Facility and other
institutional awards) analyzing winsorized amounts awarded interject a
small note of caution. Although neither the interaction nor main effects
were significant, comparisons of the subset of specific cell-means for
ICSID and World Bank Status revealed two latent effects whereby (1)
for ICSID Convention awards, Low Income respondents (n = 2)
experienced larger awards than High Income respondents (n = 3); and
(2) for Low Income respondents, amounts awarded in ICSID
Convention awards (n = 2) were higher than New York Convention
awards (n = 2).288 Given the reasonable doctrinal equivalence between
ICSID and non-ICSID regimes, the suggestion that ICSID experiences
differential outcomes beneath the surface is perplexing. To assess that
issue, it is prudent to consider the specific disputes creating cell-means
and assess whether cases are arguably representative. The ICSID-C
awards (and raw amounts awarded) involving High Income respondents
were Genin v. Estonia28 9 (US$0), Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates290
(US$0), and Maffezini v. Spain29 1 (US$155,314),292 whereas the ICSID
286. This was true for ICSID-ALL and ICSID-C awards analyzing winsorized and
transformed data.
287. This was true for ICSID-ALL awards analyzing winsorized and transformed data.
288. This was true for winsorized data. Log- and inverse-transformed data did not reveal this
effect in HSD follow-ups, but it was present in LSD follow-ups. Arguably, reliance on the
transformed data, which exhibit better conformity to the underlying statistical assumptions of the
test, is preferable.
289. Genin v. Republic of Estonia (U.S. v. Est.), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25,
2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002).
290. Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates (It. v. U.A.E.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award
(July 7, 2004), http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Soufraki_000.pdf.
291. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Arg. v. Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award
(Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002).
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Convention awards (and raw amounts awarded) against Low Income
respondents were American Manufacturing and Trading v. Zaire293

(US$9 million) and Goetz v. Burundi294 (US$2,989,636). 295 There are
various explanations for this phenomenon in the pre-2007 data that have
implications for possible normative reform.
First, the differences may be a function of the quality of legal
representation readily available to High Income respondents.29 6 Spain
and United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) are states with rather large GDPs 297
and government budgets.2 98 They are in a position to spend large
amounts on high quality legal representation. In Soufraki, for example,
the multinational law firm Allen & Overy represented the U.A.E.299
292. This was the amount coded in the common currency of United States Dollars (USD) as
at the date of the award. The amount awarded in the original currency was 3 million Spanish
Pesetas (ESP).
293. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb.
21, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 14 (2002).
294. Goetz v. Republic of Burundi (Belg. v. Burundi), ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award
(Feb. 10, 1999), 6 ICSID Rep. 5 (2004).
295. The specific finding of higher amounts awarded against Low Income countries in
ICSID-C awards. The three Additional Facility cases that would be added were all against High
Income respondents, namely the United States under NAFTA, where the award amounts were all
US$O. See supra note 261. For the Low Income respondents in the ICSID-ALL category, the
awards were the same. The additional case of Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar, however -

which was an ad hoc case outside ICSID using ICSID-AF Rules - resulted in no award. Yaung
Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Gov't of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1
(Mar. 31, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003).
296. There is a rich empirical literature related to the role of lawyers in litigation outcomes.
See Kyung Hwan Baik & In-Gyu Kim, Strategic Decisions on Lawyers' Compensation in Civil
Disputes, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 854 (2007) (exploring the role of lawyer compensation in
outcomes); Yeon-Koo Chee & Ian Gale, Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness ofAll-Pay
Auctions, 30 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 22, 22 (2000) (suggesting success is a function of
different performance of lawyers); Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation
Expenditure, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988). This must be tempered with recent research

on lawyers' capacity to predict litigation outcomes, which generally suggests that lawyers are
overconfident but that female lawyers exhibit less overconfidence and predict outcomes more
reliably. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 133, 141-43 (2010).

297. World Bank estimates from 2009 indicate Spain's gross domestic product (GDP) is
US$1,573,409 million and the U.A.E.'s GDP is US$230,252 million. World Bank, Gross
Domestic Product 2009, World Development Indicators Database (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://tinyurl.com/yg5fsj [hereinafter World Bank, GDP 2009]. Estonia, however, had a GDP of

US$19,084 million. Id.
298. Data from 2009 suggest that the U.A.E. has nearly US$5 billion in net revenue, taking
into account estimated government expenditures on the order of US$60.05 billion; similarly,
although in a deficit situation, Spain had expenditures totaling US$648.6 billion. Central
Intelligence Agency [CIA], World Factbook, Field Listing: Budget, http://tinyurl.com/4zzn51r

(last visited Mar. 24, 2011) [hereinafter CIA, World Factbook]. Estonia's budget of USS8.677
billion is much smaller. Id
299. Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates (It. v. U.A.E.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Award
(July 7, 2004), http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Soufraki_000.pdf. Likewise, if considering the
LSD analyses for the ICSID-ALL awards, the United States was the respondent in the three
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Similarly, lawyers from two different firms, one of which was Howrey
& Simon LLP, represented Estonia. 300 In contrast, in American
Manufacturing and Trading v. Zaire, the respondent appears to have

been represented by one internal government lawyer and Zaire's
ambassador to France. 301 Large GDPs and annual budgets may have
another impact on the quality of legal representation. High Income
respondents are arguably capable of paying for protracted arbitration
and have access to funds to retain expert witnesses, such as international
law or damages experts, should the dispute require it. Theoretically,
states - particularly Low Income respondents - with small GDPs or
annual budgets may be unable to marshal the funds for an equally
vigorous defense. Future research should collect data on law firms,
other experts, and the length of proceedings to control for the effect of
those variables on outcome. Similarly, it may be necessary to control for
GDP and state budgets. By holding critical variables constant in future
analyses, it will reduce co-linearity and the impact of other spurious
variables. Such an approach would decrease error and aid statistical
conclusion validity.
Second, differences in award amounts may also be a function of the
unique characteristics of Low Income respondents in ICSID Convention
cases. For two ICSID Convention awards that created the latent simple
effect, the Low Income respondents, Burundi and Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of the Congo), were neighboring African states
subjected to civil war and unrest at a time that was proximate to the
beginning of the dispute.3 02 AMT v. Zaire involved a claim filed in 1993
related to destruction caused by armed government forces in 1991 and

additional awards in those analyses. The United States likewise has a high GDP, US$14.119
trillion. World Bank, GDP 2009, supra note 297. Aside from its US$3.397 trillion budget, the
United States also has an entirely separate legal department at the U.S. Department of State with a
highly qualified defense team. CIA, World Factbook, supra note 298; International Claims and
Investment Disputes (L/CID), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://tinyurl.com/45u4pnp (last visited Mar.

24, 2011).
300. Genin v. Republic of Estonia (U.S. v. Est.), ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25,
2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002).
301. Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 21,
1997), 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1539-40; see also Goetz v. Republic of Burundi (Belg. v. Burundi),
ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award (Feb. 10, 1999), 6 ICSID Rep. 5 (2004) (indicating that while
officials from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
signed the settlement agreement, the lawyers for the respondent in Goetz v. Burundi are
unknown).

302. Moreover, as these are some of the older awards within the sample, it may be useful in
the future to control for the effect of time and the historical evolution of ITA. Theoretically, one
might posit that initial cases, particularly in what was a relatively untested dispute resolution
method, would exhibit more extreme characteristics, as parties and arbitrators may be unsure as to
how to plead, proceed, and resolve claims.
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1993.303 Goetz v. Burundi involved a claim filed in 1995 related to the
revocation of the tax and customs concessions 304 granted in 1993, near
the time of the first democratic elections after a period of civil war but
before a 1996 coup d'dtat.305 It is possible that the results are not due to
ICSID's treatment or the choice to use the ICSID Convention
enforcement regime; rather, it may be a function of the historical,
political, and government structures leading to the underlying dispute.
The two cases at the root of the significant effects both involve a
turbulent period in African history, recent civil war, relative state
instability, and a gap in regulatory infrastructure that might otherwise
manage and prevent disputes from arising. These qualitative similarities
suggest that, in the future, it would be appropriate to control for the
potential influence of a recent civil war, the length of time that
governments have been established, and the scope of regulatory
infrastructure. It may also be appropriate to code and control for the
type of state activity, namely the forcible use of military intervention.306
Third, differences in amounts awarded for Low Income countries,
whereby ICSID Convention awards are higher than New York
Convention awards, may be a function of the terms of the underlying
treaties. In both AMT and Goetz, for example, the relevant bilateral
investment treaties only permitted investment treaty arbitration to occur
at ICSID, pursuant to either the ICSID Convention or Additional
Facility Rules. 307 There was no opportunity to bring a claim at another
institution or in an ad hoc proceeding pursuant to the UNCITRAL
Rules.30 s By the same token, if either the investor or the respondent is
303. See Am. Mfg. & Trading, 5 ICSID Rep. 14; see also Bob W. White, The Political
Undead: Is it Possible to Mourn for Mobutu's Zaire, 48 AFR. STUD. REV. 65, 68 (2005)

(discussing Zaire's "announced plans for democratic reform in 1991 and the resulting urban
unrest that took the form of widespread pillaging in 1991 and 1993").
304. See Goetz, 6 ICSID Rep. 5; Eloise Obadia, IntroductoryNote: Antoine Goetz and others
v. Burundi, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 454,456 (2000).
305. See Ldonce Ndikumana, Towards a Solution to Violence in Burundi:A Casefor Political
and Economic Liberalisation,38 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 431, 432-35 (2008) (discussing economic

liberalization in Burundi in light of civil war and the disintegration of the state).
306. See Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Gov't of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D.
Case No. ARB/01/1, Award (Mar. 21, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 540, 540-41 (Even here, a case decided
under ICSID-AF rules, investors filed suit in 2000 as a result of Myanmar's armed seizure of a
brewery from 1997 to 1998).
307. See Convention Entre L'Union Economique Belgo-Luxembourgeoise et La Republique
du Burundi concernant L'Encouragement et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements
[Agreement Between the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union, on the one Hand, and the Republic
of Burundi, on the Other Hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments],
Burundi-Bel., Apr. 13, 1989, art. 8, available at http://tinyurl.com/4sb38m8; see also Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Zaire concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Zaire, Aug. 3, 1984, art. VII,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-17 (1986).
308. Even had that option for a non-ICSID forum been available, it is possible that a case
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not an ICSID Convention signatory, ICSID Convention arbitration may
not have been an available forum. Future research might therefore
usefully control for (1) whether the respondent is an ICSID Convention
signatory; (2) whether the investor is an arguable national of an ICSID
Convention signatory; and (3) the availability of a forum other than
ICSID, such as the SCC or ad hoc venues.
D.

Normative Recommendations

Analyses suggested that, on the whole, ICSID did not exhibit bias in
that, for critical elements of arbitration (namely initial amounts claimed
and ultimate outcome), ICSID did not differ materially from other
arbitration options. The general lack of a reliable relationship with
ICSID and variables of interest suggests that ICSID can be neither the
statistical cause of amounts claimed nor the cause of ultimate outcome.
Without a reliable relationship at the outset, it would be imprudent to
develop a predictive model that uses ICSID as a causal variable for
claims and outcomes; ICSID Status may, however, be a useful control
variable for future research.
One arguable conclusion to draw from the initial evidence from the
pre-2007 population - particularly given that ICSID appeared neither
better nor worse than other arbitration venues when controlling for key
variables - is that the status quo is acceptable and nothing more need
be done than distribute the research and correct misperceptions.309 This
approach, however, prevents ICSID from taking a proactive role as a
major international organization responsible for dispensing justice, as a
matter of both form and substance, during a time of international
economic transitions. Given the main effect for amounts claimed against
LA respondents in non-ICSID cases that are arguably misattributed to
ICSID and the latent simple effects that point to issues relating to Low
Income respondents, ICSID and other stakeholders should consider
proactive normative measure to prevent problems from arising. Such
potential reforms could include (1) implementing a pleading system
requiring plaintiffs to particularize damages, (2) encouraging technical
assistance, capacity building, and legal advisory capacity for states selection bias may exist where investors may voluntarily elect ICSID arbitration. For example,
given the political sensitivities of certain disputes or when dealing with states in crisis, it may be
prudent to rely upon ICSID's institutional integrity and place trust in the reputation of a branch of
the World Bank.
309. Another conclusion is that more research is necessary. Although the results provided in
this article apply to a pre-2007 population from which statistical inference is unnecessary,
inferences about the current and future population must be drawn cautiously. This is precisely
why this research has identified effect sizes and error rates, conducted different power analyses,
and called for replication of the research throughout this Article.
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particularly Low Income states, states emerging from civil unrest, or
states experiencing other fundamental changes to their forms of
government, and (3) exploring the value of ADR both to prevent
disputes and to target appropriate disputes for adjudication, whether at
ICSID or elsewhere. Such options hold the promise of addressing
perceived issues, fostering norms of substantive fairness, and promoting
procedural justice.
First, outside of ICSID, there were certain significant differences
related to amounts claimed. Neither ICSID nor other institutions
currently have rules constraining amounts claimed, guidelines for
particularizing claims, or requirements for good-faith pleading. There is
no equivalent of the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11310 in
international arbitration that sanctions improper conduct during the
course of adjudication, and parties are free to claim any amount,
irrespective of the merits of the claim. On that basis, it may be prudent
for stakeholders, particularly those with requisite drafting power, to
implement pleading requirements that promote claim amounts that are
predictable and verifiable, and that prevent exorbitant claims. States
may use a "legislative approach" to negotiate or revise IIAs in order to
offer guidance to investors about the acceptable methodologies and
legal doctrines that form the basis for calculating damages. Similarly,
ICSID might use its authority to promulgate institutional rules that
create structural safeguards, enhance its institutional integrity, and
promote the interests of stakeholders. Such improvements might include
(1) substantiating claimed damages with evidence or requiring pleading
of damages with specificity, (2) permitting assessment of damages at a
preliminary phase, or (3) establishing a good-faith pleading rule in
ICSID arbitration and granting a tribunal's authority to sanction parties
or their counsel for making frivolous claims, perhaps via cost awards.
Such an approach can enhance certainty for investors about the scope of
their legally permissible damages. Likewise, it can inform states more
accurately about the scope of risk, control investor discretion, and create
incentives for constructive behavior for all participants involved in the
arbitration process. Informal market mechanisms related to reputation
may already create these incentives. Nevertheless, it is likewise prudent
to create incentives for those who are not repeat players and do not have
the same reputational incentives for good behavior.3 1 1 Moreover, it
310. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful
Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1023 (1989).

311. See Franck,supra note 14 (advocating for changes to IIAs and institutional rules in order
to create incentives for pleading actual, specified damages rather than creating incentives for
unintentional claim inflation).
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encourages institutional integrity to create rules that promote norms of
clarity, that manage party expectations related to arbitration risk, and
that offer dispute resolution procedures reflecting standards of
professionalism, integrity, and fairness.
Second, recognizing that the results may be confined to the pre-2007
population and that there were no statistically significant effects at the
macro level, the simple effects related to Low Income states in ICSID
Convention cases and disparate amounts awarded offer initial evidence
in support of initiating reforms in support of Low Income states with
limited legal resources and regulatory infrastructure. The
implementation of structural safeguards - in the form of programs that
offer technical assistance, training and education, general capacity
building related to dispute prevention and management, and the possible
creation of a legal advisory center - could minimize concerns of actual
bias, promote enhanced institutional integrity, and improve perceptions
about procedural justice. If the effects are attributable to civil war, the
disruption of regulatory infrastructure, or the challenges of establishing
a new form of government, redressing these gaps is fundamental. If
international organizations (such as ICSID or UNCTAD) or others
provided technical assistance, training, and capacity building targeted
for Low Income respondents - particularly those in Africa or those
transitioning to new forms of government - the underlying concern
might be addressed.
Similarly, if the effects are by-products of legal representation, it
suggests that there is real value in creating - whether at ICSID or
elsewhere - a legal advisory center. Commentators have raised issues
regarding the "capacity of the poorest developing countries to defend"
themselves in ITA,312 and the effects specifically address that claim and
provide some evidence that the Low Income respondents (as compared
with High Income respondents) experienced the largest awards rendered
against them. By "leveling the playing field" through a legal assistance
facility, the lack of domestic lawyers in Low Income states with proper
capacity to resolve disputes could be addressed; similarly, the economic
power of High Income respondents to hire and retain high quality legal
teams could be equalized. Beginning to create structural safeguards to
redress this possible issue has merit. Such a structural reform fosters
norms of procedural fairness and substantive justice. Moreover, it
312. LUKE ERIC PETERSON, UK BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON INVESTMENT
REGULATION AT A TIME WHEN MULTILATERAL TALKS ARE FALTERING 10 (2004), available at

http://tinyurl.com/4flds29; see also Eric R. Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a
Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations Facing Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 237 (2007).
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mimics the Legal Advisory Center at the World Trade Organization,
which provides a structural safeguard to enhance the quality of dispute
resolution, to promote equal opportunity for defense of state interests,
and to redress arguable power and capacity imbalances in the resolution
of international trade disputes. 313
Third, there is also value in building infrastructure that encourages
the creation of ADR modalities for states. ICSID has methods of dispute
resolution other than arbitration.314 These have, unfortunately, either
never been used or used so sporadically that they are of little value.3 15
ICSID might therefore consider ways to reinvigorate these alternative
processes. More broadly, ICSID might undertake initiatives to develop
programs related to early neutral evaluation or mediation. To facilitate
this endeavor, ICSID or other professional bodies could offer mediation
guidelines or mediation-related protocols to increase ease of access to
the processes. Similarly, it would be prudent to create technical
assistance (particularly for states) to offer them access to mediation
training and conflict management courses.
There are various reasons to consider ADR programs, including cost
and time savings for parties, the preservation of investment
relationships, access to justice for small investors, and the creation of
enhanced policy space for states seeking to regain control of the
outcome of investment conflict. Beyond this, it may be possible that the
simple effects arguably impacting Low Income respondents were linked
to a state's ability to prevent, manage, and strategically settle investment
treaty disputes efficiently. In such a case, implementing ADR programs
might offer a critical structural safeguard to ensure the integrity of ITA
and the effective and proper use of arbitration.
There is value in assisting states - particularly Low Income
respondents identified in the analyses - to implement rule of law
regimes or otherwise foster internal infrastructure to minimize and to
prevent investment treaty conflict. Developing countries, such as Peru,
have created ADR procedures designed to promote information
exchange, to educate domestic officials on the scope of risk, and to
prevent investment treaty conflict.316 Meanwhile, other countries such
313. See Gottwald, supra note 312, at 264-73. See generally Kim van der Borght, The
Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and Equality, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 723 (1999).

314. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 47.
315. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; see also UNCTAD, ADR 1,supra note
76, at 62-63 (discussing the limited use of non-arbitral processes at ICSID).
316. Peruvian Law No. 28933, Ley que Establece el Sistema de Coordinaci6n y Respuesta del
Estado en Controversias Internacionales de Inversi6n [Law Establishing the System of
Coordination and Response of the State in International Investment Disputes], El Peruano,
Normas Legales 334635 (Dec. 16, 2006), available at http://tinyurl.com/4k3e8t6; see also
UNCTAD, ADR I, supra note 76, at 68-72 (discussing the Peruvian law); UNCTAD, ADR H,
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as the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Thailand are seeking to
explore opportunities for "investment after care."m One objective
would be to train domestic regulators about the scope of potential
liability. By sensitizing officials to possible unintended consequences
and offering them communication networks, the objective would be to
prevent the initiation of high value disputes at ICSID or other venues.
Another objective would be to create governmental regulatory
infrastructure, implement strategic negotiation and mediation
opportunities, and offer training for states to understand where, when,
and how to manage investment conflict. Such ADR strategies may
promote settlements on appropriate terms that prevent tribunals from
rendering large awards against developing countries. The value inherent
in these possibilities perhaps explains why there has been demonstrated
interest in ADR by UNCTAD, ICSID, parties, academics, and other
stakeholders. Such ADR regimes can enhance the integrity of ITA
generally by creating opportunities to manage conflict that preserve
policy space, promote access to justice, and foster outcomes that are
both procedurally fair and substantively appropriate.
There is, however, one structural safeguard that may be unnecessary.
The lack of statistically significant differences in amounts awarded
against LA respondents, whether at ICSID or otherwise, suggests that
the data and models in this research did not necessarily provide
evidence that justifies the normative solution of creating a regional
arbitration center for Latin America. However, to the extent that
regionalism might play into concerns about the integrity of ITA or
ICSID, an approach to regionalism that does seem supported by the data
might involve creating arbitration capacity in Africa, particularly central
African states or other African states transitioning to new governments.
To address African states' concerns about ICSID's integrity, ICSID or
other international organizations might rightly support capacity-building
efforts in Africa related to the proper negotiation of IIA terms, the
training of government officials about how to implement their IIA
obligations, technical assistance to create infrastructure and conflict
management teams to prevent disputes from occurring in the first
instance, and offers of advice and other training for internal government
lawyers to prepare them for arbitration. Such a suggestion naturally
builds upon the existing targeted areas of reform and fosters norms of
efficiency, fairness, and justice.
supra note 73, at 68-70 (same).
317. Susan Franck & Jason Ratigan, Post-Symposium Rapporteur Report: The Way Forward,
JOINT SYMPOSIUM

ON

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

LAW AND

ALTERNATIVE

DISPUTE

RESOLUTION, 6, http://tinyurl.com/4aan7q4 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011); see also UNCTAD,
ADR II,supra note 73 at 2, 81-85, 87-91.
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CONCLUSION

Overall, the current data and models have demonstrated that there
was no evidence of a reliable relationship between ICSID and concerns
about Energy disputes, Latin American respondents, or respondent's
Developmental Status. As there was no reliable relationship, it would be
inappropriate to suggest that ICSID somehow caused either the amounts
claimed or ultimate outcomes of investment treaty disputes. The lack of
divergence in ICSID cases, both in terms of amount claimed and
ultimate outcome, also undercuts the suggestion that ICSID was
substantially different (and presumably worse) than other venues of
treaty arbitration. Recognizing that this research has focused on pre2007 arbitration awards rather than the life cycle of all ICSID disputes,
this evidence nevertheless provides a basis for cautious optimism for the
investment arbitration system and provides initial evidence that suggests
that wholesale abandonment or radical rejection of ICSID arbitration
may not be warranted.
Critically, however, there were areas of potential concern, and those
analyses can and should be replicated through future research with a
larger sample of the growing population, greater statistical control and
decreased risk of statistical error. In the meantime, for those areas of
potential concern, it would be prudent to consider implementing a series
of reform measures that could begin to redress these issues, to enhance
institutional integrity and to promote procedural justice. The creation
and maintenance of consistent, fair, and just dispute resolution in
international economic law is a laudable goal worthy of thoughtful
evolution.
We are in a time of global economic transitions, where the integrity
of international institutions -

particularly the World Bank -

is of vital

importance. Now is the time for institutions such as ICSID to minimize
concerns about legitimacy and maximize opportunities for equality.
ICSID can and should be a model of fairness, efficiency, and justice in
the field of international economic dispute resolution. Taking steps
today will ensure that, rather than potential perils being realized,
ICSID's promise is achieved. Ultimately, there is value in implementing
structural safeguards to create targeted strategic reforms at ICSID in an
effort to minimize potential areas of concern, to improve the
management of international economic conflict, and to minimize the
backlash to the international investment system.

